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ABSTRACT 
Banking has a unique role in the well-being of an economy. This role makes banks 
one of the most heavily regulated and supervised industries. In order to strengthen 
the soundness and stability of banking systems, regulators require banks to hold 
adequate capital. While credit risk was the only risk that was covered by the original 
Basle Accord, with the 1996 amendment, banks have also been required to assign 
capital for their market risk starting from 1998. 
In this research, the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital 
levels and derivative activities is investigated. In addition, this study also evaluates 
the impact of using different approaches that are allowed to be used while calculating 
the required market risk capital, as well as the accuracy of VaR models. 
The implementation of the market risk capital regulations can influence banks either 
by increasing their capital or by decreasing their trading activities and in particular 
trading derivative activities. The literature review concerning capital regulations 
illustrates that in particular the impact of these regulations on bank capital levels and 
derivative activities is an issue that has not yet been explored. In order to fill this gap, 
the changes in capital and derivatives usage ratios are modelled by using a partial 
adjustment framework. The main results of this analysis suggest that the 
implementation of the market risk capital regulations has a significant and positive 
impact on the risk-based capital ratios of BHCs. However, the results do not indicate 
any impact of these regulations on derivative activities. The empirical findings also 
demonstrate that there is no significant relationship between capital and derivatives. 
The market risk capital regulations allow the use of either a standardised approach or 
the VaR methodologies to determine the required capital amounts to cover market 
risk. In order to evaluate these approaches, firstly differences on bank VaR practices 
are investigated by employing a documentary analysis. The documentary analysis is 
conducted to demonstrate the differences in bank VaR practices by comparing the 
VaR models of 25 international banks. The survey results demonstrate that there, is 
no industry consensus on the methodology for calculating VaR. This analysis also 
indicates that the assumptions in estimating VaR models vary considerably among 
financial institutions. Therefore, it is very difficult for financial market participants to 
make comparisons across institutions by considering single VaR values. 
Secondly, the required capital amounts are calculated for two hypothetical foreign 
exchange portfolios by using both the standardised and three different VaR 
methodologies, and then these capital amounts are compared. These simulations are 
conducted to understand to what extent the market risk capital regulations 
approaches produce different outcomes on the capital levels. The results indicate that 
the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR methodology. 
Thirdly, three backtesting methodologies are applied to the VaR models. The results 
indicate that a VaR model that provides accurate estimates for a specific portfolio 
could fail when the portfolio composition changes. 
The results of the simulations indicate that the market risk capital regulations do not 
provide a `level playing field' for banks that are subject to these regulations. In 
addition, giving an option to banks to determine the VaR methodology could create a 
moral hazard problem as banks may choose an inaccurate model that provides less 
required capital amounts. 
Keywords: Banking, Capital, Risk-Based Capital Regulations, Derivatives, Market 
Risk, Value at Risk, Backtesting 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Banks have a unique role in the well-being of an economy by providing a link 
between lenders and borrowers, influencing the functioning of securities markets, 
affecting the quantity of money, and influencing levels of investment and economic 
growth. These roles make banking one of the most heavily regulated and supervised 
industries around the globe. The main underlying rationale of bank regulations is to 
counter the potential effects of bank failures on the economy and to avoid systemic 
risk by creating a sound and stable financial system. 
Capital adequacy regulations are one of the most important components of bank 
regulations and are relied upon by policy-makers to ensure the stability of the 
banking system. While the original Basle Accord only covers the credit risk of banks, 
a need emerged to cover market risk of banks during the 1990s. Accordingly, the 
Basle Committee published the `Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate 
Market Risks' in 1996. In addition to the assignment of capital for credit risks, banks 
- with the implementation of the market risk capital regulations - have also been 
required to assign capital for their market risks since 1998. 
From the beginning of the '1990s, the increased prominence of trading activities, in 
particular derivative activities, together with publicly disclosed trading activity 
losses, have drawn the attention of bank regulators to market risk. Accordingly, 
regulators integrated market risk into the risk-based capital regulations framework. 
There are a few more factors that also urged bank regulators to implement the market 
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risk capital regulations. First of all, as a result of the increased trading activities, 
large banking institutions developed internal control systems to measure and manage 
their market risk exposures. Concurrently, criticisms on the 1988 Basle Accord for 
only considering credit risk and not covering other risks faced by banks have 
increased. As a result, the Basle Committee expanded the framework of the risk- 
based capital regulations by implementing the market risk capital regulations. 
Furthermore, following the developments in the risk measurement techniques of 
banks, these regulations allow banks to use the internal `Value at Risk' (VaR) 
models to calculate the required capital against market risk. 
The 1996 Basle Committee amendment is a revolution in financial regulation as it 
allows financial institutions to use their own VaR models to determine the required 
capital to cover market risk. While the original accord had imposed capital 
requirements to cover credit risk based on a uniform approach, the amendment 
requires additional minimum capital to cover market risk based on either a 
standardised approach or an internal VaR models approach. However, the use of the 
internal models approach is subject to approval of regulators. 
On the other hand, even though the implementation of capital adequacy regulations 
has led to a considerable discussion, the effects of these regulations are still unclear 
(Dowd, 1998). The market risk capital regulations have been effective since the 
beginning of 1998 and the capital regulation theory supports the view that 
implementing capital regulations may have significant effects on different aspects of 
banking behaviour. Therefore, it is very important to understand the impact of these 
regulations on bank activities. Even though the impact of capital adequacy 
regulations has been analysed extensively in the literature, apart from the study of 
Danielsson et al. (2004), there is not much empirical evidence concerning the impact 
of the market risk capital regulations. In addition, although Hendricks and Hirtle 
(1997) raised the question of whether the market risk capital regulations have any 
impact on bank capital levels, they did not carry out an empirical investigation. 
The main objective of this thesis is to empirically analyse the impact of the market 
risk capital regulations on bank capital levels and derivative activities. In addition, 
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this thesis also analyses the impact of using different approaches while calculating 
the required market risk capital, as well as the accuracy of VaR models that are 
allowed to be used within the framework of the market risk capital regulations. The 
contribution of the study and the research questions are presented in the following 
section. 
1.2 Contribution of the Study and Research Questions 
The essential contribution of this thesis lies in two areas. Firstly, this study 
investigates the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank activities. The 
implementation of these regulations can influence banks either by increasing their 
capital or by decreasing their trading activities and in particular trading derivatives. 
Therefore, this analysis investigates the impact of the market risk capital regulations 
on bank capital levels and derivative activities. 
The impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital levels and 
derivative activities is an issue that has not yet been investigated in the literature. On 
the other hand, the economic theory is unclear concerning the impact of the 
implementation of capital regulations on bank capital levels. Therefore, it is 
important to provide further empirical evidence on this issue. 
Furthermore,. the theory suggests that off-balance sheet (OBS) and derivative 
activities of banks increase due to the lack of capital regulations. Although previous 
studies investigated the growth of OBS activities and the impact of capital 
regulations on this growth, these studies generally concentrated on other activities 
rather than derivatives. In addition, although there are studies in the literature that 
investigated the characteristics of banks that are involved in derivative activities, 
there is not sufficient evidence concerning the relationship between bank capital 
regulations and derivative activities. Therefore, it is also important to investigate the 
relationship between the implementation of capital regulations and derivative 
activities. 
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In order to fill the gap in the literature concerning the impact of the market risk 
capital regulations on bank capital levels and derivative activities, this thesis carries 
out an econometric analysis by using a partial adjustment framework. More 
specifically, the research addresses the following questions: 
1) What is the impact of the implementation of the market risk capital 
regulations on banks' capital levels? 
2) What is the impact of the implementation of the market risk capital 
regulations on banks' derivative activities? 
3) Do large banks have lower capital ratios? 
4) Do large banks use more derivative instruments? 
5) Is there a relationship between bank capital levels and bank risk-taking? 
6) Is there a relationship between bank capital levels and bank derivative 
activities? 
7) Is there a relationship between bank derivative activities and bank risk- 
taking? 
In order to answer these questions, an econometric analysis is carried out and the 
changes in capital and derivative activities are modelled by using a partial adjustment 
framework. Then, the impact of the market risk capital regulations is tested by a 
panel data analysis employing quarterly US Bank Holding Company data from the 
fourth quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 1999. 
The second contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the impact of using different 
approaches that are allowed to be used while calculating the required market risk 
capital and to evaluate the accuracy of VaR models. 
Although bank regulators integrated the VaR models in the framework of capital 
adequacy regulations, these models have limitations and pitfalls. In addition, there is 
still no industry consensus on a methodology for calculating VaR. The aim of 
establishing a set of minimum capital levels is not only necessary to strengthen the 
safety and soundness of the banking system but also necessary to ensure a `level 
playing field' for financial institutions in order to eliminate competitive inequalities. 
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On the other hand, the reliance on the financial institutions' self reported approaches 
to determine capital requirements could create a moral hazard problem as the 
institutions may have an incentive to choose inaccurate models that report less 
capital requirements. Therefore, it is very important to examine whether using 
different approaches and models that are allowed to be used by the market risk 
capital regulations have any potential to create a moral hazard problem. 
In order to find an answer to this question, simulations are conducted to calculate the 
required capital amounts by using several approaches, and the different VaR models 
are evaluated by applying backtesting methodologies. The focus of this study is to 
demonstrate the outcomes of using different approaches. In particular, the research 
addresses the following questions 
1) What kind of VaR models and parameters do banks use in their market 
risk measurement framework? 
2) To what extent do the approaches of the market risk capital regulations 
produce different required capital amounts? 
3) Do the market risk capital regulations provide a `level playing field'? 
4) Do the internal VaR models provide accurate VaR estimates that reflect 
the market risk exposure of a bank? 
5) Do the market risk capital regulations create a moral hazard problem? 
In order to answer these questions, at first, differences on bank VaR practices are 
investigated by employing a documentary analysis. The documentary analysis is 
conducted to demonstrate the differences in bank VaR practices by comparing the 
VaR models of 25 international banks. Second, the required capital amounts are 
calculated for two hypothetical foreign exchange portfolios by using both the 
standardised and three different VaR methodologies. These simulations are carried 
out to make comparisons of required capital amounts. Finally, a number of 
backtesting methodologies are applied to the VaR models to evaluate the accuracy of 
these models. This analysis demonstrates a picture of the performances of the VaR 
models for a relatively long time period and for two foreign exchange portfolios. 
This analysis also demonstrates to what extent the accuracy of VaR models is 
affected by the portfolio compositions. 
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The framework of this research is shown in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1: The Research Process Diagram 
Research Questions 
Theoretical Discussions 
Market Risk Capital Regulations 
Panel Data Comparison and 
Analysis Evaluation of 
VaR Models 
Presentation and Discussion of Results 
CONCLUSIONS 
1ý 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Consequently, by analysing the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank 
capital levels and derivatives activities and evaluating different approaches that are 
allowed to be used by these regulations, this research presents new evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of bank capital adequacy regulations. The main results 
of this research indicate that the implementation of these regulations has a significant 
and positive impact on bank capital levels. As these regulations require banks to 
increase their capital levels, they are effective from a regulatory perspective. 
6 
Considering derivative activities, no significant relationship was found between 
capital regulations and derivative usage. Therefore, the results do not support the 
argument that banks' derivative activities increase due to the lack of capital 
regulations. 
Furthermore, the results of the documentary analysis demonstrate that there is no 
industry consensus on the methodology for calculating VaR and the assumptions in 
calculating VaR estimating vary considerably among financial institutions. The 
results of the analysis that is conducted to compare different approaches and to 
evaluate the accuracy of VaR models indicate that, the market risk capital regulations 
do not provide a `level playing field'. In addition, the characteristics and risk nature 
of the portfolios could mislead bank regulators while allowing banks to use a VaR 
model. Furthermore, giving an option to banks to determine the VaR methodology 
could create a moral hazard problem as banks may choose an inaccurate model that 
provides less required capital amounts. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter introduced the research objectives, contribution of the research and the 
research questions. Additionally, an outline of the following chapters' is presented 
below. 
Chapter 2 presents the rational for capital adequacy regulations and in particular the 
market risk capital regulations. Providing these concepts is crucial as they contribute 
to the theoretical framework of the study. The intermediary role of banks in 
economies and developments in banking activities, particularly the use of derivative 
activities, are discussed in this chapter. Next, the rationale for bank regulations is 
provided and the `free banking theory' is discussed. The role of capital in a bank and 
capital adequacy regulations are also introduced in this chapter: Finally, the market 
risk capital regulations are introduced. 
Chapter 3 presents the literature review concerning the impact of capital adequacy 
regulations. After discussing the interaction between deposit insurance and capital 
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regulations, the literature related to the impact of capital adequacy regulations on 
bank capital is reviewed. Then, the literature concerning the impact of capital 
adequacy regulations on bank risk-taking is reviewed. This is followed by reviewing 
the literature concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank off- 
balance sheet (OBS) activities, as well as reviewing the studies that examined the 
characteristics of banks that are involved in derivative activities. The literature 
review that is provided in this chapter is crucial as it provides the theoretical 
background of the empirical analysis that is provided in the fourth chapter. 
Chapter 4 empirically investigates the impact of the market risk capital regulations 
on bank capital levels and derivative activities. In this study, the changes in capital 
and derivative usage ratios are modelled by using a partial adjustment framework. 
The study focuses on the large US BHCs as they are more involved in trading 
activities and therefore subject to the market risk capital regulations. Using quarterly 
data for the period 1995Q4 to 1999Q4, the estimates are obtained by the panel data 
analysis. 
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of VaR. The chapter is organised in a way that 
shows how VaR was developed, uses, and limitations of VaR, and methodologies of 
VaR. The understanding of the VaR concept and in particular the understanding of 
different VaR methodologies is essential, as these methodologies are applied to the 
hypothetical foreign exchange portfolios to evaluate the market risk capital 
regulations in the eighth chapter. This chapter also introduces the literature review 
concerning the outcomes of choosing different VaR methodologies. 
Chapter 6 reviews the backtesting methodologies that evaluate the accuracy of VaR 
measures. There are a variety of tests that are used to backtest VaR models and they 
focus on a particular transformation of the reported VaR and the realised profit and 
loss. In particular, the regulatory backtesting required by the Basle Committee 
amendment, the statistical tests and the ranking tests are explained in this chapter. 
The understanding of backtests is crucial, as these tests are applied to evaluate 
different VaR models in the eighth chapter. 
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Chapter 7 presents the disclosure practices of banks' VaR models. After introducing 
the regulatory efforts to increase disclosure concerning qualitative and quantitative 
market risk information, the annual reports of a bank are evaluated to demonstrate 
how the market risk disclosures have evolved. This is followed by conducting a 
documentary analysis to demonstrate the differences on bank VaR practices by 
comparing the VaR methodologies of 25 international banks. 
Chapter 8 provides the empirical results of the simulation and backtesting analyses. 
In the simulation analysis, the required capital amounts are calculated for two 
hypothetical foreign exchange portfolios by using both the standardised and three 
different VaR methodologies and then these capital amounts are compared. These 
simulations are conducted to understand to what extent the approaches of the market 
risk capital regulations produce different outcomes on the capital levels. In addition, 
the models that provided the VaR estimates are validated by backtesting. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises all the key findings of the research. The policy 
implications of the research are also presented in this chapter. In addition, 
suggestions for future research are provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RATIONALE FOR 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATIONS AND 
THE MARKET RISK CAPITAL REGULATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
Banks have a unique role in economies. Therefore, it is crucial to have a sound and 
stable banking system. In order to ensure the soundness and stability of a banking 
system, policy-makers implement regulations. The main underlying rationale of these 
regulations is to counter the potential effects of bank failures on the economy and to 
avoid systemic risk. 
Capital adequacy regulations are one of the most important components of banking 
regulations that policy-makers rely on to ensure the stability of a banking system. 
Even though bank regulators implement capital adequacy regulations, the impact of 
these regulations is not clear. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the effects of these 
regulations. As the main objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the 
market risk capital regulations, this chapter introduces the rationale for bank capital 
regulations and in particular the market risk capital regulations. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The second section presents the role 
of banks in economies. In particular, this section discusses the intermediary role of 
banks and the use of `derivatives'. The third section provides the rationale for bank 
regulations. The `free banking theory' is also introduced in this section. The fourth 
section discusses the role of capital in the banking system and capital adequacy 
regulations. The fifth section examines the framework of market risk capital 
regulations. Finally, a chapter summary is provided. 
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2.2 The Role of Banks 
Banks are traditionally defined as financial firms that accept deposits and lend 
money. They play a major role between borrowers and lenders, which ensures that 
the financial system and the economy run smoothly and efficiently. 
In traditional banking, banks serve two principal intermediary functions. Firstly, 
banks use the funds of those who have financial surpluses and lend these funds to 
those who need funds for their activities. Therefore, the liability side of a bank 
balance sheet mainly consists of deposits and the asset side mainly consists of 
commercial loans and investments. Secondly, banks provide payment systems to 
liability holders and a positive return for their savings. 
There are two factors that enable banks to perform these intermediary roles. These 
are `information costs' and `liquidity preferences. ' As a consequence of `information 
costs', it will be more costly for lenders to offer their funds to borrowers without the 
intermediary function of banks. Fama (1985) states that "a bank has a low-cost 
ongoing history of financial information that gives it a comparative cost advantage 
in making and monitoring repeated short-term inside loans. " Heffernan (1996) 
points out four factors that cause `information costs'. These factors are: searching, 
verification, monitoring, and enforcement. In general, lenders lack the ability and 
skills needed when it comes to `information costs'. Therefore, banks are needed to 
search and verify information about potential borrowers. In addition, banks monitor 
the management of borrowing firms by enforcing loan agreements (Gorton and 
Rosen, 1995). Without the intermediation of a bank, many lenders would only be 
able to fund a few projects. Thus, they would not be able to diversify their risks and 
would be forced to lend large amounts'of funds to a very few projects (Bhattacharya 
et al., 1998). Correspondingly, Koppenhaver (1989) argues that in a world of 
transaction costs, financial intermediaries achieve economies of scale through 
specialisation in documentation, information collection, and monitoring. 
Koppenhaver also argues that informational asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders provide an opportunity for financial intermediaries to access the quality of 
specific information on the borrower better than the lender, thus allowing the 
11 
financing of a particular project to be at a lower cost for individual borrowers. 
Accordingly, intermediaries are useful for resolving ex post informational 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, as intermediary diversification lowers 
the cost of information production because of the economies of scale (Diamond, 
1984). 
`Liquidity preference' is the second factor that enables banks to perform their 
intermediary role. Without the intermediary function of banks, it will be very costly 
for lenders and borrowers to find suitable counterparties with the same liquidity 
preferences. By pooling a large number of borrowers and lenders, banks match 
parties with the same liquidity preferences. In addition, banks could provide liquidity 
to lenders on their demand, as they could transform illiquid assets into liquid funds 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)1. In summary, borrowing and lending have been an 
important part of the traditional intermediation function of banks and historically 
banks have been very successful as an intermediary (Gjerde and Semmen, 1995). In 
traditional banking, banks identify potential borrowers, perform credit evaluations, 
fund loans with bank deposits, and service these loans. 
However since the 1970s, banking has changed substantially and traditional banking 
has declined. Traditionally, banks act as intermediaries by transferring funds from 
lenders to borrowers. Non-traditional activities range from custodial services and 
underwriting activities to off-balance sheet (OBS) activities. -Since the 1970s, an 
important shift has occurred in the traditional intermediary function of banks and 
banks have started to offer more non-traditional OBS activities to their customers. 
OBS items (acceptances, guarantees, other commitments, and derivative activities) 
are contingent commitments that are not captured on the balance sheet as assets or 
liabilities. These contingent commitments are possible future commitments and they 
are not accounted for by an adjustment on the financial statements, but are added to 
the notes section of the balance sheet. 
1 If banks face any liquidity problems, they could also access the sources of central bank, which is the 
`lender of last resort' in an economy. 
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In particular, derivative activities have increased dramatically since the 1980s. And 
until the early 1970s, there was relatively little volatility in both exchange rates and 
interest rates in the financial markets. Matten (1996) argues that there was no need to 
worry regarding the efficient allocation of resources until the 1970s. That was an age 
of 3-6-3 banking (borrow at 3 percent, lend at 6 percent and be at a golf course by 3 
pm). However, starting from the early 1970s, banking has become more competitive. 
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement2 and with the major increase 
in the level of interest rates during the 1970s, foreign exchange and interest rates 
have become increasingly volatile. The volatile rates and prices have had a damaging 
impact not only on borrowers but also on lenders as well (Howcroft, 1985). 
Increased volatility in the financial markets, increased competition, global 
deregulation, advances in finance theory and technology, and regulatory changes 
have created a demand for instruments that could assist borrowers, lenders, banks 
and other institutions to reduce their financial risks. 
Accordingly, in order to actively manage the interest rate and exchange rate risks, 
financial institutions start to use derivative activities, which are formal agreements to 
transfer risk without transferring the underlying basic instrument. 
`Derivatives' is a general term that covers four major types of instruments, namely 
forwards, futures, options and swaps. These instruments are briefly explained in 
Appendix 2.1. These instruments are called `derivatives' as they are derived from a 
reference rate (such as interest rate, exchange rate or stock index) or from an 
underlying asset, which can be either a commodity, or a financial asset. 
Although risk-taking is in the nature of banking, the explosive growth of derivative 
activities in the last three decades has increased the concerns of policy-makers. In 
particular, bank regulators concerned about the rapid increase in derivative activities 
of banks after some financial institutions reported large trading losses that occurred 
from derivative activities during the 1990s. It is generally accepted that huge losses 
incurred from derivative activities could not only pose a risk to the stability of 
2 The Bretton Woods Agreement, which was established during the Second World War, had 
maintained monetary order by fixing currency exchange rates (providing exchange rate and 
consequently interest rate stability). 
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Graph 2.1 demonstrates the upward trend of the trading losses that have Occurred 
from derivative activities very clearly. While publicly disclosed derivative 
transaction losses were less than lIS! ) 5 billion at the end of' 1993, these losses 
increased to 1 BSI) O billion as of'I)cccmhcr 1998. 
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Although financial derivative instruments have been innovated to manage market 
risk. they can also he used for speculative purposes. Banks use 'derivatives' either to 
reduce the risks arising From their banking activities, i. e. hedging. or to obtain profits 
through higher exposure. i. e. speculating. Therefore, it is generally accepted that 
there are two main reasons to use derivative instruments, namely hedging and 
speculation. 
I ledging is a tool for transferring risk from those wishing to avoid it to those willing 
to assume it. This activity involves taking a position to cover or reduce risk on an 
open or anticipated position. By hedging a risk, losses from adverse movements are 
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compensated by offsetting gains from the hedge. However, hedging not only reduces 
the risk of loss from adverse price or rate fluctuations, but also limits the gain from 
favourable changes. In order to hedge a certain risk position, it is crucial to 
understand the nature and the extent of risks. 
Although derivative instruments offer certain advantages to hedge financial risks, 
they also provide speculative opportunities. Speculation involves taking an open risk 
position with a view of profiting from perceived future market movements or earning 
from bid/offer spreads. Speculators are necessary for the efficient working of any 
financial market because they provide the necessary liquidity that makes it possible 
for hedgers to cover their risk. 
Financial institutions participate in `derivatives' markets as either `end-users' or 
`dealers'. As `end-users', institutions can either use derivatives to hedge their own 
exposure or speculate on the movements of the underlying economic variables. On 
the other hand, `dealers', which are generally banks and securities firms, act as 
counterparties and provide over-the-counter (OTC) derivative instruments to other 
banks or clients. When a dealer takes a position, it immediately matches this position 
by entering into an opposite position. While almost every bank participates to a 
certain extent as `end-users', only a few of the largest institutions are dealers of OTC 
derivative instruments. 
Financial derivative instruments have been innovated to manage market risk arising 
from volatile interest rates and floating exchange rates. However, if market risk is not 
managed properly, as the `derivative disaster' cases of Metallgesellschaft, Barings, 
Orange County, Daiwa, and Procter and Gamble have demonstrated3, the institutions 
could either fail or realise enormous losses. These derivative disasters highlighted the 
need for a better understanding of risk management in financial institutions. After the 
collapse of Barings in 1995, Alan Greenspan (1997) explained his concern about risk 
management with these words: 
3 The general point of all these cases is that all of these companies suffered from derivative trading. 
For example, Barings Bank of the UK went bankrupt when a rogue trader, Nick Leeson, lost USD 1.3 
billion from derivative trading. Metalgesellschaft, a German firm, also lost USD 1.3 billion and Daiwa 
Bank lost USD 1.1 billion from derivative trading. 
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"The Barings episode suggests that further improvements to internal risk 
management systems are needed" 
Similar to other businesses, banks face risks in their activities. However, because of 
their crucial role in economies, it is more important for banks to manage their 
financial risks. The most important financial risks that banks face are; credit, market, 
liquidity, country, operational, legal and reputation risks. These risks and types of 
market risks are described in Appendix 2.2 and Appendix 2.3, respectively. 
For banks, the role of risk management is crucial as it ensures that the bank's 
activities do not expose it to losses that could result in a failure. However, risk 
management in banks is also important from a regulatory point of view, due to the 
crucial role of banks in economies. Therefore, banks are among the most highly 
regulated industries in an economy as it is generally accepted that the overall health 
of the financial system depends on the adoption of sound risk management practices 
at the individual bank level. 
Especially, in recent years bank regulators place significant emphasis on the 
adequacy of an institution's management of risk, including the establishment of a 
management structure that adequately identifies, measures, monitors and controls 
financial risks. In 1997, the Basle Committee issued `Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision', which is a comprehensive set of 25 core principles for 
effective banking supervision. Among these principles, 10 of them are related to risk 
management in banks. Furthermore, the market risk capital regulations require banks 
to establish both qualitative and quantitative risk management criteria. 
Traditionally, the main concern of bank regulators has been credit risk. The Basle 
Accord of 1988 was implemented as a principal measure to control bank credit risk- 
taking. However, in recent years market risk has gained importance with the increase 
in trading activities and derivative usage. Consequently, since 1998 banks have been 
required to hold capital against their market risks as well. As the aim of this thesis is 
to investigate the impact of the market risk capital regulations, it is important to 
understand the characteristics of these regulations. The next sections present the 
rationale for bank regulations and capital regulations. 
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23 The Rationale for Bank Regulations 
The previous section has provided the unique role of banks in economies. This role 
not only distinguishes banks from other companies, but also makes them one of the 
most regulated industries in almost any economy. According to the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the financial regulator of the UK, "Banks are different 
from other companies because of their responsibilities to depositors and potential 
depositors and because of the potential impact on the wider financial system if they 
run into difficulties. " (www. fsa. gov. uk) 
In general, it is believed that banks should be regulated as these regulations could 
prevent them from failures. Otherwise, the failures of banks could cause a large scale 
cost not only to the national economy but also to the global economy due to the 
contagion effect. Concerning-the cost of banking crises, Llewellyn (2000) states that 
in approximately 25 percent of the cases (Spain, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Mexico, 
Argentina and Hungary are the examples of countries that experienced high losses) 
the cost of bank failures exceeded 10 percent of gross national product (GNP). The 
cost of banking crises were more dramatic for Indonesia and Thailand as the costs 
exceeded 45 and 40 percent of these countries' gross domestic products (GDP), 
respectively4 (Evans, 2000). 
The strength of the banking system is vital as problems in the banking sector affect 
other sectors rapidly. For example, the failure of a bank could reduce the amount of 
loans available to an economy, initiate withdrawals of deposits, and increase the 
demand for safe heaven instruments. In addition, the payments system could collapse 
and this would lead to turmoil in the financial markets (Kaufmann, 1999). 
As bank failures not only affect the financial market members but also have 
consequences that affect the economy as a whole, regulators intervene in various 
ways in order to reduce the occurrence of financial crises and to lessen the damage 
° These figures include the compensation that was paid to depositors under 100 percent coverage and 
the public sector payments to finance the recapitalisation of insolvent banks. 
17 
that these crises could cause. As a result, the banking industry is one of the most 
tightly regulated industries and banks operate under unusual regulatory restrictions; 
including liquidity requirements, loan diversification standards, activity and 
ownership restrictions, deposit rate ceilings, limitations on a bank's investment 
portfolio or lines of business, restrictions on the type of information that banks may 
release to the public and other restrictions intended to limit the type of risks which a 
bank may undertake (Flannery, 2001). 
In addition to these regulations, regulators employ a large army of personnel engaged 
in supervision. These include resident examiners who are posted full-time in some of 
the larger banks and examiners who go on-site, usually once a year, to conduct bank 
examinations. Furthermore, in order to identify problem banks, bank regulators 
establish early warning systems and bank analysts perform off-site examinations on a 
regular basis. Pettway and Sinkey (1980) argue that the objective of an early warning 
system is to identify the risks of banks before those risks jeopardise the financial 
conditions of banks and notify bank management to take necessary measures to 
avoid bankruptcy. 
Banks play a crucial role in the payment system of an economy and as they mainly 
collect deposits, they are highly leveraged. A failure of a bank could be very harmful 
as it could cause deposit runs and collapse of payment systems, which could lead to 
systemic risk. That is the main reason why regulators put special emphasis on 
controlling bank risk-taking. Aziz (2004) summarises the importance of prudential 
bank regulations by stating that: 
"A well functioning and efficient banking sector is vital for the economic 
growth process. The banking institutions perform the important intermediation 
function of mobilizing funds to . 
finance productive activities. This 
intermediation process needs to be performed in an environment of financial 
stability. Therein lies the importance of confidence and soundness of the 
financial system. Banking business inherently involves risks and these risks 
need to be rigorously managed. In an environment of heightened uncertainty 
and increased volatility, this needs to be reinforced with the development of a 
more robust and resilient banking system. Hence the importance of prudential 
regulations to ensure the soundness and stability of the financial system. " 
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As a result, the central purpose of bank regulations is to reduce the probability of 
bank failures and consequently enhance a sound and stable financial system. 
However, while banks are subject to extensive regulations in nearly all facets of their 
operations, some argue that bank regulations are not necessary to the well-being of 
an economy. This argument is called the `free banking theory' and it involves a 
financial system with no regulator and no government intervention. In `free banking', 
financial institutions are allowed to operate freely and they are only subject to market 
forces and regular commercial law. The advocates of `free banking' point out that 
especially in the 19th century there were several countries with unregulated banking 
systems and the experiences of these countries demonstrate that unregulated 
competition among banks does not destabilise the banking system. 
According to the `free banking theory', markets generally work better than 
governments and financial markets should be left to regulate themselves, as market 
forces could provide a more stable financial system (Dowd, 2001). One of the most 
important arguments of the `free banking theory' is that, with no `lender of last 
resort' or deposit insurance, market forces could exert market discipline. According 
to the theory of market discipline, bank depositors could exert market discipline 
either by withdrawing their funds or by requesting higher risk premium from riskier 
banks. In order to continue to do business, bank managers take some necessary 
measures, such as increasing the institution's capital level, publishing audited 
accounts, and pursuing conservative lending policies (Dowd, 1996). 
In particular, bank capital level is crucial for a bank to maintain its activities as an 
adequately capitalised bank so that it could absorb unexpected losses. The advocates 
of `free banking' consider that instead of government regulations, the precise amount 
of capital should be determined by market forces. However, capital is costly and 
without an efficient market discipline, bank managers may not prefer to increase the 
institution's capital level. Therefore, arguing that market forces, in particular 
depositors, might not be able to exert market discipline efficiently; financial system 
policy-makers implement financial safety nets, such as the `lender of last resort' 
facility and deposit insurance to enhance the stability of the financial system. 
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When banks have urgent liquidity needs, central banks provide them necessary 
liquidity in order to prevent financial crises and this facility is known as the `lender 
of last resort' facility. The main objectives of this policy are to protect the integrity 
of the payments system, avoid bank runs, and prevent illiquidity at an individual 
bank from unnecessarily leading to its insolvency (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren, 
1998). However, this facility could result in a moral hazard problem. If banks are 
aware of the fact that they could easily assess to the `lender of last resort' facility, 
they might not carry out a prudent liquidity policy. This moral hazard problem is also 
a negative aspect of deposit insurance, which is another important component of the 
financial safety nets. Policy-makers generally consider that deposit insurance is 
necessary to protect small depositors and to prevent bank runs. Consequently, deposit 
insurance ensures the stability of the financial system. The advocates of deposit 
insurance argue that, in particular deposit insurance protects small depositors by 
covering the losses of those who are unable to foresee a bank failure. Otherwise, 
when depositors are suspicious concerning the financial condition of their banks, 
they would-withdraw their deposits and deposit withdrawals could have a domino 
impact that could lead to bank runs.. As a result, these bank runs could threaten the 
financial system as a whole. Therefore, deposit insurance. is considered an important 
safety net that prevents panic and systemic risk. 
On the other hand, while the existence of"a deposit insurance scheme might prevent 
bank runs, it could also cause a moral hazard problem. When a deposit insurance 
scheme is implemented, depositors no longer have any incentives to monitor the 
financial conditions of their banks. Consequently, failing banks continue to engage in 
risky activities, as depositors do not punish these banks by withdrawing their 
deposits or by requiring higher interest rates. 
As a result, deposit insurance could encourage risk-taking by banks, which is called 
the moral hazard problem. Dowd (1996) explains the effects of deposit insurance by 
stating: 
"Once we introduce deposit insurance, depositors no longer have any 
incentives to monitor bank management and managers no longer need to worry 
about maintaining confidence. A bank's rational response is to reduce its 
capital, since the main point of maintaining capital strength - to maintain 
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depositor confidence - no longer applies. Even if an individual bank wished to 
maintain its capital strength, it would be beaten by competitors who cut their 
capital ratios to reduce their costs and passed some of the benefits to 
depositors by offering them higher interest rates. The fight for market share 
would then force the good banks to imitate the bad. Deposit insurance 
consequently transforms a strong capital position into a competitive liability, 
reduces institutions' financial health and makes them more likely to fail. It also 
encourages more bank risk-taking at the margin: if a bank takes more risks 
and the risks pay off, then it keeps the additional profits; but if the risks do not 
pay off, part of the cost is passed on to the deposit insurer. The bank therefore 
takes more risks and becomes even weaker than its capital ratio alone would 
suggest. " 
These discussions lead to two- main arguments concerning the effects of deposit 
insurance. According to `stability theory', deposit insurance contributes to financial 
stability. On the other hand, according to `risk-taking theory', as a result of moral 
hazard and reduced market discipline that arise from deposit insurance, banks 
increase their risk-taking. 
The advocates of the `free banking theory' argue that, as moral hazard creates a 
major risk, deposit insurance should not be implemented and the system should rely 
on market discipline. However, bank regulators consider that bank runs are a 
significant source of financial instability that could have disruptive and costly 
effects. In addition, they generally argue that it is difficult for depositors to exert 
market discipline by assessing the financial soundness of individual banks. 
According to Miles (1995), in practice it is not easy for depositors to assess a bank's 
capital strength due to the information asymmetry between bank and depositors. As a 
result, the advocates of `stability theory' argue that depositors (in particular small 
depositors) should be protected-by implementing a deposit insurance scheme. 
On the other hand, Dowd (1999) argues that, in practice depositors can assess the 
capital strengths of banks especially by relying on shareholders to value bank capital. 
Dowd also states that "If the information exists for the regulator to formulate a 
feasible capital adequacy rule, that same information could also be used to convey 
credible signals to depositors about the capital strength of their banks. " 
Benston and Kaufman (1996) also argue that depositors and shareholders can 
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distinguish solvent banks from insolvent banks. However, they also state that deposit 
insurance exists `in the world in which we live'. In addition, according to Benston 
and Kaufman, in order to counter the negative externalities that result from deposit 
insurance, banks should be regulated prudentially. They place a particular emphasis 
on capital adequacy regulations and conclude that if the moral hazard problems 
created by the existence of a deposit insurance scheme and a `lender of last resort' 
facility encourage banks to take excessive risks, banks should be required to hold 
sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. 
The role of capital in a bank and capital adequacy regulations are explained in the 
next section. 
2.4 The Role of Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulations 
Among several tools of prudential bank regulations, capital adequacy regulations 
attract the attention of regulators. Bank regulators require financial institutions to 
maintain adequate capital as a response to the negative externalities arising from 
bank failures and to the risk-shifting incentives created by deposit insurance. 
Furthermore, Kim and Santomero (1988) argue that capital regulations serve as a 
method of coinsurance as holding high capital results in absorbing higher losses in 
the event of a failure and therefore encourage additional prudence in management. In 
addition, Dowd (2000c) argues that bank capital is a device to give depositors 
rational confidence in a bank and if a bank has sufficient capital, there will be no 
bank stability problem. 
While capital is considered as an important source from a regulatory perspective, it is 
not desirable for banks to hold much capital as they can fund themselves from other 
sources, such as deposits. In fact, the theory that was developed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) demonstrates that, in well-functioning capital markets the market value 
of a company does not depend on its capital structure, i. e. the value is not affected by 
changing the combination of debt and equity5. However, a firm's capital structure 
Referred as MM, this theory assumes a market with no taxation, information costs, or transaction 
costs. 
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does matter, as equity is a more expensive funding source than debt in a market 
where returns to debt holders are tax deductible but returns to equity holders are 
taxable (Pavel, 1988). Mingo (1975) and Pavel and Phillis (1987) also argue that 
bankers find capital adequacy regulations stringent and hence, these regulations 
create a funding disadvantage for banks. Therefore, while regulators consider capital 
adequacy of banks as an important factor to maintain a safe and sound banking 
system and prefer higher levels of capital, bank managers consider the 
implementation of capital regulations as a regulatory cost. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, capital is the difference between an institution's assets 
and -liabilities in accounting terms. However, institutions -and regulators have 
different purposes for capital. From the perspective of an institution, capital is the 
long-term source of funding, which is provided by investors or by the firm through 
retained earnings to fund operations, and capital adequacy is an important issue of 
controlling and running their portfolios. Howcroft (1985) states that, "Bankers view 
of the function of capital is basically concerned with maintaining the lowest possible 
capital base in an endeavour to maximise returns within an acceptable level of risk " 
Figure 2.1: A Basic Balance Sheet Example 
BANK BALANCE SHEET 
ASSETS LIABILITY 
CAPITAL 
(Equity + Reserves) 
On the other hand, the regulatory view considers capital as a cushion that absorbs 
unexpected losses, which are caused by exposure to various risks that the firm faces 
in its business activities. According to Greenspan (1998), capital is not only a topic 
of never ending importance to bankers and their counterparties, but also to regulators 
and central bankers whose job is to oversee the stability of the financial system. 
Indeed, the primary role of bank regulators has always been to ensure that banks 
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have adequate capital to cover outstanding risk exposure and therefore safeguard the 
financial stability. From a supervisory perspective, capital has a crucial role in a 
financial firm, as it provides a buffer against losses. As an example, the FSA defines 
the role of bank capital as: 
"Capital provides a buffer that enables a bank to absorb a level of losses 
without the interests of depositors being adversely affected, and thus protects 
the interests of depositors. " (www. fsa. gov. uk) 
Holding sufficient capital is believed to ensure a bank, and consequently the banking 
system, is safe and sound. However, it is important to mention that the sufficiency 
concerning the amount of capital is an issue that cannot be easily solved. On the 
contrary, regulators also raise their concerns while setting high capital standards. For 
example, Greenspan (1998) states that bank shareholders must earn a competitive 
rate of return and those returns are adversely affected by high capital requirements. 
He also points out that in times of difficulties, not only bank capital, but also sound 
policy actions are required to preserve financial stability. Indeed, although an 
essential one, capital requirements are only one of a larger set of tools used to protect 
the stability of the financial system. The tools of prudential bank regulations are 
demonstrated in Appendix 2.4. 
As a matter of fact, it is generally accepted that policy-makers implement capital 
adequacy regulations to overcome the moral hazard problems created by deposit 
insurance and the existence of a `lender of last resort' (Benston and Kaufman, 1996). 
However, there are two more arguments that justify the existence of capital adequacy 
regulations. While Miles (1995) argues that capital adequacy regulations should be 
implemented to counter market failure, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) also argue 
that these regulations are needed to protect small depositors. 
On the other hand, Dowd (1997) argues that the specific arguments that justify the 
existence of capital adequacy regulations are weak and unconvincing. According to 
Dowd, the market failure argument is based on a wrong basis and it is not so difficult 
for depositors to monitor the financial conditions of their banks by relying on 
shareholders to value bank capital. Concerning the Benston and Kaufman argument, 
Dowd argues that this argument does not offer any substantial challenge to the `free 
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banking theory'. Furthermore, he states that capital adequacy regulations can create a 
moral hazard problem by increasing banks' risk-taking. Consequently, although the 
intention of regulators is to make banks safer by implementing capital adequacy, 
regulations may have the opposite effect and could result in banks increasing their 
risk-taking. 
Nevertheless, because of the significance attached to capital in a financial institution, 
regulators affect bank capital by setting capital adequacy regulations to ensure that 
banks hold sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. Initially, the capital 
standards required banks to hold a flat minimum percentage of capital, which was set 
against all of the assets, irrespective of risk. However, capital adequacy regulations 
have changed dramatically since the 1980s. For example, prior to 1981, bank 
regulators did not enforce specific uniform guidelines for capital adequacy in the US. 
During that period, capital levels at individual banks were determined by considering 
the results of examinations and peer group capital levels. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the bank regulators in the UK and US issued minimum capital standards for 
banks as a result of the significant decline in the capital position of many banking 
organisations throughout the 1970s (Jacques and Nigro, 1997). In the US, capital 
adequacy regulations implemented in 1981 required banks to hold a flat minimum 
percentage of capital, which was set against all of the assets, irrespective of risk 
(Avery and Berger, 1991). These minimum capital ratios for banks and BHCs were 
implemented in the US to bring more uniformity, objectivity, and consistency to the 
regulatory process (Baer and McElravey, 1993). 
On the other hand, the first step towards risk-based capital regulations was taken by 
the implementation of the 1988 Basle Accord, which considers only the credit risk of 
banks. As the extension of credit is a primary activity of banks, regulators first 
concentrated on controlling the level of credit risk in order to ensure that banks are 
sufficiently capitalised to cover potential losses due to counter-party default. 
Baer and McElravey (1993) explain the developments that have resulted in the 
implementation of the Basle Accord by stating that: 
"In 1986, the Federal Reserve Board announced plans to impose risk-based 
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capital guidelines on U. S. banks, to better protect the deposit insurance fund, 
and to increase the safety of the banking system. However, the rapid growth of 
the international banking system and surging competition from foreign banks 
in the U. S. market made international coordination of capital requirements 
crucial in any attempts to increase the safety of the US. banking system. 
Regulators in many other countries also considered an international risk-based 
capital agreement to be desirable as a means of levelling the playing field, and 
allowing their banks to compete more effectively against foreign banks that 
seemed to be gaining worldwide market share. As a result, an international 
agreement on capital adequacy was produced under the auspices of the Bank 
for International Settlements. " 
In July 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee)6, 
whose members are representatives of the central banks and supervisory authorities 
of 12 industrialised countries7, published the `International Convergence of Capital 
Measurements and Capital Standards', which is known as the Basle Accord. The 
main objectives of the Basle Accord are to strengthen the soundness and stability of 
the banking system and provide a `level playing field' for banks, by requiring banks 
in member countries to hold a minimum level of capital in accordance with the 
perceived credit risk that banks face during their operations. 
According to Baer and McElravey (1993), there are four main advantages of the risk- 
based capital regulations. These are: 
1) The risk-based capital regulations incorporate off-balance sheet 
activities. 
2) The risk-based capital regulations employ a more conservative and 
accurate definition of capital. 
3) The risk-based capital regulations have increased the incentives for banks 
to raise additional capital in the form of preferred stock and subordinated 
debt that are included in tier-2 capital. 
4) The risk-based capital regulations provide banks with additional 
flexibility for maintaining capital adequacy. The previous regulations 
6 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities, 
which was established in 1975. This committee usually meets at the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basle, Switzerland. 
These countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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allowed banks that fell below the regulatory minimum to have only two 
choices, i. e. to decrease assets or increase capital. However, the risk- 
based capital regulations allow banks to have an additional option by 
allowing them to classify bank assets according to their risk-weight 
categories to remain in compliance with the required capital. 
The Basle Accord of 1988 requires banks to have a minimum eight percent risk- 
weighted capital ratio (the ratio of base capital to risk-weighted assets). Capital is 
defined in two tiers. Tier-1, or core capital, consists of equity and disclosed reserves. 
Tier-2, supplementary capital, which cannot exceed tier-1, contains undisclosed 
reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan loss reserves, 
subordinated debt with maturity more than five years and hybrid debt capital 
instruments (e. g. perpetual debt instruments). The total of tier-1 and tier-2 is the base 
capital and in order to calculate the capital amount that is used in the risk-weighted 
capital ratio, goodwill and investments in financial subsidiaries should be subtracted 
from the base capital. 
The rules are formula-based and apply risk weights to reflect different classifications 
of counter-party credit risk to assets and off-balance sheet items. The implementation 
of the risk-based capital regulations is a revolutionary development in bank 
regulations in terms of connecting capital to risk and requiring banks to hold capital 
against off-balance sheet items. Consequently, this accord has been adopted by 
several national bank regulators8. 
Following the publication of the Basle Accord, the European Community (EC) has 
subsequently issued two directives on the subject, the `Own Funds Directive' and the 
`Solvency Ratio Directive'. While the `Own Funds Directive' (89/299/EEC) defines 
what is regarded as a bank's capital resources for supervisory purposes, the 
`Solvency Ratio Directive' assigns weightings to the various classes of assets and 
establishes the minimum risk asset ratio. These directives mainly pick up the Basle 
Committee regulations and apply them to the EC member states. 
8 The Basle Accord rules have been adopted in more than 100 countries (Jackson et al., 1999). 
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Although the Basle Accord is a revolutionary development in the framework of 
capital adequacy regulations, it has been highly criticised not only by bankers (Price 
Waterhouse, 1991), but also by academics (Alfriend, 1988) and regulators 
themselves (Greenspan, 1998). One of the most important criticisms of the Basle 
Accord is that, these regulations only focus on credit risk and do not take into 
account other factors, such as interest rate risk, concentration of investments and 
loans, quality and level of earnings, problem and classified assets, and quality of 
management. 
Other criticisms of these regulations are summarised below: 
" These regulations do not consider the credit-worthiness of different 
private sector customers, 
0 These regulations do not recognise the effect of diversification on risk, 
0 These regulations do not take netting into consideration. Therefore, 
instead of the net exposure, banks raise capital for both of the transactions 
in which-they match borrowers and lenders. 0 -- 
Since the publication of the Basle Accord in 1988, five amendments have been made. 
Four of them were specific changes to the language of the original Accord. However, 
the `fifth amendment' was established to -alter the capital requirements in order to 
include market risk of banks. According to Hall (1995), there are a number of 
developments that reflect the concerns of regulators which resulted in widening the 
risk-based capital regulations to capture market risk. These are: 
1) The deregulation of interest rates, 
2) The dismantling of capital controls, 
3) The relaxation of constraints on banks' permitted range of activities, 
4) The erosion of the traditional distinction between `banks' and `securities 
firms', 
5) The rapid growth of banks' trading in derivatives, foreign exchange and 
securities, which increased the market risk faced by banks. 
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The amendment that covers banks' market risk, entitled `Amendment to the Capital 
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks', was issued in January 1996. These new rules 
require banks with a significant amount of market risk to hold capital against their 
market risk. The next section examines the framework of the market risk capital 
regulations in detail. 
2.5 The Market Risk Capital Regulations 
While until the 1980s bank regulations have been affected on a national level, the 
gradual liberalisation of financial markets and increased cross-border transactions 
have raised the need for global capital adequacy rules (Kjeldsen, 1997). The Basle 
Accord was accepted as a result of such efforts in 1988. These regulations introduced 
uniform capital adequacy requirements for banks by forcing them to maintain at least 
eight percent capital for their traditional banking and off-balance sheet activities. 
However, these regulations are only related to credit risk and do not consider market 
risk of banks arising from interest rate and foreign exchange rate exposures. For 
example, although government bonds have an interest rate risk, the original accord 
does not require capital for these assets. Therefore, as the original accord only covers 
the credit risk of banks, a need emerged to cover banks' market risk with the increase 
of banks' trading activities in securities and derivatives. 
In April 1993, the Basle Committee issued a consultative proposal to amend the 
Accord and required institutions to measure and hold capital to cover their exposure 
to market risk. However, this proposed amendment was offering a standardised 
approach. The standardised approach uses a `building block' approach, which 
requires banks to apply certain uniform techniques to calculate a capital charge for 
each of the market risk categories. The total capital charge is the sum of the capital 
charges for each risk category. On the other hand, during the 1990's increased 
attention was paid to Value at Risk (VaR), which is a tool that financial institutions 
use to measure their market risk. Financial institutions that were invited to comment 
on this proposed amendment criticised the standardised approach and claimed that 
their internal VaR models provide more reliable forecasts of market risk. 
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The attempt made by financial institutions to use the VaR methodologies for 
measuring their market risk has led supervisors to introduce a new approach to 
calculate capital requirements for this special kind of risk. In 1996, the Basle 
Committee published the `Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market 
Risks'. The Basle Committee's objectives in introducing this amendment, which they 
call a `significant amendment', are as follows: 
1) To provide an explicit capital cushion for price risks, especially risks 
arising from trading activities, to which banks are exposed, 
2) To strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system, 
3) To achieve improvements in risk management techniques by 
implementing qualitative standards to the banks which base their capital 
requirements on the results of internal models. 
This amendment establishes a capital adequacy framework to capture market risk, 
which is one of the primary risks that banks face in their operations. In particular, the 
amendment covers the following risks: 
1) The risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the 
trading book, 
2) Foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank's 
balance sheet. 
The framework of the market risk capital regulations is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: The Framework of the Market Risk Capital Regulations 
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Market risk consists of `general market risk' and `specific risk'. The `general market 
risk' refers to changes in the market value of on-balance sheet assets and liabilities 
and off-balance sheet items resulting from broad market movements, such as changes 
in the general level of interest rates, equity prices, foreign exchange rates and 
commodity prices. The `specific risk' refers to changes in the market value of 
individual positions due to factors other than broad market movements and includes 
such risks as the credit risk of an instrument's issuer. On the other hand, the capital 
charges for foreign exchange and commodity risks apply to total currency and 
commodity positions of banks. 
The 1996 amendment contains comprehensive capital adequacy rules to protect 
financial institutions against market risk on the trading book. According to the Basle 
Committee, a trading book consists of positions in financial instruments and 
commodities held either intent or in order to hedge other elements of the trading 
book To be eligible for trading book capital treatment, financial instruments must 
either be free of any restrictive covenants on their tradability or able to be hedged 
completely. In addition, positions should be frequently and accurately valued, and 
the portfolio should be actively managed. 
The trading book implies a bank's proprietary positions in financial instruments9, 
9 To establish a relevant base for measuring market risk in the trading book, all items should be 
marked to market. 
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including positions in derivative instruments and off-balance sheet items, which arc: 
1) Intentionally held for short-term resale, 
2) Taken on by the bank with the intention of benefiting in the short-term 
from actual and/or expected differences between their buying and selling 
prices, or from other price or interest rate variations, 
3) Positions in financial instruments arising from matched principal 
brokering and market making, 
4) Positions taken in order to hedge other elements of the trading book. 
As a complement to the capital requirement calculation for credit risk that uses the 
traditional method, banks have also been required to hold capital for their market 
risks since the beginning of 1998. Under the Basle Committee's market risk 
amendment, a bank with significant trading activity must calculate a capital charge 
for market risk using either a risk-weighting process (the standardised approach) or 
its own internal risk measurement model10 (the internal models approach). These 
approaches are explained below: 
1) The Standardised Approach: The standardised methodology uses a 
building block approach in which a bank applies certain uniform 
techniques to calculate a capital charge for the general market risk 
positions in the four risk categories, as well as for the specific risk of debt 
and equity positions located in the trading book. The four risk groups 
addressed by this amendment are; interest rate, foreign exchange rate, 
equity position, and commodities risks. For example, according to the 
standardised approach, a bank's net foreign exchange position is 
calculated as the higher of the total net short positions and the total net 
long positions in all currencies other than the bank's reporting. currency. 
The sum of the capital charges for each risk category comprises the total 
capital charge for market risk. 
10 The US financial institutions are only subject to capital requirements based on the internal models 
approach, which allows banks to use risk measures derived from their own internal risk management 
models. 
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2) The Internal Models Approach: As an alternative methodology, banks are 
allowed to use the internal models approach to calculate risk measures by 
using their own VaR models. However, the use of VaR models is subject 
to qualitative and quantitative conditions. This approach requires a bank 
to employ an internal model to calculate the daily VaR measures that 
represent an estimate of the amount by which a bank's position in a risk 
category could decline due to the general market movements during a 
given holding period, measured with a specified confidence level for each 
of four risk categories, as well as related options in each risk category. 
For the regulatory capital purposes, the market risk amendment requires a 
bank to calculate the VaR estimates to a ten-day's movement in the rates 
and prices and a 99 percent confidence level. In addition, a bank should 
base its VaR estimates upon the rates and prices observed over a period of 
at least one year. In deriving the overall VaR estimate, an institution 
could take into account historical correlations within a risk category (e. g., 
between interest rates), but not across risk categories (e. g., not between 
interest rates and equity prices). In other words, the overall VaR measure 
equals the sum of the VaR measures for each risk category. A bank's 
capital charge for the general market risk equals the greater of the 
previous day's overall VaR measure or the average of the preceding 60 
days' overall VaR measures multiplied by a factor of three (the 
multiplication factor). Moreover, the market risk amendment requires 
institutions to hold additional capital for the specific risk associated with 
debt and equity positions in the trading book. 
According to the Basle Committee, the simplicity of the VaR approach is the most 
important feature for allowing banks to use this method. The Committee argues that: 
"VaR is an effective tool for describing and communicating risk because it 
assesses different risks in terms of a common loss relative to a standard unit of 
likelihood. " 
11 Financial institutions are allowed to derive their ten-day VaR measure by scaling up the daily VaR 
by the square root of ten. 
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Banks that prefer to use their own internal VaR models to calculate the required 
capital for market risk are subject to qualitative and quantitative criteria. These 
criteria are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Qualitative and Quantitative Criteria of the Market Risk Capital Regulations 
QUALITATIVE CRITERIA QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA 
1. Independent risk control unit, 1. VaR must be computed on a daily basis, 
2. Backtesting, 2. In calculating VaR, a 99 percentile and 
a one-tailed confidence interval should 
be used, 
3. Management actively involved in the risk 3. In calculating VaR, the minimum 
control process, holding period should be ten trading 
days, 
4. The internal risk measurement model 4. Sample period should be minimum one 
closely integrated into the day to day risk year, 
management process, 
5. The risk measurement system should be 5. Data sets should be updated no less 
used in conjunction with internal trading frequently than once every three 
and exposure limits, months, 
6. Stress testing, 6. Freedom to use any model, 
7. Well documented set of internal policies, 7. Banks will have discretion to recognise 
controls and procedures, empirical correlations within broad risk 
categories, 
8. An independent review of the risk 8. Banks' models must accurately capture 
measurement system should be carried the unique risks associated with options, 
out regularly in the bank's own internal 
auditing process. 
9. Each bank must meet, on a daily basis, a 
capital requirement expressed as the 
higher of (i) its previous day's VaR 
number, (ii) an average of the daily VaR 
measures on each of the proceeding 
sixty business days, multiplied by a 
multiplication factor, 
10. Multiplication factor is minimum three. 
Banks could be required to add to this 
factor a `plus', that ranges from 0 to 1, 
determined by backtesting, 
11. Banks using models are subject to a 
separate capital charge to cover the 
specific risk of interest rate related 
instruments and equity securities. 
Source: Baste Committee, 1996 
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Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) point out two important advantages of using internal 
VaR models in the framework of capital adequacy regulations. Firstly, capital 
requirements based on the internal models produce minimum regulatory charges that 
closely match banks' true market risk exposures. Secondly, a capital charge based on 
the internal models might provide a common standard for the VaR estimates. As a 
result, it is easier and more reliable to make comparisons across institutions when the 
VaR estimates of these institutions are based on a uniform set of parameters. 
On the other hand, the framework of the internal model approach has been criticised 
from four aspects. These are: 
1) The choice of the multiplier has been found to be arbitrary and questioned 
as being too high 12. In particular, market participants argue that, the 
choice of the multiplier represents a discouragement for financial 
institutions to measure and report the risk of their trading portfolios 
accurately (Elderfield, 1995; Kjeldsen, 1997). According to " Hendricks 
and Hirtle (1997), the most discussed issue of the 1996 amendment is the 
scaling factor. The scaling factor was criticised by practitioners as an ad 
hoc supervisory adjustment that limits the benefits of basing a capital 
charge on financial institutions' internal models. According to market 
participants, a scaling factor is not necessary to produce the desired level 
of coverage for the market risk capital charge as standards of a ten-day 
holding period and a 99th percentile confidence level provide a reasonable 
base for a minimum capital standard ensuring that banks hold sufficient 
capital to cover market risk. However, Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) argue 
that even a ten-day and a 99`h percentile VaR estimate might not provide a 
sufficient degree of risk coverage to serve as a prudent capital standard, as 
the VaR estimates based on the recent historical market data may not 
12 Brooks et al. (2000) explain an interesting discussion on how regulators achieve the multiplication 
factor of three by stating that: "This bizarre rule is a compromise. US regulators wanted institutions to 
be able to use the `raw' minimum capital risk requirements value generated by the model, while the 
German delegation wanted this number to be multiplied by a factor of 5. The multiple of 3 represented 
a compromise - half way between the multiples of I and S! " 
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incorporate the possibility of severe market events. Therefore, a simple 
and easy to implement scaling factor could provide a capital cushion 
against unexpected incidents (such as regime shifts and market breaks). 
2) As under normal market conditions many positions in a financial 
institution's trading portfolio could be liquidated in a shorter time period 
than 10 trading days, a ten-day holding period was criticised as being 
overly conservative. In addition, the `square root of ten' rule, which is 
used to convert the daily VaR estimates to determine the required capital 
amount, may be inaccurate if the return distribution is not normal 
(Danielsson et al., 1998). 
3) Arguing that longer observation periods do not result in more accurate 
VaR estimates, Hendricks and Hirtle * (1997) criticise the year-long 
minimum historical observation period. However, as shorter observation 
periods tend to generate VaR estimates that are more volatile over time 
(Hendricks, 1996), by requiring a one-year of minimum historical 
observation period, banks with similar risk exposures face similar capital 
charges. According to Hendricks and Hirtle (1997), a one-year historical 
observation, period is preferred for not producing-the most accurate VaR 
estimate for capital but rather limiting inequality among institutions. They 
argue that for a set of banks with similar risk exposures, the dispersion of 
the VaR estimates across financial institutions would tend to be greater, 
when some of the financial institutions use short observation periods. As 
a result, the minimum one-year historical observation period is an attempt 
to limit this inequality. 
4) Backtesting is likely to have limited power in detecting inaccurate risk 
estimates (Kupiec, 1995). In addition, the differences of holding period in 
calculating VaR (ten-day) and backtesting (one-day) may create an 
inconsistency. However, Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) argue that the 
reason for using a one-day holding period in backtesting is the practical 
limitations of testing the VaR estimates calibrated to a ten-day standard 
(backtesting of the VaR estimates based on a ten-day holding period 
could require a significant amount of historical data to generate a series of 
independent ten-day profit and loss figures). 
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Under the market risk amendment, bank supervisors evaluate a bank's internal 
modelling and risk management process in order to ensure that the calculation of 
VaR for capital purposes conforms to the specified quantitative criteria and that the 
risk management process meets certain qualitative criteria, such as requiring 
independent model validations. Backtesting and stress testing are two qualitative 
model validation techniques. While backtesting provides information concerning the 
accuracy of a VaR model by comparing a bank's daily VaR measures to its 
corresponding daily trading profits and losses, stress testing provides information 
concerning the impact of adverse market events on an institution's positions. 
The use of accurate VaR models is very important while managing market risk of 
banks, as banks use internal VaR models to calculate the required capital for their 
market risk. Therefore, regulators require banks to do backtesting in order to 
determine the accuracy of VaR models. The concept of backtesting and backtesting 
methodologies are discussed in the sixth chapter of this thesis. 
Although backtesting is a useful method to determine the accuracy of VaR models, it 
is only just one part of the risk management framework in financial institutions. 
Financial institutions are also recommended to regularly perform simulations to 
determine how their portfolios would perform under stress conditions (Group of 
Thirty, 1993). The calculation of VaR depends on the assumed probability 
distributions of the expected return and in some circumstances the probability 
distribution might not capture market risk. In order to overcome this problem, stress 
testing is recommended as a supplement to capture the risk of the unexpected. 
Stress testing can be defined as a procedure used to identify possible losses that may 
accrue under extreme market movements of asset prices. When a portfolio is under 
stress, the assumptions underpinning the VaR methodology become invalid and 
historical correlation structures are also likely to breakdown. By performing stress 
testing, VaR could be complemented, as stress testing measures the behaviour of 
portfolios under various market conditions, such as the changes in key risk factors, 
correlations and large market moves, which is not captured by VaR. 
37 
The need for stress testing appears because of the unexpected market events. The 
Group of Thirty report on risk management and control over derivatives trading 
clearly states that stress testing should be done to calculate the impact of market 
shocks and disasters. The Basle Committee also requires banks that use the internal 
models approach to adopt a `rigorous and comprehensive stress-testing program'. 
History of market events such as the stock market crash of 1987 and the Russian 
default and the LTCM crises of 1998 have proven that in extreme events, a VaR 
model that assumes the normal distribution is ineffective. As a result, financial firms 
use stress tests to measure the potential impact of various large market movements 
on the value of an institution's portfolio. Such tests determine whether large changes 
in market conditions could lead to high losses. In addition, these tests are -useful for 
identifying exposures that appear to be relatively small in the current environment 
but that grow more with changes in risk factors. 
As well as the qualitative factors that are explained above, namely backtesting and 
stress testing, there are two quantitative factors of the internal models approach that 
should be considered carefully. These are the holding period and the confidence 
level. Although in general the industry practice is to limit the confidence level to 95 
percent and the holding period to one day, the market risk capital regulations require 
banks to calculate the required capital amount by using a 99 percent confidence level 
and a ten-day holding period. However, many market participants believe that it is a 
conservative approach to use a 99 percent confidence level and a ten-day holding 
period in the calculation of the VaR estimates. 
Although the market risk capital regulations are generally found to be conservative, 
the main objective of these regulations is to set aside adequate capital to protect a 
financial institution against failure due to adverse price movements. One of the main 
objectives of this thesis is to analyse whether the methodologies that are allowed by 
the market risk capital regulations produce adequate and accurate VaR estimates. In 
order to carry out this investigation, simulations are conducted and different VaR 
models are evaluated by applying backtesting methodologies in the eighth chapter of 
this thesis. 
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Concerning the impact of the market risk capital regulations, there is not much 
evidence in the literature. Although there are several studies related to the 
applications of VaR, to my best knowledge the study of Danielsson et al. (2004) is 
the only study that investigates the impact of these regulations. Danielsson et al. 
investigated the consequences of risk constrained trading by means of simulations of 
a general equilibrium model with a VaR constraint and compared the results to the 
case when there are no risk constraints. In particular, their study concentrates on the 
side effects of imposing VaR constraints in an economy where trades follow 
backward looking belief revision rules. Their findings indicate that while prices are 
lower on average in the presence - of risk regulation, the volatility is higher. 
Therefore, instead of stabilising prices, the effect of such constraints is to induce 
behaviour that exacerbates the shocks further. They conclude that the market risk 
capital regulations might have the perverse effect as the widespread adoption of the 
internal VaR models may have the unintended and undesirable side effect of 
exacerbating short-term price fluctuations in financial markets. Apart from the study 
of Danielsson et al., there is not much empirical evidence concerning the impact of 
the market risk capital regulations. However, the impact of capital adequacy 
regulations has been analysed extensively in the literature. These studies are 
reviewed in the following chapter. -- 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the rationale for bank capital regulations and in particular the 
rationale for market risk capital regulations. 
In order to provide systemic stability, policy-makers implement financial safety nets, 
such as prudential regulations, a `lender of last resort' facility and deposit insurance. 
However, while the existence of a `lender of last resort' facility and a deposit 
insurance scheme might prevent bank runs, they could also cause a moral hazard 
problem. Therefore, it is generally accepted that policy-makers implement capital 
adequacy regulations to overcome the moral hazard problems created by the 
existence of a `lender of last resort' facility and deposit insurance. 
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On the other hand, the advocates of the `free banking theory' argue that, as moral 
hazard creates a major risk, deposit insurance should not be implemented and the 
system should rely on market discipline. The moral hazard problems created by the 
existence of deposit insurance schemes and a `lender of last resort' facility encourage 
banks to take excessive risks. Therefore, it is crucial for banks to hold sufficient 
capital to absorb unexpected losses. 
As a result, bank regulators place emphasis on a banks capital adequacy and 
influence bank capital by setting capital adequacy regulations to ensure that banks 
hold sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. Initially, the main concern of 
bank regulators is credit risk. The Basle Accord of 1988 was implemented as a 
principal measure to control bank credit risk-taking. However, with the increase in 
trading activities and derivative usage, market risk has gained importance in recent 
years. With the implementation of the market risk capital regulations, as well as 
assigning capital for their credit risks, banks have also been required to assign capital 
to cover their market risks starting from 1998. 
The 1996 Basle Committee amendment is a revolution in financial regulation as it 
allows financial institutions to use their own VaR models to determine the required 
capital to cover market risk. While the original accord has imposed capital 
requirements to cover credit risk based on a uniform approach, the amendment 
requires additional minimum capital to cover market risk based on either a 
standardised approach or any type of internal VaR models approach. However, the 
use of the internal models approach is subject to the approval of regulators. If 
financial institutions choose to determine required capital on the basis of their own 
internal VaR models, they are required to report daily their VaR at a 99 percent 
confidence level and over a ten-day horizon. On the other hand, even though the 
Basle Committee standardises the model parameters, banks could choose their 
individual particular models to estimate VaR. 
Although the impact of capital adequacy regulations has been analysed extensively in 
the literature, apart from the study of Danielsson et al. (2004), there is not much 
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empirical evidence concerning the impact of market risk capital regulations. 
Danielsson et al. investigated the consequences of risk constrained trading by means 
of simulations with a VaR constraint and compared the results to the case where 
there are no risk constraints. They found that market risk capital regulations might 
have a perverse effect. This thesis is also projected to investigate the impact of 
market risk capital regulations. However, the focus of this study is another aspect of 
the impact of these regulations. The impact of these regulations on bank capital 
levels and derivative activities is an issue that has not yet been investigated in the 
literature. Therefore, one of the most important objectives of this thesis is to 
investigate the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital levels 
and derivative activities. In order to analyse these issues, an econometric analysis 
was carried out in the fourth chapter of this thesis. However, before carrying out this 
analysis, the literature concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations was 
reviewed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW CONCERNING THE 
IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of banks in an economy and 
discussed the role of capital regulations. Due to banks' intermediary role in 
economies, bank regulators put significant emphasis on bank soundness. 
Consequently, capital adequacy of banks has always been a primary concern of bank 
regulators as capital provides a buffer to absorb unexpected losses that result from 
the risks that the banks face in their operations. Kim and Santomero (1988) state that 
"The amount of capital influences the probability of bank solvency and thus the 
soundness of the entire banking system, the regulators, ceteris paribus, prefer more 
capital to less". Therefore, bank regulators shape bank capital by setting capital 
adequacy regulations, which could affect the activities of banks in more than. one 
dimension. 
Despite the fact that the implementation of capital adequacy regulations has led to a 
considerable discussion, the effects of these regulations are still unclear (Dowd, 
1998). Another reason why this issue remains important is the evolving framework 
of capital regulations. The risk-based capital regulations were first imposed in 1988 
and the 1996 amendment requires banks to cover their market risk exposure. In 
addition, new proposals were issued which will alter the Basle Accord in the near 
future. This evolving face of the capital regulations has interested researchers since 
the 1970s. 
Therefore, whether the implementation of these regulations leads banks to hold 
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higher capital ratios or induces banks to substitute towards riskier assets, such as 
derivative activities, are important questions that should be investigated in order to 
understand the impact of these regulations. In this chapter, the literature concerning 
the impact of capital regulations is reviewed. This review is crucial as it provides the 
theoretical background for the empirical analysis that is provided in the fourth 
chapter. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The second section presents the interaction 
between deposit insurance and capital regulations. In the third section, the literature 
related to the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank capital levels is 
reviewed. The fourth section reviews the literature concerning the impact of capital 
adequacy regulations on bank risk-taking. This is followed by reviewing the 
literature on the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank off-balance sheet 
(OBS) activities in the fifth section. In this section, the characteristics of banks that 
are involved in derivative activities are also examined. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of discussions. 
3.2 The Interaction Between Deposit Insurance and Capital Regulations 
Due to the important role of banks in a financial environment, academics and 
regulators have been questioning bank supervision and regulation. Among the 
financial safety nets that policy-makers rely on to ensure the stability of a banking 
system, deposit insurance and capital adequacy have always played a prominent role. 
Policy-makers generally consider that deposit insurance is necessary to protect small 
depositors and to prevent bank runs. However, the existence of a deposit insurance 
scheme could cause a moral hazard problem. According to Benston and Kaufman 
(1996), policy-makers implement capital adequacy regulations to overcome the 
moral hazard problems created by deposit insurance. 
On the other hand, Dowd (2000c) argues that if financial institutions have adequate 
capital, depositors might not make a run on their investments and financial 
institutions would not fail. In his study, Dowd deals with the highly influential 
justification for deposit insurance provided by the work of Diamond and Dybvig 
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(1983). In the Diamond and Dybvig model, agents that face individual liquidity risk 
form an intermediary to pool their liquidity risks. Diamond and Dybvig argue that if 
individual investors believe that their financial institutions will fail, they may panic 
and bank runs might occur. Consequently, the institutions may fail. Therefore, 
Diamond and Dybvig suggest that as the banking system is fragile, in order to avoid 
a systemic risk that could be caused by bank runs, the government should provide 
deposit insurance to investors that guarantees them to be paid in full in case of a 
failure. In such an environment, investors would not withdraw their funds and the 
financial institution would not fail. 
Dowd (2000c) criticises the Diamond and Dybvig model as their model considers 
that intermediaries have only one source of finance. In addition, Dowd also argues 
that when intermediaries have adequate capital to absorb shocks to their portfolios, 
they could maintain their ability to make payments to depositors. 
In his study, Dowd provides a theoretical example. The Dowd model differs from the 
Diamond and Dybvig model by not considering every individual identical and by 
considering more `realistic' financial institutions. In addition, different from the 
Diamond and Dybvig model, the Dowd model provides a natural role for bank 
capital, which gives a rational confidence to investors. 
The results of the study of Dowd indicate that if banks have adequate capital, there is 
no need for deposit insurance. Dowd concludes that provided that a bank has 
adequate capital, "it can always meet its commitments and depositors can be fully 
confident of being repaid". 
As a result, Dowd demonstrates that, although the underlying rationale of 
implementing capital adequacy regulations is to overcome the moral hazard 
problems created by deposit insurance, a deposit insurance scheme will not be 
needed if banks have adequate capital. 
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3.3 The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulations on Bank Capital 
The rules related to minimum capital adequacy requirements were implemented in 
developed countries at. the beginning of the 1980s, which was followed by the 
implementation of the risk-based capital standards in the 1988 Basle Accord. Under 
the Basle Accord, banks are subject to minimum capital requirements that depend on 
the riskiness of their portfolio. The coverage of the risk-based capital regulations was 
enlarged in 1998 by the implementation of the market risk capital regulations. 
Whether the implementation of capital adequacy regulations affects bank capital 
levels is an issue that has attracted a lot of attention. In this section, the literature 
concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank capital levels is 
reviewed. 
The descriptive statistics of the US banks' capital levels provided in the study of 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) demonstrate that, after the implementation of the risk- 
based capital regulations in 1988, bank capital ratios were increased. For example, 
the equity-asset ratio for all commercial banks increased from 6.75 percent in 1988 
to 8.01 percent in 1993. In addition, the risk-based capital ratio increased from 10.67 
percent to 13.17 percent over the same period. The study of Jackson (1999) also 
presents supporting evidence that the introduction of the Basle Accord was followed 
by an increase in the risk-weighted capital ratios. She argues that the average ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets of major banks in the G-10 countries rose from 9.3 
percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 1996. Graph 3.1 also demonstrates that the capital 
to risk weighted asset ratios of the US and UK banks started to increase in 1988. 
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Although the introduction of the Basle Accord was followed h} an increase in the 
hank capital ratios, it is diNicult to conclude that the imhlcmcntation cif the risk- 
based capital regulations as the only cause 01' this increase. Therefore, in order to 
explain the relationship between capital levels and capital regulations, an 
econometric analysis should he employed. Jackson (1999) also ariucs that 
econometric models are required to analyse such relationships, as it is possible für 
batiks to he subjected to market pressure to increase their capital ratios or specific 
situations in their countries could lead to such a result. 
The impact of' capital regulations on the hank capital ratios has been empirically 
investigated since the beginning of the 1970s. Ilowever, the first two studies 
concerning the impact of- capital regulations reached opposing conclusions. The first 
study that investigated this issue was carried out by Peltzman (1970). Peltrman 
analysed the impact of the ABC ratio, which is the ratio of actual hank capital to the 
capital desired by the regulator, on the lIS banks' percentage capital growth. 
According to Feldman, the crucial test for the effectiveness of regulation is to look at 
whether banks respond to regulatory pressure by increasing their capital. Peltzman 
investigated the magnitude o[' the eflect o1' government regulation on capital 
investment in commercial banking. However. he could not find any evidence 
supporting that bank capital investment behaviour is affected by the regulatory 
standards. 
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Mingo (1975) also analysed the impact of the ABC ratio on the US banks' 
percentage capital growth. The results indicate that bankers treat deposit insurance as 
a substitute for bank capital. In addition, the evidence suggests that regulators have 
made no attempt to reduce this `substitution effect'. On the other hand, Mingo's 
findings are inconsistent with Peltzman as the level and distribution of bank capital 
were found to be affected by regulation. Mingo found that the capital adequacy 
regulation had a substantial effect on the level of bank capital, indicating that the 
level of bank capital is now greater than it would be in the absence of bank capital 
regulation. These findings suggest that the lower is the ratio of actual capital to 
capital desired by the regulators, the more likely is the banker to add to capital over 
the next period. 
The impact of the ABC ratios on the US banks' capital levels was also examined by 
Dietrich and James (1983). By using similar empirical tests to those employed by 
Peltzman and Mingo, Dietrich and James investigated whether bank capital adequacy 
regulations formulated by regulators have any effect on the capital decisions of 
commercial banks. They used a much larger sample of banks and a different time 
period. The regressions were estimated using annual data for a sample of more than 
10,000 banks for the years 1971 to 1975. Their findings, which are similar to those of 
Peltzman, suggest that there is no significant relationship between changes in capital 
and the capital standards imposed by regulators. Dietrich and James explained the 
conflict with Mingo's findings by expressing Mingo's failure to consider the 
influence of other bank regulations, particularly the effect of deposit interest rate 
ceilings 13, which was not effective in the observation period that Peltzman has 
investigated. 
All of the above mentioned studies investigated the impact of capital regulations by 
employing single multivariate regression models where the dependent variable is the 
percentage growth in bank capital. Jackson (1999) criticises these studies from two 
13 Dietrich and James (1983) argue that when interest payments are limited by rate ceilings 
(Regulation Q limited the rate of interest that could be paid on time deposits by banks and savings and 
loans), banks have an incentive to increase capital to compete for non-insured deposits as an increase 
in capital results in an increase in the risk-adjusted expected return to depositors. 
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aspects. Firstly, these studies used capital growth rates instead of focusing on 
changes in capital levels. Secondly, these studies considered only conditioning 
variables but not lagged capital or capital growth in contrast to subsequent studies 
that employed a partial adjustment model. 
The studies of Marcus (1983), Keeley (1988), Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and 
Nigro (1997) and Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) also investigated the impact of 
capital regulations on bank capital levels. However, in these studies the changes in 
bank capital are modelled in a partial adjustment framework, where the change in 
capital is modelled as the difference between the actual capital level and the capital 
target level. While these studies investigated the impact of capital regulations on the 
US banks, Ediz et al. (1998) analysed the impact of capital regulations on the UK 
banks and Rime (2001) analysed the impact of capital regulations on the Swiss banks 
by employing a partial adjustment framework. 
One of the first studies that employed a partial adjustment framework is the study of 
Marcus (1983). Criticising the previous studies for using only cross-section data and 
for not considering the change in. capital ratios over time, Marcus employed time 
series cross-sectional data and market values of capital instead of book values. While 
Marcus found a significant impact of market factors on the capital ratios, he could 
not find any impact of regulatory pressure. Keeley (1988) also employed a partial 
adjustment framework to examine the impact of capital regulations on bank capital 
levels. Keeley investigated the impact of the minimum capital-to-asset ratio 
requirements that have replaced the earlier peer group type of capital regulations14 on 
the capital positions of the 100 largest bank holding companies (BHCs). In 
particular, he examined whether the new capital requirements urged banks with low 
capital ratios to meet these new standards. Keeley found that the uniform capital 
requirements of the 1980s seemed effective as banks with low capital levels 
increased their capital ratios. He also found that capital deficient banks' increased 
14 Prior to the 1980s, there were subjective capital requirements in the US and these were based on the 
regulators' examinations of banks. In this framework, regulators were comparing a bank's capital-to- 
asset ratio with bank peer groups, i. e. banks grouped by common characteristics such as total assets or 
ownership), and require banks with lower capital ratios to increase their capital. After 1981, banks and 
BHCs in the US were required to hold at least 5 percent capital-to-asset ratio as a result of the 
increasing risk exposure due to deteriorating asset quality and increase in OBS activities (Keeley, 
1988). 
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their capital ratios mainly by slowing down the asset growth relative to capital 
growth, which suggests that the increase in the capital-to-asset ratios reflected a 
reduction in leverage. 
Another study that employed a partial adjustment framework is the study of Shrieves 
and Dahl (1992). Shrieves and Dahl argue that the presence of leverage and risk- 
related costs might induce managers and shareholders to increase capital (or decrease 
leverage) in response to higher levels of asset risk. In particular, they examined the 
bank behaviour with respect to the observed changes in capital and risk by 
considering the impact of the 1981 capital regulations on a large sample of US banks. 
They employed simultaneous equation models to analyse adjustments to bank capital 
and risk levels. Their findings suggest that banks with lower (below 7 percent) 
capital to assets ratios responded to the capital regulations by increasing their capital 
levels. They also found a positive association between the changes in risk and 
capital. 
While the above mentioned studies focused on the impact of capital regulations on 
bank capital levels prior to 1988, Jacques and Nigro (1997) investigated the impact 
of the risk-based capital regulations. 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) examined the impact of the Basle Committee's risk-based 
standards on both portfolio risk and bank capital levels. Building on previous 
research of Shrieves and Dahl (1992), which suggests that increasing regulatory 
capital standards might cause banks to increase, rather than decrease, their portfolio 
risk, they employed a three-stage least squares methodology to analyse the 
relationship between bank capital, portfolio risk, and the risk-based capital standards. 
The study of Jacques and Nigro covers the first year of the risk-based capital 
standards were in effect, i. e. 1991. Their findings can be summarised under two 
headings. Firstly, the risk-based capital standards have a significant positive impact 
on capital and a negative impact on portfolio risk of well-capitalised banks (no 
significant impact is found for undercapitalised banks). Secondly, undercapitalised 
banks showed increases in the equity-asset ratio, but these increases essentially 
appear to be the result of decreasing portfolio risk and a reduction in total assets. 
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They conclude that while the overall level of portfolio risk in undercapitalised banks 
decreased, implementation of the risk-based standards appears to have had little 
effect on the portfolio risk of these banks. 
On the other hand, Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) examined the impact of the Prompt 
Corrective Action'5 (PCA) on capital ratios and portfolio risk levels of the US banks. 
They used the model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and modified by 
Jacques and Nigro (1997). The results of their study suggest that both adequately 
capitalised and undercapitalised banks increased their capital ratios in response to the 
PCA standards. In addition, they found some evidence that the PCA standards led to 
significant reductions in portfolio risk. They conclude that the PCA has been 
effective in getting banks to simultaneously increase their capital ratios and reduce 
their level of portfolio risk. 
There are also a number of studies that investigated the relationship between capital 
and implementation of capital regulations in the US by using methodologies other 
than a partial adjustment framework. Among these studies, Wall and Peterson (1987) 
investigated the impact of capital regulations on US banks. They claim that, the US 
bank regulators issued explicit capital standards in 1981 in order to address the long- 
term decline in capital ratios of many large banking organisations during the 1970s. 
Therefore, they investigated whether the 1981 US capital guidelines has any effect 
on the equity capital to asset ratios of large BHCs'. Wall and Peterson argue that 
there are six factors that influence the capital policies of BHCs. These are: 
1) Capital regulations, 
2) Deposit insurance, which tends to decrease the optimal capital by shifting 
part of the risk of failure from depositors to government, 
3) Tax advantages of debt, which encourage lower capital ratios, 
4) Diseconomies of scale in producing deposit services, which encourage 
higher capital ratios, 
's Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is one of the key provisions of the FDICIA (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act), which came into effect in 1991. PCA provisions obliged 
supervisors to take specific actions when a bank's capital ratios fell below certain trigger levels. 
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5) Bankruptcy costs, which tend to increase optimal capital, 
6) Profitability (banks with high earnings might be in a better position to 
increase their capital ratios). 
Wall and Peterson examined the hypothesis that the primary capital guidelines 
imposed by regulators influenced the changes in large BIICs' equity capital. They 
used a disequilibrium estimation procedure16 that allows BIHCs to be influenced by 
binding regulatory capital regulations or by market forces. In this framework, 
maximum likelihood techniques'? were employed and if the regulatory pressure 
exceeds market pressure, i. e. regulations are binding, the BHC is assumed to operate 
in the regulatory model. Their findings suggest that the overwhelming majority of the 
BHCs were influenced by regulatory forces and only a small number of BHCs were 
influenced by market forces. They conclude that because regulatory control over 
bank capital leads to greater risk-taking by banks, the regulators should strengthen 
their supervision for those BHCs that increase their capital due to regulatory 
pressures. 
Arguing that the changes in bank capital ratios might have been caused by financial 
markets or regulatory standards, Wall and Peterson (1995) investigated the relative 
impact of regulations and financial markets on the capital ratios of BHCs. They 
applied a disequilibrium methodology to estimate the regulatory equation and the 
financial market optimum equation by maximum likelihood. They argue that 
analysing whether capital regulations cause banks to maintain higher capital ratios is 
important from four aspects. These are: 
1) Can regulators effectively influence bank behaviour? 
16 Wall and Peterson (1987) argue that "disequilibrium estimation overcomes the shortage in ordinary 
least squares estimation as it allows each observation of the dependent variable in a cross section to 
come from one of two regimes. In addition, the probability that an observation came from the first or 
second regime may be estimated A disequilibrium framework represents a common dependent 
variable as the greater (or lesser) of that obtained from two different models". The regulatory regime 
is based on the hypothesis that capital regulations cause at least some banks to maintain higher capital 
levels than they would in the absence of regulation (Wall and Peterson, 1995). 
" The regulatory and financial market equations were estimated by maximum likelihood, which 
selects the optimal separation of the observations into two regimes by maximising the likelihood 
function. 
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2) Do binding capital regulations cause banks to take more risk? 
3) Do increased capital ratios cause credit crunch, i. e. a reduction in the 
growth rate of bank lending? 
4) If regulations are not binding, does this suggest that banks are subject to 
substantial market discipline? 
They found that most BHCs are not influenced by the market or regulatory pressure 
to adjust their leverage ratios in 1989. However, BHCs were found to be influenced 
by the actual implementation of the risk-based capital regulations after 1990. 
Therefore, they conclude that regulators influence capital levels. 
All the above-mentioned studies investigated the impact of capital regulations on the 
US banks' capital levels. The only study concerning the UK banks' response to 
capital regulations is the research of Ediz et al. (1998). In this study, they used 
confidential supervisory data of British banks and employed both descriptive 
statistical analysis and a regression model. Their findings suggest that capital 
requirements affect bank behaviour over and above the influence of the banks' own 
internally generated capital targets. Furthermore, banks were found to achieve 
adjustments in their capital ratios primarily by directly boosting their capital rather. 
than through systematic substitution away from assets such as corporate.. loans. 
Finally, they conclude that capital requirements are attractive regulatory instruments 
as they serve the aim of strengthening the stability of the banking system without 
apparently distorting banks' lending choices. 
Building on previous work by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001) used 
simultaneous equation models to analyse adjustments in capital and risk at the Swiss 
banks. He found that the Swiss banks, which had capital ratios below the minimum 
regulatory capital requirements, increased their ratio of capital to risk-weighted 
assets. This result indicates that regulatory pressure has the desired impact on banks' 
behaviour. Rime argues that the regulatory pressure on the Swiss banks' capital is 
not larger in amplitude than that reported for comparable studies on the UK and US 
banks. Although Rime found a positive and significant relationship between the 
changes in risk and the changes in the ratio of capital to total assets, he failed to find 
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a significant relationship between the changes in risk and the changes in the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets. According to Rime, these two findings are consistent 
in a regime of risk-based capital standards "... as banks constrained by the capital 
requirements have to increase their ratio of capital to total assets following an 
increase in risk to keep their risk-adjusted capital ratio constant. " lie concludes that 
as the implementation of capital regulation in Switzerland has decreased the capital 
burden for Swiss banks, the positive relationship between capital and risk is not a 
result of higher capital requirements. 
One of the fundamental arguments concerning capital regulations is that these 
regulations are effective if they result in an increase in capital levels (Rime, 2001). 
Therefore, by implementing capital adequacy regulations, bank regulators require 
additional capital for banks. This is called the regulatory cost hypothesis. Although it 
is costly for bank managers to increase capital ratios, the regulatory view considers 
capital as a cushion that absorbs unexpected losses. Therefore, this hypothesis 
implies that in order to be effective, capital regulations should increase the capital 
level of banks. 
Sheldon (1996) also argues . that capital regulations are intended to raise the capital 
standards of the institutions that they cover. Since these regulations increase the 
percentage of capital that banks must hold and therefore expand the buffer available 
to absorb losses to the value of a bank's assets, solid capital requirements are 
expected to decrease the probability of bank failure. As a result, with an increase in 
the capital ratio, the protection of depositors and debt-holders increase, as well as the 
increase in the soundness and stability of the banking system as a whole. 
The literature review concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank 
capital demonstrates that the earlier studies did not make any distinction between 
bank short-run and long-run effects of capital regulations. These studies did not 
employ any lagged capital growth in the models and only regressed capital growth on 
conditioning variables. However, the recent studies have generally employed a 
partial adjustment framework. Marcus (1983), Wall and Peterson (1987) and Dahl 
and Shrieves (1990) used a partial adjustment framework to model bank capital 
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decisions. Following them, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) used this model to test the 
relationship between bank capital levels and portfolio risk. Later, Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Rime (2001) modified the model of 
Shrieves and Dahl to analyse the impact of the risk-based capital regulations on bank 
capital and risk levels. 
In these studies, recognising that banks may not be able to adjust their desired capital 
and portfolio risk levels instantaneously, the changes in the capital and risk ratios are 
modelled by using a partial adjustment framework. In this framework, the 
discretionary changes in capital and risk are proportional to the difference between 
the target levels and the levels existing in period 1-1. The actual changes of capital 
and risk of a bank are assumed to follow the below process: 
Ký - Ký-i = SiK1 - Kr-ý) + ýý (3.1) 
where K, is the actual capital (or risk) at time t, K: is the capital (or risk) target for 
time t, 8 is the coefficient of adjustment and c, is a random error. If the target level 
is less than the level existing in period t-1, then the actual change is on average 
negative. If the target level is higher than the level existing in period t-1, then the 
actual change is on average positive. Therefore, in the long run the actual level will 
be likely to converge towards the target level and the extent of the coefficient of 
adjustment (8)-indicates the rate at which this convergence occurs. 
Equation 3.1 indicates that the actual change is decomposed into two components. 
These are, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by an exogenously 
determined random shock. As the target level is not observable, it is assumed that the 
target level depends upon a set of observable variables. Therefore, in the previous 
studies the capital (or risk) target was replaced by observable variables indicating the 
bank's financial condition, such as bank size, risk variables, and profitability, as well 
as regulatory and macro economic conditions. 
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The literature review concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations also 
demonstrates that, in general the studies concerning the impact of capital regulations 
on bank capital levels provide contradictory results. However, banks may also react 
to the implementation of these regulations by changing their risk-taking. The next 
section presents the literature review concerning the impact of capital adequacy 
regulations on bank risk-taking. 
3.4 The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulations on Bank Risk-Taking 
Another issue in the literature concerning the impact of capital regulations is whether 
increased capital standards have any effect on bank risk-taking. The implementation 
of capital adequacy regulations may influence banks either by increasing capital or 
by decreasing their risk-taking. On the other hand, banks may also respond to these 
regulations by increasing their risk-taking. Therefore, it is a very important issue to 
analyse the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank risk-taking. Leonard and 
Biswas (1998) stress that: 
"Changes in the regulations governing financial institutions change the 
opportunities for risk-taking and regulatory costs; therefore, regulatory 
changes will establish a new equilibrium level of risk-taking that equates the 
new level of marginal benefits and costs. It is an empirical issue whether 
changes in the incentives for risk-taking dominate or are dominated by changes 
in regulatory and risk-related costs and whether changes in regulations lead to 
increased or decreased risk-taking by banks. " 
Avery and Berger (1991) also argue that one of the important questions that has been 
investigated in the bank capital standard literature is whether increased capital 
standards increase or decrease bank risk-taking. They state that: 
"Virtually all authors agree that a mandatory increase in capital has the direct 
effect of reducing insolvency risk by providing an increased `buffer stock' of 
reserve funds to absorb losses. (.. ) However, authors sharply disagree upon 
whether banks in typical financial conditions will generally increase or 
decrease portfolio and insolvency risks as a result of increased capital 
requirements. " 
Although the aim of implementing capital adequacy regulations is to provide a buffer 
to absorb unexpected losses, these regulations can also create a moral hazard 
problem by increasing banks' risk-taking. Whether there is any relationship between 
capital regulations and bank risk-taking is another issue that has led to a considerable 
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discussion. The studies of Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and 
Santomero (1988), Furlong and Keeley (1989), Keeley and Furlong (1990), Sheldon 
(1996) and Leonard and Biswas (1998) exclusively concentrated on the impact of 
capital regulations and bank risk-taking. 
On the other hand, the studies of Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Rime (2001) investigated the impact of 
capital regulations on capital levels as well as analysing the relationship between 
capital regulations and bank risk-taking. As explained in the previous section, 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) found a positive relationship between changes in risk and 
capital. On the other hand, Jacques and Nigro (1997) found that the risk-based capital 
regulations result in a significant increase in capital and decrease in portfolio risk of 
well-capitalised banks, while the impact is little on undercapitalised banks. 
Furthermore, Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) demonstrated that the PCA has been 
effective in getting banks to simultaneously increase their capital ratios and reduce 
their level of portfolio risk. However, the results of the study of Rime (2001) are not 
so clear. Rime found a positive and significant relationship between the changes in 
risk and the changes in the ratio of capital to total assets, but could not find a 
significant relationship between the changes in risk and the changes in the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets. As a result, the empirical studies that investigated the 
relationship between capital and bank risk-taking reach contradictory results. 
In addition, the theoretical studies which investigated this issue also provided 
contradictory results. Among these studies, Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero 
(1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) concentrated only on the relationship between 
capital regulations and risk-taking. These studies demonstrated that higher regulatory 
capital standards have caused banks to increase their risk-taking and therefore might 
lead to higher probability of failure. On the other hand, the theoretical studies of 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) suggest that increased 
capital standards would not necessarily cause value-maximising banks to increase 
their risk-taking. 
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The studies of Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980),. and Kim and 
Santomero (1988) were based on a utility maximising framework in which banks 
seek to maximise their utilities. In this framework, higher capital ratios lead to an 
increase in the probability of failure because of the increased asset risk to maintain 
the same rate of return on the increased capital' 8. 
Analysing the impact of constraints on asset portfolio composition and capital 
requirements on the probability of insolvency, Kahane (1977) found that these 
factors are ineffective in reducing failure probability. Kahane concludes that 
increased capital requirements lead to increased bank risk. 
Using the same framework, i. e. utility maximising, Koehn and Santomero (1980) 
examined the issue of portfolio reaction to capital requirements by investigating the 
effect of capital regulation on the portfolio behaviour of commercial banks. They 
firstly examined the portfolio allocation of a bank and then examined the effects on 
bank portfolio risk of a regulatory increase in the minimum capital asset ratio. Koehn 
and Santomero found that banks react by rearranging their asset portfolio towards 
riskier assets when higher capital requirements are imposed. They conclude that, 
although the central purpose of bank regulation is to reduce bank risk-taking, so as to 
reduce the probability of failure in order to protect depositors and the banking system 
as a whole, when higher capital requirements are imposed an opposite result could be 
expected. Therefore, regulating bank capital through ratio constraints appears to be 
an inadequate tool to control the riskiness of banks and the probability of failure. 
Employing utility maximisation framework similar to Kahane's and Koehn and 
Santomero's studies, Kim and Santomero (1988) examined the effectiveness of 
capital regulations in an environment of fixed rate deposit insurance. They found that 
the portfolio risk of a bank might increase with higher capital standards and the 
probability of failure could actually rise with higher capital requirements. They 
conclude that uniform capital requirements are not effective to control bank failure 
and therefore to maintain a safe and sound banking system, while risk weights under 
'$ The utility maximising framework attempts to optimise the shareholder's rate of return on the 
bank's capital by selecting an optimal portfolio of assets and leverage positions (Sundaresan, 1996). 
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risk-based capital requirements are more effective as the weights are chosen 
optimally. 
The studies of Kahane, Koehn and Santomero and Kim and Santomero demonstrate 
that a more stringent capital requirement may influence financial institutions to 
substitute riskier assets for less risky ones and therefore may increase the risk of 
trading portfolios and the probability of default. These studies conclude that the 
effect of an increased capital asset ratio is therefore contrary to the desired objective. 
However, some studies do not support the view that capital requirements play a role 
" in bank risk-taking. Furlong and Keeley (1989), for example, criticise Kahane, 
Koehn and Santomero and Kim and Santomero as their models do not hold for value 
maximising banks, for which the liability exposure of the deposit insurance system is 
especially relevant. According to Furlong and Keeley, these studies have internally 
inconsistent models and their results cannot be used to support the claim that 
implementing capital regulations could increase bank risk-taking. Furlong and 
Keeley analysed the effect of stringent capital requirements in a value maximising 
framework by studying the impact of changes in banks' incentives for increasing 
asset risk due to the changes in the capital ratio requirements. Furlong and Keeley 
used a state-preference model (two periods and two states) to analyse the portfolio 
and leverage decisions of a bank that is subject to deposit insurance and maximises 
its current market value of equity. By demonstrating that more stringent capital 
regulations would reduce bank risk-taking as long as the severity of the regulation of 
asset portfolio risk remains unchanged, they conclude that higher bank capital ratios 
do not lead value-maximising banks to increase asset risk. Their results also indicate 
that instead of selling assets and reducing deposits, a value maximising bank prefers 
to meet higher required capital ratios by raising additional capital. 
Keeley and Furlong (1990) also criticise the utility maximising framework because 
of questionable assumptions and demonstrate that if banks have diversified 
portfolios, capital requirements could reduce bank risk-taking. In sum, the studies of 
Keeley and Furlong demonstrate that higher capital requirements reduce the 
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incentives to increase asset risk and conclude that more stringent capital regulations 
reduce the risk exposure to the deposit insurance system. 
Empirically analysing the appropriateness of risk-weights in risk-based capital 
regulations, Avery and Berger (1991) argue that if risk-based capital risk-weights 
correspond precisely with bank risk-taking, this implicit pricing of risk-taking might 
offset incentives to increase risk-taking influenced by the increased capital 
requirements. Therefore, they tried to find an answer to the question of "How do the 
risk weights correspond to actual bank risk? " Using data on US banks from 1982 to 
1989, Avery and Berger regressed historical measures of bank performance, such as 
portfolio losses and bank failures, on the items in the 1988 Basle Accord's risk 
categories and examined the efficacy of the relative weights assigned. They also 
compared the ability of various measures of capital, including both the new and the 
previous capital standards, to predict future bank performance. In addition, they 
examined the stringency of the new standards to determine whether they are likely to 
be effective in changing bank behaviour. Avery and Berger found that the new 
standards are more stringent not only on large banks but also on small banks. They 
conclude that the 1988 Basle Accord comprises a significant improvement over the 
previous capital standards. However, because their results are based on historical- 
associations, conclusions regarding future -bank performance and behaviour should 
be drawn carefully. 
Leonard and Biswas (1998) investigated changes in bank risk-taking behaviour of 
US banks resulting from the regulatory changes. In particular, they tested the 
regulatory cost hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that more restrictive 
enforcement practices (greater regulatory scrutiny that resulted from passage of 
FIRREA19 in 1989) increased regulatory costs for banks and therefore reduced the 
level of risk-taking. Their results indicate that more restrictive enforcement practices 
limited the excessive risk-taking of banks. In addition, they conducted a two-stage 
least squares analysis to investigate whether the changes in capital and the changes in 
credit risk index were determined simultaneously. However, the results of this 
analysis do not indicate any significant relationship between risk-taking and capital. 
"Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act. 
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Sheldon (1996) also investigated the impact of capital regulations on bank risk- 
taking by using a sample of banks operating in different countries. In particular, 
Sheldon investigated the impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on a sample of 219 banks 
drawn from the Basle Committee member countries and his study covers the period 
from 1987 to 1994. The empirical methodology that Sheldon applied is based on the 
call option interpretation of firm equity stemming from the Black-Scholes model of 
option valuation. The results indicate little evidence that implementation of the 
guidelines had a risk increasing impact on bank portfolios. 
In his theoretical study, Blum (1999) also explored whether capital adequacy rules 
cause an increase in bank risk-taking. By using a two-period model, Blum 
demonstrates that as capital requirements increase the marginal utility of a unit of 
capital tomorrow, tighter capital requirements may lead to an increase in risk in an 
effort to increase the expected return. Blum concludes, "if regulators are mainly 
concerned about reducing the insolvency risk of banks, introducing capital rules, 
therefore, may not be such a good idea after all. " 
Consequently, the studies that have investigated the relationship between bank 
capital and risk-taking could not reach uniform conclusions. Therefore, whether the 
implementation of capital adequacy regulations creates a moral hazard problem by 
increasing banks' risk-taking is an important question that should be answered. 
Another important issue concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations is the 
relationship between these regulations and OBS activities. In response to the capital 
regulations, banks can also increase their risk-taking by increasing their OBS 
activities, in particular, derivative activities. The next section investigates the 
relationship between capital regulations and OBS activities. 
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3.5 The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulations on Bank OHS Activities 
The aim of this section is to review the related literature and provide an analytical 
background for the relationship between capital regulations and off-balance sheet 
activities, in particular, derivative activities. This review is crucial as it provides the 
theoretical background to the analysis that tests the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations on bank derivative activities in the next chapter. 
Off-balance sheet (OBS) activities have been increasing dramatically since the 1970s 
The growing importance of OBS activities also worried the regulators and led them 
to propose the risk-based capital standards that also cover credit risk of these 
activities in 1986 (Baer and Pavel, 1988). Hassan et al. (1994) points out to this issue 
by stating that "Bank regulators have been concerned that off-balance sheet 
activities increase the riskiness of banks, and have enacted a risk-based capital 
requirement for some OBS activities. " As a result, the risk-based capital requirements 
implemented by the Basle Accord in 1988 were set up to cover credit risk of OBS 
activities as well. 
Gunther- and Siems (1995) also argue that the growth of derivative activities of banks 
and highly publicised derivative related losses have led regulators and policy-makers 
to worry about the potential impact of derivative activities. According to Jagtiani 
(1996), because the notional amount of derivatives exceeds the equity capital of 
many banks, losses from derivative activities could potentially wipe out bank's 
capital and threaten the safety. and soundness of the banking system. These 
discussions lead to the argument that banks become more risky when they engage in 
derivative activities. 
The existing literature examined the key motivations for the explosive growth in 
bank OBS activities, including derivatives. A popular explanation for this growth is 
the avoidance of capital requirements, i. e. capital avoidance hypothesis. This 
hypothesis indicates that OBS activities of banks increase because of the lack of 
capital standards (Jagtiani et al., 1995). However, the studies that test this hypothesis 
provided contradictory results. While Giddy (1985) argues that capital requirements 
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encourage banks to engage in OBS activities, Koppenhaver (1989) argues that the 
`bindingness' of capital constraints is not an important factor in banks' decisions to 
use OBS activities. The studies of Pavel and Phillis (1987), Baer and Pavel (1988), 
Koppenhaver (1989) and Koppenhaver and Stover (1994) are among the studies that 
have empirically investigated the relationship between the implementation of capital 
regulations and OBS activities. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) investigated the reasons of banks selling their assets. They 
found that banks are involved in asset securitisation in order to reduce regulatory 
taxes, such as deposit insurance premiums and reserve requirements. Although they 
indicated that banks are likely to sell loans when capital ratios are low, they did not 
find any supporting evidence that the loan sales were caused by the implementation 
of capital regulations. On the other hand, Baer and Pavel (1988) investigated the 
determinants of stand-by letters of credit activities and found a positive relationship 
between the implementation of capital regulations and stand-by letters of credit 
activities. 
Investigating. the determinants of US commercial bank activity in the market for 
OBS guarantees, Koppenhaver (1989) found that a bank's issuance of loan 
commitments, standby letters of credit, and commercial letters of credit significantly 
depends on bank credibility as a guarantor, regulatory incentives and the willingness 
and ability to accommodate customers. However, Koppenhaver could not find any 
significant relationship between increasing capital requirements and bank OBS 
activities. On the other hand, he found that a number of other regulatory-based 
incentives, such as required reserves and loan loss allocations are significant 
determinants of OBS guarantees. Koppenhaver recommends that if OBS 
participation is a regulatory concern, a policy option should be to pay market interest 
rates on reserve requirements to reduce the relative advantage of OBS banking. On 
the other hand, the results of the Koppenhaver's study indicate a consistent and 
positive relationship between bank asset size and the issuance of OBS guarantees. 
Koppenhaver concludes that "although a capital requirement has very little effect on 
the issuance of off balance sheet guarantees, the imposition of a risk-based capital 
standard may be useful in protecting the solvency of the deposit insurance fund 
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because it provides an additional buffer against the loss of market value for banks 
that engage in the risky activities covered by the standard. " 
Koppenhaver and Stover (1994) also investigated the relationship between bank 
standby letters of credit and capital by employing a simultaneous equation model to 
capture the joint decision process for standby letters of credit issuance and bank 
capital. They found that there is a positive relationship between the issuance of OBS 
activities and bank capital. Therefore their empirical results support the theoretical 
argument that a feedback system exists between OBS activities and bank capital. 
The studies that investigated the relationship between capital regulations and OBS 
activities provide contradictory results. While the studies of Pavel and Phillis (1987) 
and Koppenhaver (1989) could not indicate any significant relationship between the 
implementations of capital regulations and OBS activities, Baer and Pavel (1988) 
and Koppenhaver and Stover (1994) found- a positive relationship between capital 
and OBS activities. However, these studies examined the relationship between 
capital and OBS items excluding derivatives. 
On the other hand, the growth of derivatives has led to more discussion. Jagtiani 
(1996) argues that because the notional amount of derivatives exceeds the equity 
capital of many banks, losses from derivative activities could potentially wipe out 
banks' capital and threaten the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
However, although the determinants of derivative usage have been investigated 
extensively, there is not much evidence in the literature concerning the impact of 
capital adequacy regulations and derivative activities. 
The studies of Koppenhaver (1990), Sinkey and Carter (1997) and Carter and Sinkey 
(1998) are among the studies that investigated the determinants of derivative usage. 
Koppenhaver (1990) analysed the determinants of banks' futures positions. He found 
that banks use interest rate futures in order to hedge their balance sheet risks, 
measured by the maturity gap (the difference between interest bearing assets and 
liabilities maturing or repricing during the relevant period). Koppenhaver also found 
that bank size and experience affect the use of derivatives. 
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Sinkey and Carter (1997) analysed the determinants of derivative usage of US banks 
from 1989 to 1991. They employed two approaches in their study. First, dividing the 
sample banks into user and nonuser groups of derivatives, group means of the 
explanatory variables were compared through descriptive statistics (in particular, the 
statistical significance of the differences in the means of explanatory variables are 
determined by t-tests, which are based on unequal group variances). In addition to 
the descriptive statistics, Sinkey and Carter employed a regression analysis to 
estimate the relationship between the extent of derivative usage and the explanatory 
variables. Derivative activities were measured by the notional value of outstanding 
derivative contracts divided by total assets. The results of the Sinkey and Carter's 
descriptive study indicate that derivative activities are concentrated on large banks 
with lower capital ratios, smaller maturity gaps, lower net interest margins, more 
notes and debentures, greater equity growth, higher dividend payout and greater 
liquidity. On the other hand, similar results were obtained from the econometric 
analysis. The results of the econometric model indicate that larger asset size, low 
capital ratios, low net interest margins, small maturity gaps, high liquidity, high 
dividend payouts and more capital notes are significant determinants of derivative 
usage. 
Carter and Sinkey (1998) investigated the use of interest rate derivatives of US banks 
from 1990 to 1993. They used the outstanding notional value of derivatives scaled by 
total assets to capture the extent of derivative activities by large community banks. 
They found a positive and significant relationship between the use of interest rate 
derivatives and exposure to interest rate risk, measured by the absolute value of the 
one-year maturity gap. Size was also found to be an important factor that positively 
affects the use of derivative instruments. They also found that banks with strong 
capital positions involve heavily in derivative transactions. The results of this study 
support the existence of market discipline, which suggests that external monitoring 
and pricing prevent banks from being involved in risk-taking activities. In addition, 
the results of Carter and Sinkey also support the existence of regulatory discipline, 
which suggests that banks are required to hold more capital because of the capital 
requirements that cover derivative activities of banks. 
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The studies that investigated the characteristics of banks that use derivatives indicate 
that, size is an important factor that determines derivative activities of banks. Booth 
et al. (1984) argue that large banks are more likely to be involved in derivative 
transactions. By surveying banks in the US, they found a strong relationship between 
the size of financial institutions and the usage of derivatives, which is consistent with 
the existence of significant scale economies because of personnel training, education 
of management and development of internal control systems. Booth et al. conclude 
that lack of these considerations is an important obstacle that limits the usage of 
derivative instruments. 
The survey results of Block and Gallagher (1986) also indicate that large size non- 
bank firms involve more in derivative transactions comparing to small firms. Nance 
et al. (1993) state that over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets demonstrate 
significant scale economies in the structure of transaction costs, which means that 
large banks are more likely to use these instruments. In addition, Gunther and Siems 
(1995) claim that only larger banks could gather the necessary resources to 
participate in derivative activities. Investigating the determinants of derivative usage 
for a sample of 175 BHCs in the US, Whidbee and Wohar (1999) found a positive 
relationship between size and the decision to use derivatives. Rogers and Sinkey 
(1999) also argue that participation in non-traditional banking activities, such as 
derivatives, requires specialisation in that area. In addition, banks should hire or train 
their personnel with special work related to derivatives and also acquire advanced 
technology. 
As well as investigating the determinants of derivative usage, the studies of Kim and 
Koppenhaver (1992), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) and 
Jagtiani (1996) have also analysed the impact of capital adequacy regulations on 
derivative activities. 
Kim and Koppenhaver (1992) investigated the characteristics of banks that use 
interest rate swaps. The likelihood of swap market participation was estimated by a 
probit model and the dependent variable in the model reflects a binary choice of 
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bank, i. e. a bank- could either engage in a swap transaction or not. In a separate 
model, Kim and Koppenhaver estimated the swap market participation by banks by 
employing a regression model in which the dependent variable is the notional value 
of the ratio of outstanding interest rate swaps to total bank assets. As explanatory 
variables, they employed the following variables: 
" Absolute maturity gap, as a percent of total assets, 
" Interest rate expectations, 
" Primary capital to asset ratio, 
" Market concentration in deposits, 
" Size, 
"A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bank is a swap dealer, 
" The ratio of loan portfolio to total assets, 
"A dummy variable of futures and forward trading (the use of these 
instruments indicates the experience of a bank with derivative activities), 
"A dummy variable of foreign exchange trading, 
" Two dummy variables that represent the impact of capital regulations. 
Following the arguments of Benveniste and Berger (1987) and Koppenhaver (1989), 
Kim and Koppenhaver point out that the implementation of capital requirements 
might motivate banks to engage in OBS activities. In order to measure the impact of 
capital regulations, they included two dummy variables in the models. First one is 
related to the regulatory pressure and takes the value of 1 if a bank's capital ratio is 
less than 5.5 percent, which is the established minimum capital ratio. In order to 
capture the impact of capital regulations on the decisions of banks whose capital 
ratios are between 5.5 and 7.0 percent (above but close to the uniform standard), 
another dummy variable is included in the models. Kim and Koppenhaver expect a 
positive impact on the likelihood and extent of a banks' swap market participation if 
undercapitalised banks use OBS activities as intermediaries to generate income and 
preserve this income on the capital to meet regulatory requirements. On the other 
hand, if the swap market imposes market discipline on undercapitalised banks, 
regulatory impact variables should be negatively related to swap transaction 
involvement. 
Kim and Koppenhaver use the primary capital to asset ratio as an independent 
variable. They argue that as bank capital increases, the ability to bear risk increases. 
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On the other hand, a high capital position makes a bank an attractive party to a swap 
transaction because of the higher credibility of high-capitalised banks. In addition, 
they argue that size is an important factor that determines derivative activities as 
large banks could make use of specialised management skills needed to effectively 
use these activities. They also argue that because of the `too-big-to-fail' doctrine, 
large banks might be perceived more credible than small banks by the markets and 
therefore be a party to a derivative transaction. 
Kim and Koppenhaver found that the likelihood of swap market participation is 
directly related to the competitiveness of banks and size. However, they found a 
negative relationship between swap market participation and capital levels. Expected 
interest rate change was also found to have a negative relationship with swap market 
participation. On the other hand, increasing interest rate exposure and the ratio of 
loans to total assets, were found to be a determinant of swap market participation. 
Outstanding notional amount of interest rate transactions were also found to be 
directly related to long-term exposure to interest rates, size, loans and the use of 
futures trading. Concerning regulatory impact, Kim and Koppenhaver found a 
negative and significant relationship between the usage of swap transactions and 
dummy variables that represents regulatory capital pressures. Kim and Koppenhaver 
conclude that "Efforts to increase bank capitalisation through the risk-based capital 
guidelines, however, may increase the willingness of banks to bear interest rate risk 
and decrease swap usage as a risk management tool. " 
Jagtiani et al. (1995) argue that although several studies have examined the impact of 
capital requirements and other motivations on the growth of OBS activities, the 
results are mixed. Therefore, they investigated `whether OBS activities grow over 
time as OBS financial technology is diffused among banks'. They also investigated 
the impact of changes in capital requirements on OBS growth by employing dummy 
variables. In their study, they modelled the diffusion of bank OBS activities, such as 
interest rate swaps, standby letters of credit, loan securitisation, interest rate options 
and interest rate futures and forwards. They tested the issue of capital requirements 
and OBS activities by modelling each OBS activity as an innovation whose adoption 
follows a diffusion pattern specific to that activity. The notional dollar amounts of 
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OBS activities were used in the analysis. As bank characteristics, they employed the 
logarithm of total assets, foreign currency deposits as a percentage of total deposits, 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, the ratio of net income to total assets 
and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. The implementation of new 
capital regulations was captured by dummy variables. There were two capital 
requirement changes during the period of their study. First, in June 1985, the uniform 
minimum capital ratios (the ratio of capital to total assets), second, in July 1988, the 
risk-based capital regulations (the Basle Accord) were implemented in the US. 
The results of Jagtiani et al. 's study indicate that the implementation of uniform 
- capital requirements 
in -1985 has had a significant negative impact on derivative 
activities. However, the implementation of these regulations has had a significant 
positive impact on standby letters of credit and loan securitisation. They conclude 
that standby letters of credit and loan sales might have been used by banks to avoid 
capital requirements. The results concerning the impact of the Basle Accord indicate 
that the risk-based capital requirements do not reduce the growth of derivative 
transactions. In addition, the results of the model that investigates the impact of bank 
characteristics on OBS growth did not produce significant coefficients. Therefore, 
Jagdani et al. conclude that "the adoption of OBS derivative products seems to be 
related to technological and learning factors and overall economic activity". 
By employing time series cross-section data over the period 1984 to 1991 for 91 
largest banks in the US, Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) examined the impact of the 
risk-based capital regulations. They found that banks do not reduce their OBS 
activities in response to the regulatory tax imposed by the risk-based capital 
regulations, which is consistent- with Jagtiani et al. 's findings. They also found that 
the changes in risk-based capital reduce the optimal bank size that achieves 
maximum scale and scope economies. As a result, following the implementation of 
capital requirements, some large banks that have been efficient until that time have 
become too large and inefficient. They conclude that regulations encourage large 
banks to expand their activities. 
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Jagtiani (1996) investigated whether capital requirements encourage banks to 
increase their swap transactions and whether market discipline exists in the swap 
market. In order to investigate the relationship between a bank's probability to use 
swap transactions and capital regulations, a logit analysis was employed (in which 
the dependent variable is 1 if a bank uses swap transactions). The analysis was 
performed on panel data from 1985Q2 to 1991Q3. In addition to bank size, dummy 
variables were employed to measure the impact of capital constraints as explanatory 
variables in this logit model. Furthermore, in order to investigate the factors that 
determine the volume of swap transactions, OLS estimation was employed. Jagtiani 
employed two measures of swap volume in this second analysis; first, each bank's 
market share (notional amount of swaps to aggregate notional amount of swaps of all 
banks in the sample), and second, the ratio of notional amount of swaps to total 
assets. Six variables were included in this model as explanatory variables. These are; 
the capital ratio, a dummy variable that represents money centre banks, S&P rating, 
futures and forward contracts and balance sheet creditworthiness (measured by the 
ratio of income to total assets and the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets). 
The results of the logit model suggest that banks that are subject to a binding capital 
constraint are more likely to be involved in swap transactions. Jagtiani explains these 
results by stating that "when loan activities are constrained, in order to generate 
--. income, 
banks engage more in swap transactions". The results of the OLS model 
also suggest that there is a positive significant relationship between credit-worthiness 
and the use of swap transactions. Therefore, it is concluded that creditworthy banks 
will be more involved in swap transactions, which - 
is an evidence of market 
discipline in the swap market. As a result, Jagtiani underlines that bank 
creditworthiness plays an important role in the use of swap activities. 
As a result, the argument concerning that, OBS activities of banks increase because 
of the lack of capital standards, has been tested by a number of studies. The studies, 
which investigated the relationship between capital regulations and OBS activities 
excluding derivative activities, provide contradictory results. The studies that 
investigated the relationship between derivative activities and capital regulations also 
provide contradictory results. While Kim and Koppenhaver (1992) found a negative 
and significant relationship between the usage of swap transactions and regulatory 
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capital pressures, Jagtiani et al. (1995) and Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) found that 
the implementation of the risk-based capital requirements do not reduce the growth 
of derivative transactions. On the other hand, Jagtiani (1996) found that banks that 
are subject to a binding capital constraint are more likely to be involved in swap 
transactions. 
As a conclusion, there is an emerging literature that investigates the impact of capital 
requirements on bank OBS activities. However, rather than investigating the impact 
of capital adequacy regulations on derivative activities, these studies have generally 
concentrated on other OBS activities. In addition, the studies that investigated the 
relationship between derivative activities and capital regulations could not provide 
uniform evidence. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
Among the financial safety nets that policy-makers rely on to ensure the stability of a 
banking system, deposit insurance and capital adequacy have always played a 
prominent role. Although policy-makers generally consider that deposit insurance is 
necessary to protect small depositors and to prevent bank runs, it could also cause a 
moral hazard problem. Therefore, it is generally accepted that policy-makers 
implement capital adequacy regulations to overcome the moral hazard problem 
created by deposit insurance. On the other hand, the literature concerning the 
interaction between deposit insurance and capital regulations indicates that a deposit 
insurance scheme may not be necessary if banks have adequate capital. 
As a result, bank regulators place so much emphasis on banks' capital adequacy and 
try to affect bank capital by setting capital adequacy regulations to ensure that banks 
hold sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. However, the impact of these 
regulations is not clear. 
This chapter summarised the literature concerning the impact of capital regulations 
on bank capital levels, risk-taking, and OBS activities. Despite the fact that capital 
requirements are accepted as being crucial for the soundness of the financial system, 
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the discussion regarding the impact of these regulations on financial institutions is 
still an important issue and attracts both the attention of academics and regulators. 
The literature review presented in this section demonstrates that in general the 
studies concerning the impact of capital regulations on bank capital levels provide 
contradictory results. On the other hand, this review demonstrates that a partial 
adjustment methodology has been broadly employed to test the impact of capital 
adequacy regulations on bank capital levels and risk-taking. 
The implementation of capital adequacy regulations may influence banks either by 
increasing their capital or by decreasing their risk-taking. Therefore, banks may also 
react to the implementation of these regulations by changing their risk-taking. The 
studies that investigated the relationship between bank capital and risk-taking failed 
to reach a uniform result concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations on 
bank risk-taking. Therefore, whether the implementation of capital adequacy 
regulations creates a moral hazard problem by increasing banks' risk-taking is an 
important question that should be answered. 
Another important issue concerning the impact of capital adequacy regulations is the 
relationship between these regulations and OBS activities. In response to capital 
regulations, banks can also increase their risk-taking by increasing- their OBS 
activities, in particular, derivative activities. The literature. review concerning the 
relationship between capital regulations and OBS activities provide contradictory 
results. Although there is an emerging literature that investigates the impact of 
capital requirements on bank OBS activities, most of these studies have concentrated 
on OBS activities excluding derivatives. In addition, the studies that investigated the 
relationship between derivative activities and capital regulations could not provide 
uniform evidence. 
Furthermore, although the impact of capital adequacy regulations has been analysed 
extensively in the literature, excluding the study of Danielsson et al. (2004), there is 
not much empirical evidence concerning the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations. In addition, the impact of these regulations on bank capital levels and 
derivative activities is an issue that has not yet been investigated in the literature. 
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In summary, there is an ongoing debate concerning the effects of capital adequacy 
regulations. Therefore, it is a key question to find out whether the implementation of 
the market risk capital regulations has created any impact on bank capital levels and 
derivative activities. In order to analyse this issue, an econometric analysis is carried 
out in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMPACT OF THE MARKET RISK CAPITAL 
REGULATIONS ON BANK CAPITAL LEVELS 
AND DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to empirically analyse the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations on bank activities. The implementation of these regulations can influence 
banks either by increasing their capital or by decreasing their trading activities and in 
particular, trading derivatives. Therefore, the analysis provided in this chapter 
investigates the impact of the market risk capital regulations on the changes of bank 
capital levels and derivative activities. 
The changes in capital levels and derivative activities are modelled by using a partial 
adjustment framework. In these models, the changes in the capital and derivative 
usage ratios depend on the lagged level of the capital and derivative usage ratios. In 
addition, a range of variables describing banks' activities and risk-taking are 
assumed to have an impact on these variables. The study focuses on the large US 
BHCs, as they are more involved in trading activities and therefore subject to the 
market risk capital regulations. Using quarterly data for the period 1995Q4 to 
1999Q4, a panel data analysis is employed to obtain the estimates 
One of the fundamental arguments concerning capital regulations is that these 
regulations are effective if they result in an increase in capital levels. Accordingly, by 
implementing the market risk capital regulations, bank regulators require additional 
capital for banks that are heavily involved in trading activities. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of these regulations can be tested by examining to what extent the 
implementation of these regulations has an impact on bank capital levels. 
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The first research question of this analysis is whether the implementation of market 
risk capital regulations has an effect on capital levels. Accordingly, the first 
hypothesis that is tested in this study is the regulatory cost hypothesis. Although it is 
costly for bank managers to increase capital levels, the regulatory view considers 
capital as a cushion that absorbs unexpected losses. Therefore, this hypothesis 
implies that in order to be effective, capital regulations should increase the capital 
levels of banks. 
In order to test the regulatory cost hypothesis, the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations on bank capital levels is analysed. This analysis indicates whether the 
market risk capital regulations are effective by causing an increase in the capital 
level. A finding of `no relationship' between the implementation of these regulations 
and the change in capital ratios should indicate that the market risk capital 
regulations are not effective, as there is no regulatory influence on the capital 
decisions of banks. On the other hand, a significant positive coefficient of the 
variable that proxies for the implementation of the market risk capital regulations 
should indicate that these particular regulations are effective. 
The second research question -of this analysis is -whether there is a relationship 
between the implementation of the market risk capital regulations and the usage of 
derivatives. To find an answer to this question, the capital avoidance hypothesis is 
tested. According to this hypothesis, OBS activities of banks increase because of the 
lack of capital standards. In order to test this hypothesis, the impact of the market 
risk capital regulations on derivative activities is investigated. A finding of a negative 
relationship between the implementation of the market risk regulations and the 
change in derivative usage ratios could demonstrate that with the existence of capital 
regulations banks' derivative activities decrease. On the other hand, a significant 
positive coefficient of the variable indicates that there is no capital avoidance that 
causes a decrease in derivative usage by the implementation of these regulations. 
The two main hypotheses that are tested in this study in order to investigate the 
impact of the market risk capital regulations are presented below. 
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1) 111: The implementation of the market risk capital regulations increases 
capital levels of banks (the regulatory cost hypothesis). 
2) H1: The implementation of the market risk capital regulations decreases 
the usage of derivatives (the capital avoidance hypothesis). 
There are four additional hypotheses that are tested within this analysis. These are; 
the economies of scale hypothesis, the moral hazard hypothesis, the regulatory 
discipline hypothesis, and the market discipline hypothesis. 
The research questions related to the economies of scale theory are; whether there is 
a relationship between i) bank capital and asset size, and ii) level of derivative 
activities and asset size. The size of a bank might influence its capital level in more 
than one way. The prediction of economies of scale in the production of deposit 
services suggests a negative relationship between size and capital level as larger 
institutions attract more deposits. Furthermore, because larger banks could better 
diversify their portfolios, they have lower bankruptcy risks. In addition, depositors 
and debt-holders believe that large banks are protected from failure by implicit 
guarantees of regulators, and this belief rises with size. This argument is known as 
the `too-big-to-fail' doctrine. According to this doctrine, bank regulators could be 
more committed to bailout larger banks that are considered `too-big-to-fail' in the 
event of distress and insolvency. In addition, capital is considered as an expensive 
source for bank managers. Therefore, large banks are more reluctant to increase their 
capital levels. These arguments suggest a negative relationship between bank size 
and capital levels. 
Concerning derivative activities, the literature indicates that size is an important 
factor that determines derivative activities of banks. As large banks are more likely 
to use derivatives, a positive relationship between bank size and derivative activities 
is expected. 
Another research question is to find out whether there is a relationship between the 
level of bank capital and derivative activities. In addition to this, the relationship 
75 
between the level of bank capital and risk-taking of banks is also investigated. 
According to the moral hazard hypothesis, banks with low capital invest more in 
risky portfolios and use more derivative activities. Rogers and Sinkcy (1999) argue 
that because of moral hazard, banks use derivative activities to take advantage of 
deposit insurance. Therefore, excessive risk-taking arises as deposit insurance allows 
banks to take more risk without having to pay a risk premium on deposits (Calem 
and Rob, 1999; Rogers and Sinkey, 1999). Moral hazard might encourage low- 
capitalised banks to use derivative transactions to increase their risk-taking, as these 
activities could be used for speculative purposes (Sinkey and Carter, 1997). 
However, the moral hazard hypothesis is not strongly supported by empirical studies 
(Park, 1997). In order to test this hypothesis, the relationship between bank capital 
and derivative activities and the level of risk-taking are examined in this study. 
The regulatory discipline hypothesis suggests that banks are required to hold more 
capital because of the capital -requirements that cover derivative activities of banks. 
Due to the regulatory capital requirements, banks that have relatively higher levels of 
capital are more likely to participate in derivative markets (Carter and Sinkey, 1998). 
Therefore, this hypothesis is also tested to determine whether a positive relationship 
between bank capital levels and derivative activities exists. 
On the other hand, market discipline could prevent banks from using derivatives. 
According to the market discipline hypothesis, external monitoring and pricing 
prevent banks from being involved in risk-taking activities (Sinkey and Carter, 
1997). Therefore, with the decrease of the indicators of creditworthiness, the risk- 
taking activities of banks are also expected to decrease. This hypothesis suggests a 
positive relationship between the indicators of credibility and derivative activities. 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses. 
1) H1: There is a negative relationship between bank capital levels and asset 
size (the economies of scale hypothesis). 
2) H1: There is a positive relationship between bank derivative activities 
and asset size (the economies of scale hypothesis). 
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3) Ill: There is a negative relationship between bank capital levels and bank 
risk-taking (the moral hazard hypothesis). 
4) H1: There is a negative relationship between bank capital levels and 
derivative activities (the moral hazard hypothesis). 
5) 111: There is a positive relationship between bank capital levels and 
derivative activities (the regulatory discipline and market discipline 
hypotheses). 
6) H1: There is a negative relationship between bank derivative activities 
and risk-taking (the market discipline hypothesis). 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The second section explains the methodology. As 
well as the models that are employed to determine the impact of the market risk 
capital regulations on bank capital levels and derivative activities, the dependent and 
independent variables are also presented in this section. The third section introduces 
the data. The fourth section reports the empirical results. The findings are explained 
in the fifth section. 
4.2 Methodology 
In this study, the changes in capital and derivative usage ratios are modelled by using 
a partial adjustment framework. In this framework, the discretionary changes in 
capital and derivative usage are proportional to the difference between the target 
levels and the levels existing in period t-1. The actual changes of capital and 
derivative usage of a bank are assumed to follow the below process: 
Ký -K, -t =5(K, -K, -1)+cr 
(4.1) 
where K, is the actual capital ratio (or derivative usage ratio) at time t, K, is the 
target capital ratio (or target derivative usage) for time t, (K, -K, -, 
) is the actual 
change and (K, - K, _, 
) is the desired change in the capital ratio (or derivative usage 
ratio), S is the coefficient of adjustment, which is (0 < 851), and C, is a random 
error. If K, is less than K, _,, 
then (K, - K, _, 
) is on average negative. If K, ' is 
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higher than K, _,, 
then (K, -K, _, 
) is on average positive. In the long run, K, will be 
likely to converge towards K; and the extent of the coefficient of adjustment (5) 
indicates the rate at which this convergence occurs. 
Equation 4.1 indicates that the actual change is decomposed into two components. 
These are, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by an exogenously 
determined random shock. As K, ' is not observable in Equation 4.1, it is assumed to 
depend upon a set of observable variables. 
The major assumptions and limitations of using this framework are presented below: 
1) This framework assumes that banks do not adjust their target capital 
levels and derivative activities instantaneously. In this framework, banks 
adjust their desired levels with a lag that is approximated by a partial 
adjustment specification. 
2) This framework assumes that banks adjust their portfolios as the actual 
holding of an asset grows further away from what is desired. However, 
banks may not forcefully adjust their portfolios if they are not in danger 
of hitting their minimum required capital levels. 
3) As bank capital and derivative targets (with . or without any capital 
regulation) are difficult to observe, they are assumed to depend upon a 
set of observable independent variables. This framework offers a 
practical advantage, as the formulation is fundamentally linear in the 
parameters. However, the actual changes could be determined 
nonlinearly by the independent variables. Therefore, assuming that the 
actual changes of capital and derivatives linearly depend upon a set of 
observable independent variables is an important limitation of the study. 
4) The impact of capital regulations is measured by the coefficient of a 
dummy variable. However, this is another limitation of this framework as 
the dummy variable may be influenced by any omitted variable. 
The models based on this framework are explained in the following sub-section. 
78 
4.2.1 Model Specification 
In order to investigate the impact of the market risk capital regulations, the actual 
changes in capital and derivatives usage ratios are modelled by using a partial 
adjustment framework. 
The actual changes in capital and derivative usage ratios are the changes in the bank 
j's capital and derivative usage ratios during the period t, such that: 
ACAPj,, = CAPS ,, - 
CAP J , l_I 
and 
ADER,, =DERB,, -DER , t_1 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
where ACAPj,, and ODER j,, are the total actual changes in the capital and 
derivative usage ratios during the period t for bank j, respectively. CAPS,, -, and 
DER j , _1 represent 
the bank j's capital and derivative usage ratios at the beginning 
of period t, and CAP,,, and DER j,, represent the end of period t levels for. bank j, 
respectively. 
The actual changes in bank capital and derivative usage ratios have two components. 
The first one is a discretionary adjustment and the second one is the exogenously 
determined random shock, i. e. a change caused by factors exogenous to the bank. 
The changes in capital ratios are formulated as: 
ACAPj,, =ACAPý,, +Ejt (4.4) 
where ACAPý J represents the endogenously 
determined (discretionary) adjustment 
in capital, and E ., 
represents the exogenously determined factors (random shock) 
for bank j in period t. 
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The changes in derivative usage ratios are formulated as: 
ADER 
., =ODER 
f. +U 
.t 
(4.5) 
where ADER j .t 
is the discretionary adjustment in derivative usage and, U ,. t 
represents the exogenously determined random shocks. 
Considering capital, exogenous changes could be the result of enforced increases in 
the required capital by regulators or unanticipated changes in earnings. Considering 
derivative usage, exogenous changes could be the result of unanticipated shocks. 
The behaviour of banks is modelled by using the partial adjustment framework, such 
that: 
ACAP) 
,, =a 
(CAP f -CAP J , f_, 
) (4.6) 
and 
ADER 
,r=ß 
(DER;., -DER,,, -, 
) (4.7) 
where CAP J ., 
and DER;,, are bankj's target capital and derivative usage ratios, 
respectively. In a partial adjustment framework, the discretionary changes in capital 
and derivatives are proportional to the difference between the target level and the 
level at the beginning of the period, which is the desired change. a and ßl3 are the 
coefficients that indicate the proportion of the desired level of change. Equations 
(4.7) and (4.8) postulate that the actual changes in period t is some fraction a (or ß) 
of the desired change for that period. These equations can be alternatively written as: 
ACAPJ' = aCAP;, +(I - a)CAPf,, _1 
and 
ODER = /3DER; 1 + (1-, ß)DER J., _, 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
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By substituting the equations (4.8) and (4.9) into the equations (4.4) and (4.5), the 
actual changes in capital and derivatives are formulated as: 
ACAP1, = aCAPf, + (1- a)CAP,, _t + 
Ei., (4.10) 
and 
ADERE J= ßDER;., + (1- ß)DERjJ_, + 
0» (4.11) 
These equations suggest that the actual changes in capital and derivative usage ratios 
in a period for a bank are a function of: 
" Target capital and derivative usage ratios, 
Lagged capital and derivative usage ratios, 
" Exogenous factors. 
As the target levels are unobservable, they are assumed to depend upon a set of 
observable variables. Bank size, risk variables, and profitability are assumed to 
substitute for the target capital level. On the other hand, bank size, risk variables, 
credibility variables, profitability, and trading activities are assumed to substitute for 
the target level of derivatives. As it is also desirable to investigate the relationship 
between bank capital and derivatives, derivative activities are included as an 
independent variable to explain the actual change in capital. Conversely, the actual 
change in capital is included as an independent variable to explain the actual change 
in derivatives. In order to account for the exogenous factors of regulatory and macro 
economic conditions, a number of binary variables are employed. 
By substituting the target levels and exogenous factors of equations (4.10) and 
(4.11), the models are structured as: 
ACAI = co +c, SIZE,, +c2R6VAj1 +c3NONPERFj., +c4GROSSDERB f 
+ CS TRADING., + C6INCEXPý J+ c7DREGJ., + c8 DR USA, 
+ c9 DPRES, J + c10 LAGCAPjJ_, + Ej,, (4.12) 
and 
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ADERJ,, =do +d, SIZE,., +d2RIVA,, + d3NONPERF, J +d4RBCC, 
+ d5 TRADING,,, + d6INCEXP,,, + d7 DREGS, + d8DRUS , 
+d9LAGDER, J_, +U,, 
(4.13) 
where; 
- ACAP indicates the change in the capital ratio (DELTARBC / 
DELTATIERI / DELTALEV I DELTAEQUITY), 
- ADER indicates the change in the ratio of derivatives to total assets 
(DEL TA FA IRDER / DELTAGROSSDER), 
- SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, 
- RWA is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, 
- NONPERF is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
- GROSSDER is the ratio of gross value of derivatives to total assets, 
- RBC is the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-adjusted assets, 
- TRADING is the ratio of total trading assets and liabilities to total 'assets. 
- INCEXP is the ratio of total income to total expense, 
- DREG is the dummy variable that takes the value of one for those periods 
that the bank is subject to the market risk capital regulations, 0 otherwise, 
- DRUS is the, dummy variable that takes the value of one for those periods 
that markets face a financial turmoil, 0 otherwise, 
- DPRES is the dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks that 
are undercapitalised, 0 otherwise, 
- LAGCAP indicates the previous period's capital ratio 
(LAGRBC / 
LAGTIERI / LAGLEV I LAGEQUITY), 
- LAGDER indicates the previous period's ratio of derivatives to total 
assets (LAGFAIRDER / LAGGROSSDER). 
The dependent and independent variables of the models presented in equations (4.13) 
and (4.14) and the hypothesised signs of the explanatory variables are explained in 
the following sub-sections. 
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4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
The observed changes in bank capital ratios and derivative usage ratios are 
dependent variables of the models. These variables are explained below: 
a) Bank Capital 
The capital ratio (CAP) is the ratio of capital to total assets. Four different capital 
indicators are used to calculate this ratio; namely the total risk-based capital ratio 
(RBC), the tier-1 risk-based capital ratio (TIER]), the leverage ratio (LETS) and the 
equity capital ratio (EQUITY). 
In the US, banks and BHCs are classified into five capital categories based on three 
capital ratios, namely the total risk-based capital ratio, the tier-1 capital risk-based 
ratio and the tier-1 leverage ratio. The capital thresholds for these five categories are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: -Capital Thresholds and Bank Classification 
Total Risk- Tier-1 Risk- Tier-1 Leverage 
Capital Threshold Based Capital Based Ratio Ratio 
Well Capitalised z 10% z 6% z 5% 
Adequately Capitalised 2: 8% ý 4% z 4% 
Undercapitalised < 8% < 4% < 4% 
Significantly Undercapitalised < 6% <3% <3% 
Critically Undercapitalised Tangible Equity 5 2% 
Source: Aggarwal & Jacques, 1998 
The US regulators use all of these three capital ratios as the indicators of bank 
capital. The total risk-based capital and the tier-1 risk-based ratios are consistent with 
the Basle Accord, whereas the leverage ratio, which is the ratio of tier-1 capital to 
average total assets, was implemented in the US in 1990. 
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Current Basle regulations define three capital elements, namely tier-1, tier-2, and 
tier-3. Among these tiers, tier-3, introduced by the 1996 amendment, can only be 
used by banks that are subject to recent market risk capital regulations (Basic 
Committee, 1996). 
Tier-1 capital consists of the following: 
" Common stock, 
" Perpetual non-cumulative preference shares, 
" Disclosed reserves, 
" Minority interests in the equity of subsidiaries (in the case of 
consolidated accounts), 
" Less goodwill. 
In addition to tier-1 capital, total risk-based capital includes tier-2 and tier-3 capitals. 
The items that are included in tier-2 and tier-3 capitals are as follows: 
0 Tier-2 (limited to a maximum of 100 percent of tier 1) 
- Undisclosed reserves, 
- Asset revaluation reserves, 
- General provisions/loan loss reserves (limited to 1.25 percent of 
risk weighted assets), 
- Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments, 
- Subordinated debt (limited to a maximum of 50 percent of tier-1), 
which includes unsecured subordinated debt with a minimum 
original fixed term to maturity of over five years and limited life 
redeemable preference shares. 
0 Tier-3: 
Short-term subordinated debt, (limited to 250 percent of tier-1), 
which includes unsecured subordinated debt with an original 
maturity of at least two years and which could be used only to 
support market risk. 
Although all of the regulatory capital indicators are used as dependent variables, the 
risk-based capital has a more fundamental role in the market risk capital regulations, 
as banks are allowed to include tier-3 capital in the calculation of the required capital 
against market risk. 
As well as the regulatory capital ratios that are explained above, the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets is also used as a dependent variable. Equity capital is the 
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difference between the total assets and total liabilities, which is also called the `net 
value' or `net worth'20, and the ratio of equity capital to total assets has been 
extensively used in the literature. In this study, equity capital is the sum of common 
stock, perpetual preferred stock, capital surplus, retained earnings, net unrealised 
gains on AFS securities, accumulated net gains on cash flow hedges, cumulative 
foreign currency translation adjustments, less treasury stock. This is consistent with 
the calculation of equity capital that the Federal Reserve carries out in its FR Y-9C 
reports. 
b) Derivative Activities 
`Derivatives' is a general term, which covers a wide range of financial contracts such 
as swaps, options, forwards and futures. Banks participate in derivative activities in 
two ways: as `end-users' and as `dealers'. `End-users' employ derivatives either for 
hedging or speculation purposes. Dealer banks, on the other hand, as well as being an 
`end-user', provide OTC derivative products to other banks or clients. While all 
derivative user banks participate to a certain extent as `end-users', only a few of the 
largest institutions are `dealers' of OTC derivatives. 
The focus of this study is the market risk capital regulations that have been 
assimilated into the risk-based capital guidelines to incorporate a measure for market 
risk, which is the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices (Basle Committee, 1996). The risks concerning the 
interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book and foreign 
exchange risk and commodities risk of both trading and banking books are the risks 
that are subject to these regulations. 
As these regulations particularly target the trading activities of banks, as an indicator 
for derivative activities, the ratio of trading derivative activities to total assets (DER) 
is employed. However, two different measures are used. First, the ratio of total of 
positive and negative fair value of trading derivatives to total assets (FAIRDER), and 
20 Equity capital is defined by the "Dictionary of Banking Terms" as the value of stockholders' 
ownership interest in a corporation after all claims have been paid. 
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second, the ratio of notional gross amount of trading derivatives to total assets 
(GROSSDER). 
While several studies have employed the notional amount of derivative activities in 
their models (Sinkey and Carter, 1997; Carter and Sinkey, 1998; Jagtiani et al., 1995; 
Jagtiani, 1996; ), Whidbee and Wohar (1999) argue that the total notional principal 
amount of derivative contracts is not a sufficient measure as it aggregates long and 
short positions. Although Carter and Sinkey (1998) employed notional amounts of 
derivatives, they also point out the disadvantage of using this variable by stating that: 
"We fully recognise, however, that notional values do not reflect either the 
market value or the risk of the contracts. Since the focus of our empirical 
investigation is on two decisions, usage and extent of usage, notional values 
represent reasonable proxies for these two traits regardless of the actual 
underlying risk exposure. " 
Although this study employs the ratio of notional amount of trading derivatives to 
total assets, due to the disadvantage of using this variable, the ratio of total positive 
and negative fair value of trading derivatives to total assets is also employed as a 
dependent variable. 
On the other hand, the limitation of this study is that banks could use derivatives not 
only for speculative purposes, but also for hedging and dealing purposes. In spite of 
this, there is no available data that separates the speculative derivative activities from 
the hedging activities. The unavailability of detailed data that separates the nature of 
derivative transactions is a limitation of this study. 
4.2.3 Independent Variables 
In this section the independent variables of the equations (4.13) and (4.14) are 
introduced. 
As the implementation of the market risk capital regulations is the cornerstone of this 
study, a binary variable (DREG) is used to analyse the impact of these regulations. 
This dummy variable takes the value of one for periods that the BHC is subject to the 
market risk capital regulations. In the US, the final rule regarding the market risk 
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capital regulations has been included into the risk-based capital regulation 
framework for bank holding companies and commercial banks with significant 
trading activities effective since January 1998. However, it should be noted that not 
all the BHCs in the sample are subject to these regulations from the beginning of 
1998. Two of them have been required to hold capital for their market risk later, 
when they became subject to these rules. 
In this- study the implementation effect of the market risk capital regulations is 
investigated, rather than the announcement effect. Banks could change the 
composition of their portfolios quickly and the impact appears more clearly after the 
implementation date (Haubrich and Wachtel, 1993). Following this argument, a 
binary variable is used as unity for the quarters that these regulations are effective for 
the sample banks, and 0 otherwise. Due to the regulatory cost hypothesis, a positive 
relationship is expected between the capital ratios and DREG, and because of the 
capital avoidance hypothesis, a negative relationship is expected between the 
derivative ratios and DREG. 
SIZE is calculated as the natural logarithm of a bank's total assets. This variable is 
included in the equations to proxy the potential for large banks to realise economies 
of scale. Following the previous empirical studies, the models include size as a 
standard control variable that captures the potential influence of other variables. A 
negative relationship between change in the bank capital ratios and asset size and a 
positive relationship between the change in bank derivative ratios and asset size is 
expected because of the economies of scale hypothesis. 
In order- to capture the risk-taking of banks, three variables are included in both of 
the equations. These are; the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA), the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NONPERF) and the ratio of total trading 
assets and liabilities to total assets (TRADING). More risky banks are assumed to 
increase the share of their risk-weighted assets, non-performing loans and trading 
assets and liabilities in total assets. Due to the moral hazard hypothesis, which 
implies that banks with low capital invest more in risky portfolios, a negative 
relationship is expected between the change in bank capital ratios and risk proxies. 
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Risk measures indicate the creditworthiness of banks. Therefore, banks with risky 
assets and higher non-performing loans may have been disadvantaged in using 
derivatives due to the lack of credibility (Jagtiani et al., 1995). On the other hand, 
more creditworthy banks could become involved in derivative activities without 
difficulty (market discipline hypothesis). This argument leads to a negative 
relationship between risk measures and derivative usage. On the other hand, Carter 
and Sinkey (1998) argue that a higher level of risk is expected to lead to a higher 
level of derivative usage as banks that have significant risk exposures could use 
derivatives to hedge these risks. Therefore, Carter and Sinkey expect a positive 
relationship between risk measures and derivative usage. Furthermore, as derivative 
activities could be used to hedge trading assets and liabilities, it is not unforeseen to 
expect a positive relationship between derivative usage and trading accounts. Due to 
these conflicting arguments, the expected signs of RWA, NONPERF and TRADING 
in the derivative equations are ambiguous. 
In order to investigate the relationship between capital and derivatives, the ratio of 
gross notional values of derivatives to total assets (GROSSDER) is included in the 
capital equations and the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets (RBC) is 
included in the derivative equations. Considering the moral hazard hypothesis, which 
implies that low-capitalised banks are involved in derivative activities, a negative 
relationship is expected between the change in bank capital ratios and derivative 
usage. On the other hand, as derivatives are subject to the capital regulations, the 
regulatory discipline hypothesis implies a positive relationship between the change in 
bank capital ratios and derivative usage. The RBC variable in the derivative 
equations also indicates creditworthiness, as capital ratios are often considered as an 
instrument to control bank risk-taking (Bruni and Paterno, 1995). As the higher 
capital increases the credibility of banks, their derivative activities should increase 
accordingly. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between the changes in 
derivative usage and the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets. As a 
result, a positive relationship between these two variables indicates the existence of 
not only regulatory discipline but also market discipline. However, since there are 
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conflicting arguments concerning the relationship between capital and derivative 
activities, the expected signs of RBC and GROSSDER are ambiguous. 
INCEXP, which is the ratio of total income to total expense, is included in the 
equations as the measure of profitability. Profitability could positively affect capital 
levels of banks if they prefer to increase capital through retained earnings. Rime 
(2001) argues that banks prefer to increase capital through retained earnings rather 
than through equity issues as issuing equity might give a negative signal to the 
market concerning its value in the presence of an asymmetric information. Therefore, 
in the capital equations, a positive relationship is expected between the changes in 
capital ratios and the ratio of total income to total expense. 
INCEXP is included in the derivative equations as a measure of creditworthiness. As 
profitability increases the credibility of banks, their derivative activities should 
increase accordingly. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between the 
changes in derivative usage and the ratio of total income to total expense. 
The BHCs might also be affected by macro economic developments that occurred 
during the time period of the investigation. In order to allow exogenous regulatory 
and macro economic factors, which might affect the actual changes in dependent 
variables, binary variables are used. In order to obtain information concerning which 
factors that have affected the US banks, two main sources were checked. The first 
source that has been checked is the "Calendar of Main Economic Events". This 
source demonstrates the important economic factors that have affected the US 
economy during the years 1995 to 1999 and this is published as an appendix in the 
"OECD Economic Surveys of United States"21. The second source that was checked 
is the "FDIC Banking Review" for the years 1995 to 2000, in which the "Recent 
Developments Affecting Depository Institutions" are published regularly. 
The most important development that might affect the US BHCs was the Russian 
default and the near collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 22, 
211995 
, 1996,1997, and 1999 publications of "OECD Economic Surveys: United States" 22 The LTCM is a hedge fund. 
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%%hich occurred in August and September 1998, respectively. In August 1998, Russia 
devalued the ruhte and rlýlectively cleläulteý1 on some ul its clchts, which r fused the 
financial markets to sri/c up. Following this development. linancial markets 
witnessed the near collapse cif the I. 'I'('M. which is said to have nearly blown up the 
wworld*s financial system (, lorion, 1999). The impact of these developments on 
derivatives can also he seen from Graph 4.1, which shows that during this period the 
derivative losses of the US banks increased dramatically. In order to account for 
these extraordinary developments in global financial markets, another hinarv variable 
(1)R( 'S) is used and this variable takes the value of one fier the third and fimurth 
quarters of' 998. 
Graph 4.1: Derivatives Charge-Offs of US 
$ Millions Commercial Banks, 1996-99 
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The binary variable DRUS is included in both equations. Additionally, in order to 
account for the regulatory pressure on 131 ICs that are undercapitalised, another binary 
variable (i)PRES) is included to explain the actual changes in capital levels. 
Ilo«ever, this variable is only included in the capital equations. 
As noted by Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), if a bank falls into one of the three 
undercapitalised categories, regulators place compulsory restrictions on the activities 
of'banks that become increasingly severe as the bank's capital ratios decline. In order 
to account for the pressure of regulators, the DIRE, variable is added to the capital 
equation, which is unity for the observations when the BI IC is undercapitalised at the 
end of' the previous period. This variable also sheds some light on the eflcctivcness 
CC) rn rn rn 0) 
VN (1) V 
of the regulatory discipline. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between 
the DPRES and capital ratios. 
4.3 Data 
In order to investigate the impact of the market risk capital regulations on capital 
levels and derivative activities, as well as the relationship between them, quarterly 
data for the US BHCs is employed. There are two important reasons to use the US 
data in the analysis. Firstly, the US banks are leading financial institutions, which 
dominate the world market for derivative contracts. Secondly, it is possible to obtain 
detailed information concerning the US individual institutions. 
In the US, the final rules regarding the market risk capital regulations were included 
into the risk-based capital regulations framework for bank holding companies and 
commercial banks with significant trading activities in September 1996. These 
regulations took effect in January 1998. In the US, only the largest 18 banks with 
extensive trading activity were subject to these regulations at the beginning of 1998. 
The US market risk capital regulations require these banks to use . their 
internal VaR 
models. This, in fact, distinguishes the US rules from the Basle amendment, as the 
standardised approach is not taken into consideration. However, this in turn brings an 
advantage to use US data as it is known that all banks that are subject to these rules 
are using a VaR methodology-to measure the required capital to hold against market 
risk. In the UK, for example, internal models have been in use since September 1998 
(wvwv. fsa. gov. uk). However, because of the confidentially it is not possible to 
separate the banks that are using the standardised approach from the ones that are 
using internal models. 
The data is utilised from the quarterly Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies (FR Y-9C) reports for the periods froth the last quarter of 1995 
to the fourth quarter of 199923 (17 quarters). FR Y-9C reports provide financial data 
from BHCs on a consolidated basis in the form of a balance sheet, an income 
statement, and detailed supporting schedules, including the schedules of OBS items 
23 Appropriate data for the analysis is available since the third quarter of 1995. 
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and risk-based capital. These reports were gathered from the National Information 
Center (NIC) web page (www. ffiec. gov/nic). On this web page, which is supplied by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, NIC provides comprehensive 
information on institutions for which the Federal Reserve has a supervisory and 
regulatory interest. 
In the US, the market risk capital rules apply to any bank holding company or 
commercial bank whose trading activity24 equals 10 percent or more of its total assets 
or USD 1 billion or more, on a world-wide consolidated basis. As the objective of 
this analysis is to investigate the impact of the market risk capital regulations, the 
data for the BHCs that are subject to these regulations as of 31.12.1999 were 
gathered. In order to determine which BHCs are relevant, peer 1 and peer 2 groups of 
the US BHCs25 that are subject to the market risk capital regulations are considered. 
This information was gathered from the FR Y-9C Schedule HC-I-Risk-Based Capital 
reports in which only the BHCs subject to these rules report the amount of market 
risk equivalent assets, while other BHCs do not report any information26. As of 
31.12.1999, there were 166 BHCs with consolidated asset size more than USD .3 
billion. However, in peer 2, there is no BHC that is subject to these rules, whereas in 
peer 1 there are 18 BHCs, which are subject to these rules. Among them, three BHCs 
do not have available data for the- entire period; therefore they are excluded from the 
sample. The final data set contains quarterly detailed consolidated data from 15 US 
BHCs. Among them, 13 BHCs have been subject to the market risk capital 
regulations since January 1998. The list of the BHCs that are included in the sample 
and their total assets are provided in Table 4.2. 
24 US regulators define a banking organisation's trading activity as the sum of its trading assets and 
trading liabilities. 
25 FED classifies BHCs into 8 peer groups, considering the consolidated asset size at the end of the 
quarter. BHCs with consolidated assets size $10 billion and over constitutes peer 1 group, whereas 
peer 2 consists of BHC with asset size between $3-10 billion. 
26 Instructions for Preparation of Reporting Form FR Y-9C, March 1999. 
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"fahle -1.2: 'I'otaI Assets of Sample Banks as of fear-end 1909,11iIIioins 1 Stil) 
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demonstrates the shares of assets of sample banks as of car-end 1991). 
While the total assets of'these 15 banks is more than IISI) 3,000 trillion, the Bank of 
America. ('hast Manhattan and Citicorp have the largest asset size as of year-end 
1999. respectively. 
Graph 4.2: Total Assets (as of year-end 1999) 
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Using data from the last quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 1999, Graph 4.3 
illustrates the increase of total assets for sample banks. While the total asset size of 
the sample banks was USI) 1,00 trillion as of year-end 1995, in Imir years time total 
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assets acre increased hN almost 1O0 percent and exceeded the IeveI of I IS 1) 3.000 
trillion. 
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Graph 4.4 demonstrates the shares of equity of sample banks as of year-end 1999 and 
using data from the last quarter of' 1995 to the last quarter of' 1999, Graph 4.5 
illustrates the increase of'total equity for sample banks. 
Graph 4.4: Total Equity Capital (as of year-end 1999) 
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During the period of' 1995-1999. total equity Capital of's, rnihle hanks increased more 
than IN percent from tISI) 105 hill ion to USI) 214 hill ion. As ofyrar-enci 1999, the 
Bank of' America, Citicorp, and ('hast Manhattan haue the Irr ýýt equity, 
respectively. 
I)ýriýýýtiýr activities cif the sample hanks also increased substantially during the 
examination period. (graph 4.6 demonstrates the instrument types of derivative 
contracts. In the sample, the share of' swap transactions is SI percent, the share of' 
futures and forwards is 28 percent, and the share of' Options is 21 percent of the total 
notional amount of derivative contracts as ofyear-end 1909. Graph 4.7 demonstrates 
the growth in the use of' derivatives of the sample banks. The notional amount of 
derivative contracts increased dramatically from USD 12.6 billion in year-end 1995 
to USD 311.6 billion in year-end 1999, which indicates a 166 percent increase. 
Graph 4.6: Instrument Types of Derivative Contracts 
of Sample Banks (as of year-end 1999) 
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urthcrnlorc. Graph 4.8 demonstrates the risk types of' derivative contracts. Interest 
rate risk derivative contracts have the highest share and these contracts constitute so 
percent of' the total notional amount of derivative contracts. Graph 4.9 illustrates the 
increase of' gross derivatives by considering risk types. 
Graph 4.8: Risk Types of Derivative Contracts 
of Sample Banks (as of year-end 1999) 
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As mentioned above, one of the main reasons for including only large l1S 131 IC's in 
the sample is that the US banks are generally accepted to he significant users of 
financial derivative instruments, which provides a proper background to this 
analysis. Another reason is the availability of' detailed quarterly data for the US 
banks and the significant number of banks that met the criteria to be subject to the 
market risk capital regulations. Since only large banks present the greatest market 
risk that could affect the financial stability. it is also meaninglül to put these banks in 
96 
Graph 4.9: Derivative Activities of Sample Banks 
(By Risk Type) 
the focal point of the study. The next section provides the results of the empirical 
study. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
In order to analyse the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital, a 
partial adjustment methodology is used. The sample includes all the US BIICs that 
are subject to these particular regulations and for which complete Y9C data is 
available for the period 1995Q3 to 1999Q4. The sample contains information on 15 
US BHCs. 
The equations 4.13 and 4.14 are estimated by employing a panel data analysis. 
Instead of using an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, a panel data model (pooled 
cross section, time series model) is employed to allow for simultaneous consideration 
of the intertemporal movements and cross sectional differences27 (Greene, 2003). 
The panel data set, or longitudinal data set, is a data set that combines time series and 
cross sections. In this study, 15 cross-sectional units, which are BHCs, are observed 
over. 17 quarters. A balanced panel is constructed from banks with no missing data 
for each quarter. 
Heteroskedasticity, which refers to a non-random pattern in the residual error term 
(i. e., variability in the error term), is a common problem that arises in the analysis of 
cross-section data. This problem could affect the size of the standard error of the 
regression coefficient and cause biased hypothesis test results. Therefore, in order to 
obtain reliable t-ratios, White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance28 is applied. Furthermore, autocorrelation or serial correlation could also 
influence the outcome of the hypothesis-testing procedure. However, since 
autocorrelation coefficients could vary across groups, the existence of 
27 Furthermore, because of the limited number of observations, using the cross section or time series 
data alone does not yield sufficient degrees of freedom in OLS analysis. 
' Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator is suggested by White and this approach 
provides correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form. 
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autocorrelation is not investigated by treating each group of observations as. a 
sample. 
In order to evaluate the statistical significance of the variables, the level of 
significance is reported in the tables, as well as the adjusted multiple coefficients of 
determination, adjusted R2's, which signify how well the model fits the population. 
In addition, in order to evaluate the models, F tests are performed and reported in the 
tables. The F statistics reported for all models indicate that the hypotheses that the 
coefficients on the independent variables are not jointly significantly different from 
zero are rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
The following sub-section presents the results of the estimation of equations that 
analyse the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital levels. The 
empirical results of the econometric analyses are presented in Tables 4.3-4.8. 
4.4.1 Results of the Capital Equations 
Tables 4.3-4.6 demonstrate the pooled least squares estimates of the capital 
equations. When the change in the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets 
is employed as the dependent variable in the capital equation (DELTARBC), most of 
the variables are found to be significant. In this equation, SIZE, RIVA, NONPERF, 
TRADING, DREG and LAGRBC variables have statistically significant coefficients. 
In the equation which employs the change in the ratio of tier-1 capital to risk- 
weighted assets as the dependent variable (DELTATIER1), the variables RWVA, 
DREG and LAGTIERJ; and in the equation which employs the change in the ratio of 
total equity to total assets as the dependent variable (DELTAEQUITY), the variables 
TRADING, INCEXP and LAGEQUITY are found to be statistically significant. The 
previous periods' capital ratios are found to be highly significant with a negative 
coefficient in all of these three equations. However, in the equation that employs the 
change in the ratio of tier-1 capital to average total assets (DELTALEP), none of the 
variables are found to be significant, even at the 10 percent significance level (Table 
4.5). 
98 
Table 4.3: Fixed Effect Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Capital Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTARBC 
(Change in the Ratio of Risk-Based Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets) 
Equation (4.13) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE -4.592756 -2.236348** 
RIVA -0.165312 -1.996430** 
NONPERF 4.320498 1.657092* 
GROSSDER -0.001208 -0.703880 
TRADING -0.278383 -1.958075* 
INCEXP -0.057219 -0.351557 
DREG 2.230915 2.301185** 
DR US -1.513709 -1.370155 
DPRES 0.476818 0.208452 
LAGRBC -3.670264 -5.325487*** 
Adjusted 0.219057 
F statistic 10.58311*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 Quarters) 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The t-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
Table 4.4: Fixed Effect'Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Capital Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTA TIERI 
(Change in the Ratio of Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets) 
Equation (4.13) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE -2.851662 -0.815680 
RIVA -0.223373 -1.880412* 
NONPERF 2.370726 0.536812 
GROSSDER -0.000156 -0.066353 
TRADING -0.344177 -1.620812 
INCEXP -0.029548 -0.115068 
DREG 2.312288 1.826627* 
DR US -2.139804 -1.333599 
DPRES -0.755293 -0.227610 
LAGTIERI -5.412285 -4.879391*** 
Adjusted 0.187926 
F statistic 9.197713*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 Quarters) 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The 1-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
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Table 4.5: Fixed Effect Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Capital Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTALEV 
(Change in the Ratio of Tier 1 Capital to Average Total Assets) 
Equation (4.13) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE 10.05515 0.819120 
RIVA 0.043924 0.185329 
NONPERF -11.15595 -0.690380 
GROSSDER 0.004324 0.811069 
TRADING -0.621322 -1.483054 
INCEXP -0.674347 -0.877058 
DREG -0.388120 -0.130546 
DR US -5.843741 -1.191958 
DPRES -0.895408 -0.129454 
LAGLEV -3.713142 -1.490193 
Adjusted 0.06 0321 
F statistic 4.478346*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 Quarters) 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The t-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
Table 4.6: Fixed Effect Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Capital Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTAEQUITY 
(Change in the Ratio of Total Equity to Total Assets) 
Equation (4.13) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE 1.664544 0.360748 
RNA 0.230595 1.618647 
NONPERF 1.110720 0.168255 
GROSSDER 0.003740 1.410766 
TRADING -0.433577 -1.724039* 
INCEXP -0.496727 -1.820311 * 
DREG -0.820402 -0.552241 
DRUS 0.190586 0.084796 
DPRES 2.374151 0.514245 
LAGEQUITY -4.109527 -2.971449*** 
Adjusted 0.172012 
F statistic 8.529753*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 uarters 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The /-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
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The positive and highly significant coefficient of the DREG variable in the first 
equation (Table 4.3) indicates that with the implementation of the market risk capital 
regulations, banks increase their risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets ratios 
substantially. The variable DREG is also found to be significant in the equation, 
which employs the ratio of tier-1 capital to risk-weighted assets as the dependent 
variable. However, DREG is significant at the 10 percent level in the latter equation. 
These findings are consistent with the regulatory cost hypothesis. Therefore, it may 
be concluded that from a regulatory perspective, the market risk capital regulations 
are effective as the implementation of these regulations result in an increase in the 
capital ratios of banks. 
Due to the economies of scale and too-big-to-fail theories, the capital ratios are 
expected to have a negative relationship with bank size. In the equation with the 
dependent variable DELTARBC, a negative relationship between bank capital levels 
and asset size is found, which supports the economies of scale hypothesis. However, 
the variable SIZE is not found to be significant in other equations. Conversely, in the 
equations with dependent variables DELTALEV and DELTAEQUTTY, SIZE even 
does not have the expected negative sign. Therefore, the evidence on the economies 
of scale hypothesis is not robust. 
In the capital equations, there are three variables (RIVA, NONPERF and TRADING) 
that are included in the models to proxy for bank risk-taking and a negative 
relationship between bank capital levels and bank risk-taking is hypothesised 
because of the moral hazard hypothesis. The results indicate that R TVA has a negative 
significant coefficient in the equations with dependent variables DELTARBC and 
DELTATIERJ. The second risk variable, NONPERF, is found to be significant only 
in the first equation. However, the sign of NONPERF in this equation is positive, 
which indicates a positive relationship between the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans and the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets. 
On the other hand, the variable TRADING is found to be significant in two of the 
equations. In the equation with dependent variable DELTARBC and in the equation 
with dependent variable DELTAEQUITY, the ratio of total trading assets and 
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liabilities to total assets is found to have an expected negative sign with a statistically 
significant coefficient. As the variables RWA and TRADING have the expected 
negative statistically significant coefficients, these results indicate an association of 
riskier activities with low capitalisation, which supports the moral hazard hypothesis. 
However, the findings do not support any significant relationship between bank 
capital ratios and derivative activities. These findings provide conflicting results 
concerning the moral hazard hypothesis. 
However, the regulatory pressure (DPRES) is also not found to have any significant 
association with the change in capital ratios. In addition, the financial turmoil during 
1998 and profitability variables are also not found to have any association with the 
change in capital ratios. 
The results of the estimation of equations that analyse the impact of the market risk 
capital regulations on derivative activities are presented in the following sub-section. 
4.4.2 Results of the Derivative Equations 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate the pooled least squares estimates of the derivative 
equations. In Table 4.7, the coefficients of asset size (SIZE), the ratio of trading 
assets and liabilities to total assets (TRADING), and the ratio of total income to total 
expense (INCEXP) are found to be statistically significant determinants of the change 
in the ratio of gross fair values of derivative contracts to total assets 
(DEL TA FAIRDER). However, in Table 4.8, none of the coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant. Adjusted R2 of the equation in which the dependent variable 
is the change in the ratio of total gross amount of trading derivative activities to total 
assets (DELTAGROSSDER) is also found to be relatively low. 
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Table 4.7: Fixed Effect Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Derivatives Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTAFAIRDER 
(Change in the Ratio of Gross Fair Values of Derivatives to Total Assets) 
Equation (4.14) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE 240.5396 1.794353* 
RWVA 1.253596 0.969430 
NONPERF -151.9193 -0.987612 
RBC 36.54482 1.246148 
TRADING 8.582017 2.081277** 
INCEXP -8.356514 -1.886904* 
DREG -42.15188 -1.473765 
DRUS 57.83696 0.988862 
LAGFAIRDER -1.917752 -1.484026 
Adjusted 0.151695 
F statistic 8.552593*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 Quarters) 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The t-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
Table 4.8: Fixed Effect Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Derivatives Equation 
Dependent Variable: DELTAGROSSDER 
(Change in the Ratio of Notional Amount of Derivatives to Total Assets) 
Equation (4.14) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients t-statistics 
SIZE 3676.792 1.226079 
RIVA 11.25255 0.510290 
NONPERF 2060.280 0.851986 
RBC -119.3854 -0.467431 
TRADING 141.7283 1.145798 
INCEXP -109.3104 -1.181686 
DREG -623.2707 -1.100982 
DR US 2188.796 1.046431 
LAGGROSSDER -1.308945 -0.945914 
Adjusted 0.037036 
F statistic 4.096125*** 
Number of observations 225 
Observation Period 1995: 4-1999: 4 (17 Quarters) 
Number of Banks 15 
Note: The t-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% *, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
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The empirical analysis could not provide any support for the capital avoidance 
hypothesis. Considering the capital avoidance hypothesis, a negative relationship is 
hypothesised between the implementation of the market risk capital regulations and 
derivative activities. In both equations, the coefficients of DREG are found to be 
negative, as expected. However, the coefficients are not significant, which indicates 
that the implementation of the market risk capital regulations does not have a 
significant impact on derivative usage. When the variable RBC is replaced with the 
variable TIERI (the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets) in the equation with 
dependent variable DELTAFAIRDER, a significant impact of the implementation is 
found at only 10 percent significance level29. Therefore, the results do not indicate a 
robust evidence of the capital avoidance hypothesis. 
The results suggest that size is an important factor that determines the change in the 
usage of derivatives. In the equation in which the dependent variable is 
DELTAFAIRDER and in the equation in which the dependent variable is 
DELTAGROSSDER, size is found to have a positive effect on derivative usage. 
However, the coefficient of size is only found to be statistically significant in the 
equation in which the dependent variable is the change in the ratio of gross fair 
values of derivative contracts to total assets. This finding supports the economies of 
scale hypothesis, which indicates that large banks are expected to use more 
derivatives. 
The positive relationship between the change in derivative usage and risk-based 
capital is an indicator of regulatory and market discipline in the use of derivatives, as 
demonstrated by the studies of Gunther and Siems (1995), Jagtiani el al. (1995), 
Jagtiani (1996) and Carter and Sinkey (1998). While the ratio of risk-based capital to 
risk-weighted assets (RBC) has the expected positive sign in the DELTAFAIRDER 
equation, this variable has an unexpected negative coefficient in the 
DELTAGROSSDER equation. However, the coefficients of RBC are not significant 
in these equations. 
29 This is not shown in the study. 
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Although a positive relationship is hypothesised between profitability and derivative 
usage, the results indicate a negative significant coefficient, which is significant at 
the 10 percent significance level. As a matter of fact, credibility measures other than 
TRADING do not provide any significant coefficient. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that the credibility of a bank does not have any impact on the use of derivative 
activities 30 
When fair values of derivative contracts is used as the dependent variable, a positive 
and significant relationship is found between the derivative usage and the ratio of 
trading assets and liabilities to total assets. This variable has also a positive sign 
where the dependent variable is the notional amount of derivative contracts. 
However, in this case the variable is not significant. 
The relationship between derivative usage and trading activities is hypothesised as a 
negative relationship considering the TRADING variable as a proxy of risk. 
Therefore, it is not unforeseen to observe such a positive association as derivative 
transactions could be used to hedge trading assets and liabilities, as well as the risk of 
the existing portfolio. 
During the turmoil that financial markets witnessed as a result of the Russian crisis 
and the LTCM case, the US BHCs seem to increase their derivative usage as the 
coefficient of the variable DRUS is found to be positive. However, this variable is 
not statistically significant. In addition, similar to the findings of the capital 
equations, no significant relationship is found between capital and derivative usage. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the impact of the market risk capital regulations was analysed. The 
changes in capital and derivatives usage were modelled by using a partial ädjustment 
framework. In these models, the changes in the capital ratios and derivative usage 
depend on the lagged level of the capital ratios and derivative usage. In addition, a 
30 It should be noted that credibility could only have an impact on OTC derivatives (swaps, futures 
and OTC options) as exchange traded futures and options do not have any credit risk. 
105 
range of variables describing banks' activities and risk-taking are assumed to have an 
impact on these variables. The study focuses on the large US BI1Cs as they are more 
involved in trading activities and therefore subject to the market risk capital 
regulations. Using quarterly data for the period 1995Q4 to 1999Q4, the estimates are 
obtained by the panel data analysis. 
Although the main objective of this analysis is to investigate the impact of the market 
risk capital regulations on bank capital levels and derivative usage; the economies of 
scale, moral hazard, regulatory and market discipline hypotheses were also tested. 
The principal findings of the empirical analysis indicate that the implementation- of 
the market risk capital regulations has had a significant positive impact on bank 
capital levels. This finding displays the effectiveness of the market risk capital 
regulations from a regulatory perspective. On the other hand, no significant 
relationship was found between the implementation of these regulations and the 
usage of derivatives. In addition, the results of the study do not provide any evidence 
of the capital avoidance hypothesis, which explains the growth of off-balance sheet 
activities due to the lack of capital regulations. Furthermore, the empirical results fail 
to demonstrate any significant relationship between the capital levels and derivative 
activities. However, large banks were found to be more active in the use of 
derivatives, which demonstrates that larger banks have the specialised management 
skills needed to participate actively in derivative markets. 
The analysis that was provided in this chapter empirically investigated the impact of 
the market risk capital regulations on bank capital levels and derivatives activities. 
However, as explained in the first chapter of this thesis, it is also aimed to evaluate 
the use of value at risk methodologies in the framework of the market risk capital 
regulations. In order to provide a background to the simulations that are carried out 
in the eighth chapter of this thesis, the next chapter explains the value at risk 
methodology, which is an important concept of the market risk management 
framework. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VALUE AT RISK 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank 
capital levels and derivative activities were analysed empirically. The results indicate 
that the US banks react to these regulations by increasing their capital levels. 
However, the results do not indicate any relationship between the implementation of 
the market risk capital regulations and bank derivative activities. 
The market risk capital regulations require banks to hold capital for their market risk 
and banks are allowed to use their own internal Value at Risk (VaR) models under 
this framework. The basic concept of VaR is well described by Linsmeier and 
Pearson (1996): 
"Value at risk is a single summary, statistical measure of possible portfolio 
losses. Specifically, value at risk is a measure of losses due to 'normal' 
market movements. Losses greater than the value at risk are suffered only 
with a specified small probability. Subject to the simplifying assumptions used 
in its calculation, value at risk aggregates all of the risks in a portfolio into a 
single number suitable for use in the boardroom, reporting to regulators, or 
disclosure in an annual report. Once one crosses the hurdle of using a 
statistical measure, the concept of value at risk is straightforward to 
understand. It is a simple way to describe the magnitude of the likely losses 
on the portfolio. " 
As one of the objectives of this research is to evaluate different methodologies that 
are allowed to be used by the market risk capital regulations, it is crucial to 
understand the background, underlying assumptions, and advantages and 
disadvantages of this concept. Therefore, this chapter introduces the concept of 
Value at Risk (VaR), which was implemented in the capital regulatory framework 
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following the developments in bank practices. The understanding of this concept and 
in particular the understanding of different methodologies that are used to calculate 
VaR is essential, as these methodologies are applied to the foreign exchange 
portfolios to evaluate the market risk capital regulations in the eighth chapter. 
This chapter also introduces the literature review concerning the applications of VaR 
methodologies. Although there is an extensive VaR literature, the literature review is 
limited to the studies that particularly analyse the impact of choosing different VaR 
methodologies. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the second section, the background of VaR is 
presented, which is followed by describing the underlying assumptions of VaR in the 
third section. The uses and limitations of VaR are explained in the fourth and fifth 
sections, respectively. According to the modelling literature, there are three basic 
approaches to calculate VaR. These are, the variance-covariance (parametric), 
historical simulation, and Monte Carlo simulation methodologies. These 
methodologies are explained in the sixth section. The sixth section also discusses the 
concept of volatility and correlation of financial asset. returns,. which are essential- 
factors to calculate the VaR estimates in the parametric approach. The first six 
sections of this chapter explain the VaR concept and the VaR methodologies. 
Although these issues are extensively documented in the literature, it is important to 
explain these issues as these were used in the simulations that were conducted in the 
eighth chapter of this thesis. In the seventh section, the literature associated with the 
use of different VaR methodologies is reviewed. The chapter is concluded with a 
summary of discussions. 
5.2 The Background of VaR 
Financial investment risk is a fact of life and since the earliest trading days, the trade- 
off between risk and reward has been the basis of virtually every investment 
decision. Therefore, the financial investment risk, which can be defined as the 
possible unfavourable deviation from the expected in future, is at the core of the 
business of finance. 
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As a result of increasing risks that financial institutions face in their operations, 
measurement and management of financial risks have become very important. The 
examples of mismeasurement and mismanagement of the financial risks, such as 
Orange County, Barings, Metalgesellschaft, LTCM, and Sumitomo, have also 
attracted attention to financial risks and the management of them. Correspondingly, 
risk management has been of growing interest in recent years as a result of the well- 
publicised losses among banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and municipalities 
(Simons, 2000). 
As well as the recent financial disasters, the turbulence in emerging markets, starting 
in Mexico in 1995, continuing in Asia in 1997 and spreading to Russia and other 
emerging economies in 1998, has also extended the interest in risk management. It is 
generally accepted that these financial disasters could have been avoided if there 
were adequate risk management systems and internal controls in place. These 
developments accelerated the need of financial market participants to implement 
properly functioning risk management systems that accurately measure financial 
risks. At the same time, these developments also attracted the attention of regulators 
whose main concern is the financial stability. 
While there are several types of risks which financial institutions are exposed to, 
with the increased emphasis on trading activities and considerable volatilities in 
foreign exchange and interest rates, market risk has become a more important risk 
element in banking. Therefore, the need for a better understanding of measuring 
market risk is of crucial importance for risk managers, chief executives, boards of 
directors, and regulators. 
Consequently, measuring the risks incurred by financial market participants and 
financial institutions has become the main focus of modem finance theory. With the 
improvement of financial theory and technology, institutions began to measure and 
manage their risks more effectively. Christoffersen et al. (1999) argue that, there are 
two important developments that facilitated the advancement in knowledge 
concerning risk management. These are; the development of volatility models for 
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measuring and forecasting volatility dynamics that began during the 1980s, and the 
RiskMetrics methodology that was published by JP Morgan in 1995. The 
introduction of the RiskMetrics methodology enabled companies to compute similar 
measures of market risk for a given portfolio of assets. 
The risk management methods could be classified under three headings; firstly, 
traditional risk management tools (such as gap analysis 31, and duration analysis32), 
secondly, the portfolio theory which was developed by Markowitz during the 1950s33 
(Markowitz, 1952 and 1959) and thirdly, the Value at Risk methodology, which has 
its philosophical roots in the portfolio theory. 
In particular, the risk measurement technique, which is known as Value at Risk, 
abbreviated as VaR34, has received great attention and is now applied widely by the 
financial institutions for risk assessment, risk-adjusted performance measurement, 
and risk-based capital controls. VaR has now become a standard approach for 
measuring the market risk of financial instruments. Although VaR gained an 
important role in the risk management of financial institutions in recent years, the 
origin of today's VaR systems goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. During 
that time, as a result of the increase in trading activities, especially in derivatives, the 
major financial institutions operating internationally developed new risk 
management techniques to monitor their market risk and trader performances. 
Bankers Trust and JP Morgan, both U. S. investments banks, were two pioneer 
institutions that developed financial risk measurement techniques (Jorion, 1997). 
However, among the VaR methodologies, JP Morgan's RiskMetrics is one of the 
best-known models since JP Morgan published this model in 1995. It is interesting 
how VaR has developed since the 1970s and became a major tool in the JP Morgan's 
31 Gap analysis measures the interest rate exposure by considering the difference in the repricing 
sensitivities of interest bearing assets and liabilities. 
32 Duration analysis measures the interest rate exposure of a bond, and the duration of a bond can be 
regarded as the term to maturity of the security, adjusted for the maturities of interim coupon 
p3ayments. 
The portfolio theory is based on variations from the mean and indicates that investors want a 
portfolio with maximum expected return and low standard deviation. 
While VaR is a general name, there are also other specific names given by different institutions to 
the same concept, such as Capital at Risk (CaR) and Daily Earnings at Risk (DeaR). 
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risk management system in 1990. Guldimann (2000) explains how RiskMctrics 
became a popular report among senior managers: 
"By 1990 the data, methodologies and mechanics for risk reporting against 
limits had become reasonably stable. So Marcus Meier, then head of 
international trading, requested a daily management report to show 
aggregated P&Ls and risks - ready for the daily 4: 15pm Treasury meeting in 
New York With the group's comments, the report was then forwarded to the 
chairman, Sir Dennis Weatherstone. (... ) The regular daily reporting of risks 
and returns, side by side, consistent across all trading activities, had a major 
effect. It sensitised senior management to risk-return trade-offs and led over 
time to a much more efficient allocation of risks across the trading businesses. " 
The underlying theory of the RiskMetrics methodology is to calculate. the maximum 
likely loss over the next trading day by using the estimates of the standard deviations 
and correlations between the returns of trading instruments. However, this approach, 
which is generally called the parametric approach, is only one of the VaR 
methodologies that are used in the market risk measurements. VaR can also be 
estimated by using non-parametric approaches. 
The concept of VaR appears-to be straightforward. However; as Dowd (1998) points 
out, the devil is in the detail. Before explaining the methodologies that are used to 
measure VaR, first the underlying assumptions of VaR are explained and then uses 
and limitations of VaR are discussed in the following sections. 
5.3 The Underlying Assumptions of VaR 
VaR is a straightforward concept that measures the maximum expected loss over a 
given horizon period and at a given level of confidence. As a result of the increased 
market risk, which is the uncertainty of future returns due to the fluctuations of 
financial asset quantities such as stock prices, interest rates, exchange rates and 
commodity rates, measuring and managing these risks is under the focus of market 
participants. Consequently, VaR has become a common standard in the market risk 
management. Therefore, in recent years many financial institutions implemented risk 
management systems based on VaR. 
According to Jorion (1997), VaR became popular because of two main reasons; first, 
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it is a method for measuring market risk that is easy to understand, and second, VaR 
provides users, especially top managers and shareholders, with a single summary 
measure of market risk. Furthermore, VaR was also officially accepted and promoted 
by regulators not only as a sound risk management practice, but also as a 
methodology that is used in the measurement of market risk for the capital 
requirement purposes. 
By describing VaR as a measure of the worst expected loss over a given horizon 
under normal market conditions at a given level of confidence, Jorion (1997) 
illustrates this concept by giving the following example: 
"For instance, a bank might say that the daily VaR of its trading portfolio is $1 
million at the 99 percent confidence level. In other words, under normal market 
conditions, only one percent of the time, the daily loss will exceed $1 million. " 
VaR is a statistical measure of risk exposure with a function of two key factors; the 
time horizon and the confidence level. Although the choice of these two key 
quantitative factors has a significant impact on the VaR calculation, there is no 
consensus among the market participants on these factors. For example, RiskMetrics 
uses a 95 percent confidence interval over one day and the Basel Committee requires 
a 99 percent confidence interval over ten days. These two fundamental issues, 
namely the time horizon and the confidence interval, are discussed in the next two 
sub-sections. 
5.3.1 Time Horizon 
Financial institutions calculate VaR based on different time horizons ranging from 
one day to longer periods as long as one year. Stambaugh (1996) argues that the 
choice of time horizon has a vital importance on the outcome and states that: 
"Longer holding periods are generally associated with greater risk Clearly, in 
order for the risk measurement to be meaningful, one would choose a holding 
period that approximates one's trading behaviour. Active traders in liquid 
markets, such as banks, will typically find their portfolios change dramatically 
from one day to the next, and so consider a one-day holding period to be an 
appropriate one. Other actors, such as investors, will typically maintain a 
portfolio intact for a longer period, perhaps as long as a month, in which case 
that would be the better holding period. " 
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The time horizon used to calculate VaR should depend on the liquidity of assets in 
the portfolio and how frequently they are traded. For example, because it is difficult 
to liquidate relatively less liquid assets, a longer time horizon is required while 
calculating VaR for the portfolios that consist of illiquid assets. Therefore, the choice 
of time horizon depends upon the characteristics of the portfolio and liquidity of its 
positions. For trading and market making operations, VaR is typically computed 
using one-day, five-day, or ten-day time horizons, while longer time horizons are 
often used by institutional investors and corporations. 
Despite the fact that a number of institutions can operate on longer holding periods 
such as one-quarter or one-year, the usual holding periods are one-day or one-month 
(Dowd, 1998). Although one-day is the shortest holding period at the moment, by 
employing high frequency data, it is theoretically possible for institutions to work 
with holding periods less than a day. Dowd argues the liquidity of the markets in 
which the institution operates is the most important factor that affects the choice of 
the holding period. If a position can be liquidated quickly in an orderly fashion, that 
position's VaR might be preferred' to be based on a short target period. However, 
when orderly liquidation takes time because of thin market conditions and difficulty 
in finding counterparties, a longer holding period might be more appropriate. On the 
other hand, because liquidating a-position in an orderly manner could differ among 
markets, it is normal for an institution to choose a common holding period. 
Therefore, an institution should choose a holding period that best reflects its trading 
positions, taking into account the markets in which it is mostly involved. 
As a result, the time horizon could be a one-day period, i. e. the next trading day, or a 
longer period. While traders and financial risk managers are generally interested in a 
one-day time horizon, regulators and market participants, considering illiquid 
markets, generally prefer multiple-day time horizons while calculating market risk by 
using VaR methodologies. 
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5.3.2 Confidence Interval 
The confidence interval defines the time frame over which an institution should not 
lose more than the VaR amount. As a matter of fact, when the implications of the 
confidence interval are understood, the actual choice of it is not important. While the 
Basle Committee requires a 99 percent confidence interval, commonly used 
confidence intervals range from 90 to 99 percent. Often the VaR confidence level is 
chosen as 99 percent. The 99 percent confidence level implies that there is only a1 
percent probability of losing a larger amount over the period in question. Therefore, 
on average, at any day during a 100-day period, it can be expected to lose more than 
the amount of VaR in only one day of the 100-day period. However, other 
confidence levels such as 95 percent or 98 percent are also used in practice. 
Although there are a number of factors that should be taken into consideration while 
choosing the confidence level and the time horizon, the Basle Committee amendment 
requires banks to employ a holding period of two weeks (ten trading days) and a 99 
percent confidence level when using VaR models to set aside capital for the market 
risk of their trading operations. 
5.4 Uses of VaR 
VaR has emerged as a standard tool for measuring and reporting financial market 
risk. In the last decade, both practitioners and regulators have made increasing use of 
VaR as a tool for market risk management. Today, VaR has been widely accepted 
and has become an industry standard in the risk management framework of financial 
institutions. 
As VaR is a measure of a financial institution's overall exposure to market risk, it is 
used as a trading and control tool. According to Jorion (1997), many companies in 
financial markets have lost billions of dollars because of the deficient monitoring of 
their exposure to market risk. For that reason, in the late 1990s several financial 
firms began to use VaR for calculating and controlling market risk. 
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The concept of VaR was first explicitly endorsed in the Group of Thirty's 1993 
report entitled "Derivatives: Practices and Principles", where VaR is considered as 
the best practice for market risk measurement. As VaR estimates provide information 
concerning the exposure of a company's financial instruments to gain or loss, in 
1995, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted VaR as an 
acceptable method of providing required information concerning a company's 
derivatives activity. In 1995, the International Swap and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) also approved VaR as a market risk measurement tool. 
The popularity and strength of VaR could be explained in its simplicity, because it is 
a quantitative measure reported in units that everybody could understand. Therefore, 
the most important contribution of the VaR concept is that the entire distribution of a 
portfolio's return is summarised in terms of a single number which investors find 
useful and can easily understand. As VaR measures the market risk of a portfolio as a 
total value in a single monetary unit, the idea behind VaR is easily explained even 
for those who do not have special knowledge of different instruments, including 
chief executives that seek a better understanding of market risk, 
The flexibility of VaR as a risk measurement tool also generates its own popularity, 
as VaR can be specified for various horizons (generally between 1 day and 1 month) 
and confidence levels (generally between 90 percent and 99 percent). 
Although VaR was initially introduced for measuring market risk, it serves a number 
of other purposes in financial institutions, such as to report information, to allocate 
economic capital, to trade-off risk and return and to set trading limits for traders. 
These are explained below: 
1) Information reporting: One of the greatest attractions of VaR is that it can 
be used as a summary measure of market risk to both internal bodies, 
such as senior management and board of directors, and external bodies, 
such as shareholders, regulators and investors. This information enables 
these parties to be informed of the risks run by the trading and investment 
operations of the institution. 
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2) Economic capital allocation: The VaR models could be used by the 
management to gain an idea of the positional risk for the whole or part of 
the institution (El Jahel et al., 1998). By using VaR information, risk 
takers are able to make more informed decisions concerning their 
investment strategies. Therefore, profit objectives across businesses can 
become a function of the risk incurred and the management could use 
profit to risk ratios in order to allocate resources to specific businesses (JP 
Morgan, 1996). 
3) Performance evaluation: The remuneration paid to a dealer or a dealer 
desk can be based on their efforts both in terms of risk and return (El 
Jahel et al., 1998). However, given that high rewards bestowed on 
outstanding trading talent may bias the trading professionals towards 
taking excessive risks, if these risks are not properly measured and the 
returns are not adjusted effectively for the amount of risk taken, the 
interest of the firm may not be in line with the interest of the risk-taking 
individual (JP Morgan, 1996). 
4) Setting trading limits: Position limits of traders could also be determined 
by using the VaR figures. Position limits have traditionally been 
expressed in nominal terms, future equivalents or other denominators 
unrelated to the amount of risk effectively incurred (JP- Morgan, 1996). 
However, setting limits in terms of VaR has significant advantages. First, 
position. limits become a function of risk and positions in different 
markets or products can be compared through a common measure. 
Second, limits become meaningful for management as they represent a 
reasonable estimate of how much could be lost. Finally, setting limits 
motivates managers of multiple risk activities to favour risk reducing 
diversification strategies. 
As a result, VaR is particularly useful for measuring market risk of a multi-asset 
class portfolio as it can measure the exposure to stocks, bonds, commodities, foreign 
exchange, structured products such as asset-backed securities and collateralised 
mortgage obligations, as well as derivative instruments such as forwards, futures, 
options and swaps. 
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5.5 Limitations and Drawbacks of VaR 
Although the VaR concept is generally accepted, it should be seen as nothing more 
than a high quality tool for managers because of its limitations and drawbacks. For 
example, the implementation of VaR is harder than understanding the simplicity of 
its concept. Beder (1995) points out three issues, which she believes that make VaR 
difficult to implement. First, the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR 
methodology. Second, vast quantities of data and significant modelling or systems 
efforts may be required. Finally, firms must design and implement risk management 
add-ons to address VaR's limitations and weaknesses. - 
Nugee (2001) argues that, those considering using the VaR techniques need to be 
aware of its strengths as well as its drawbacks. These weaknesses are as follows: 
1) The VaR techniques predict the future by considering the calculations of 
volatility and correlations based on historical data. However, past 
performance cannot always be a good guide to future performance. The 
use of historical data is always limited by the assumption that past trends 
are replicated. 
2) Although the volatility numbers can be derived for each historical period, 
they may vary from day to day. In addition, the length of the historical 
data and whether a weighting factor should be applied to give greater 
weight to recent data should be considered carefully (too little past data or 
a too fast decay factor could lead to much emphasis on the most recent 
figures and a volatility input series can jump significantly). On the other 
hand, long moving averages with little decay in the weighting process 
could lead to an input series that is slow to change and late in reacting to 
changes in the prices. 
3) Applying a normal distribution of price movements is one of the central 
assumptions of the parametric approaches. This means that up and down 
movements of price are broadly equal and the distribution of those 
movements are consistent with the normal statistical distribution. 
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However, the distribution of financial price movements generally 
demonstrates that market movements are not normal but have `fat tails'. 
Therefore, a VaR analysis that is based on the normal distribution could 
lead to an underestimate of the likelihood of extreme events. However, 
supporters of VaR claim that the gains obtained by assuming the 
simplicity of the normal distribution are more advantageous than any 
disadvantages. 
4) The use of VaR techniques requires expensive `information technology' 
(IT) investment. The amount of data required to calculate and then put to 
use all the volatilities and cross-correlations could be enormous and could 
consume computing power and IT resources on a commensurate scale. " 
5) Users of the VaR models, especially senior managers, should be aware of 
the fact that the VaR numbers could mislead them concerning the 
movements in the financial markets and should not forget that the VaR 
numbers are dependent on the statistical assumptions and the confidence 
level chosen for the statistical part of the process. For example, 
considering a confidence level of 98 percent could sound safe. However, 
this indicates that one day in every 20 working days there is a possibility 
of losing more than the VaR number. In addition, using VaR models does 
not make a risky portfolio safer and there is always a possibility of a three 
or even four standard deviation move in the market to throw a portfolio 
into heavy loss. It should not be forgotten that no VaR statistic could 
guide a manager when the basic ground rules change in the market and 
using VaR statistics is not a substitute for assessing more basic risks, such 
as whether markets would continue to function at all. 
VaR is also criticised for reducing all the information down to a single number, 
which indicates the loss of information that could in turn create misleading 
interpretations of the analytical results (Tsai, 2004). Tsai argues that VaR is of 
limited use at the strategic level as it is difficult to allow meaningful comparisons 
across various financial markets by reducing everything to a single number. 
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5.6 VaR Methodologies 
Although there is one definition of VaR, there are three fundamental methodologies 
for estimating VaR that financial institutions use in their market risk management 
systems. These are: 
0 The variance-covariance (parametric) methodology, 
0 The historical simulation methodology, 
0 The Monte Carlo simulation methodology. 
The variance-covariance and historical simulation methodologies forecast risk by 
analysing historical movements of market variables. However, methodologies that 
use historical data assume that the relationships between market rates and prices that 
have been observed over the observation period are valid for estimating risk over the 
next holding period. In the variance-covariance methodology, VaR is estimated with 
an equation that specifies the parameters such as volatility and correlation. On the 
other hand, the historical simulation methodology estimates VaR by revolving 
positions for each change in the market. The Monte Carlo simulation methodology 
also estimates VaR by revolving positions in a portfolio. However, the Monte Carlo 
methodology simulates random hypothetical scenarios rather than using actual 
historical market movements. 
The variance-covariance methodology is the most common method of VaR 
calculation that financial institutions use, unless the portfolio consists of options in 
the portfolio, in which case they also use simulations (Simons, 2000). However, 
choosing the most appropriate model and its associated assumptions to use is one of 
the first and most important features of the VaR measurement decisions that an 
institution faces. 
As each of these approaches has its own set of assumptions and therefore their own 
strengths and weaknesses, they should not be considered as competitors, but as 
alternatives. The intention of this section is to provide the theoretical background of 
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basic VaR methodologies. These methodologies are explained below along with their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
5.6.1 The Variance-Covariance Methodology 
The variance-covariance methodology is the most popular VaR approach where the 
distribution of returns (profit and loss) is specified and used to figure out the VaR 
number. Also called the parametric approach, this methodology depends on a 
statistical analysis of past price movements that determine returns on the assets. By 
quantifying financial risks with the help of statistical techniques, this approach 
evaluates how return volatility behaved in the past and measures the worst expected 
loss over a given horizon at a given confidence level. 
In this methodology, the VaR estimates are based on the statistical estimates of the 
volatility, i. e. the variances of returns and the covariances among returns are used to 
summarise the overall market risk faced by the institution. By using the volatility and 
covariance estimates, this methodology generates a matrix of possible market 
movements under the time period and to the probability distribution specified at the. 
outset, where the matrix is then used to calculate the variance of the portfolio return. 
If it is known that portfolio returns show a certain random behaviour, a normal 
probability distribution can be used to calculate VaR. 
This methodology assumes that the variance-covariance matrix completely describes 
the distribution. Therefore, the assumption concerning the probability distribution is 
crucial. A normal probability distribution is characterised by two variables. These 
are; the mean (expected value) and the variance (spread around the mean). The 
variance can be defined as the weighted sum of squared deviations around the mean, 
and the square root of the variance is called the standard deviation, or volatility. 
Therefore, the first step in the calculation of a VaR estimate in the variance- 
covariance methodology is to decide on the probability distribution of the returns of 
the underlying assets. Then, calculating VaR by using the variance-covariance 
approach is the estimation of the volatility for each risk factor and the covariances 
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for the risk factors. The volatilities and covariances are then combined in a 
covariance matrix, which is followed by the calculation of risk weights for each 
factor. Then, by using matrix algebra, portfolio volatility is calculated. Finally, the 
portfolio volatility is scaled by a factor according to the selected confidence level of 
the assumed probability distribution. 
VaR describes the quantile of the probability distribution of gains and losses over the 
target horizon. fAp being the probability density function (pdf) of AP (portfolio 
return) and c being the confidence interval, the VaR number over some time horizon 
is; 
-VaR 
1-ý = jr1(x)dx 
(5.1) 
As c is selected as the confidence level, VaR corresponds to the 1-c lower-tail level 
(left tail) and therefore the cut line is -a. If the portfolio return is normally 
distributed, the VaR. number could be obtained by applying the standard deviation 
z-/ with z= -VaR ; so VaR is calculated by: 
a 
VaR=-aa-, u (5.2) 
where a is a parameter reflecting the confidence level, o is the standard deviation 
of return and p is the mean return. As o and u are unknown, the estimate of VaR 
is obtained by replacing them with their estimates s and x, respectively. Then: 
VaR = -as -x (5.3) 
If the value of a risk factor X for a particular day is P, then VaR of this asset factor 
for that day is: 
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VaR(X) = -asP -x (5.4) 
The advantage of the normal distribution assumption is that VaR is expressed as a 
simple function of the portfolio return's volatility, i. e. standard deviation. 
Assuming that the statistical distribution of asset returns is normally distributed, a 
corresponding to the confidence level, c, could be obtained from the standard normal 
table. For example, if the confidence level is chosen to be 95 percent, the 
corresponding a is 1.65 (Graph 5.1), and if the confidence level is chosen to be 99 
percent, then a is 2.33 (if confidence level is 98 percent, then a is 2.054 and 2.054 
standard deviations leave 2 percent of the normal distribution in its left tail, where 
1.65 standard deviations leave 5 percent of the normal distribution in the left tail). 
Graph 5.1: Normal Distribution 
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For a single financial asset, if it is assumed that returns of that asset are normally 
distributed, calculating VaR requires only the calculation of volatility of that asset. 
For a given confidence level of a, for example 5 percent, and assuming a zero 
mean, VaR equals to 1.65e r. Then the calculation of VaR is reduced to estimating 
the volatility, i. e. standard deviation (a), of the financial asset's return. 
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When calculating VaR for a portfolio of assets, while the concept remains the same, 
the computation of VaR becomes a more complex process, as the VaR of the whole 
portfolio is not merely the summation of the VaRs of the individual assets because of 
the inter-correlation among all the assets in the portfolio. 
In the variance-covariance approach, calculating the standard deviation of a portfolio 
requires calculating the standard deviation of each component asset in the portfolio 
and the covariance between the return on different assets. When returns are assumed 
to be normally distributed, the standard deviation of a portfolio consisting of two 
assets is given by: 
°AB = a2QÄ +b2QB +2abp, aaAoß (5.5) 
where O4, QB are standard deviations of assets-A and B, pAB is the correlation 
between those two assets and a, b is the amount invested in assets A and B, 
respectively. 
In the variance-covariance approach, the portfolio VaR measures are based on the 
variance-covariance matrix. In equation 5.4, VaR for a risk factor is formulated. 
Assuming that the mean is zero, then VaR of the risk factor X equals to: 
VaR(X) = -asP (5.6) 
When the value of the risk factor is known and the desired confidence level (a) is 
chosen, then the only variable that should be estimated is the standard deviation (s) 
of the return of the risk factor. Similarly, for a portfolio containing many risk factors, 
the standard deviation of the portfolio should be estimated. 
Although there are 'different approaches that have been employed by banks to 
measure VaR, JP Morgan's RiskMetrics is the best-known system that uses the 
variance-covariance methodology. During 1994, JP Morgan launched RiskMetrics35 
35 JP Morgan's RiskMetrics system was first unveiled in October 1994. 
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technical document, which is a set of tools allowing the users to estimate their 
exposure to market risk under the VaR framework. According to this document, 
RiskMetrics build normal distributions for historic price changes and aggregate the 
results into a diversified VaR number for a 95 percent confidence level. This means 
that the volatility estimates generated by RiskMetrics are below the actual figure in 5 
percent of cases. RiskMetrics also suggest that the volatility for a certain point in 
time can be estimated by extracting the square root from a weighted average of 
lagged, squared portfolio returns (as the average return is assumed to be zero, this is 
equal to the weighted standard deviation). The weights used decrease exponentially 
at a given rate, so that only the very latest squared returns contribute significantly to 
the estimated volatility. 
RiskMetrics uses the exponentially smoothed historical data to estimate the volatility 
series, which allows capturing the time varying, persistent volatility observed in the 
financial markets. There are two fundamental assumptions that the RiskMetrics 
method builds upon. First, the value of all positions can be linearly approximated 
from the, underlying prices. Second, log returns are distributed according to the 
conditional normal distribution36. RiskMetrics considers that the variance of each 
return and the correlation between returns are a function of time and the returns 
follow a conditional normal distribution. 
Despite its usefulness, such as -being straightforward, industry standard, and least 
computational intensiveness, there are some disadvantages of the variance- 
covariance approach. This methodology is inadequate for measuring the risk of 
derivatives such as options. This approach assumes that instrument payouts are 
symmetrical, which could create problems for institutions whose portfolios contain 
many options or other instruments whose return profiles are not symmetrical. When 
dealing with products presenting non-linear payoffs (like options), it is not a 
reasonable assumption to admit a linear relationship 
between the value of the 
instrument and the value of its underlying asset. However, the market risk of 
financial instruments, which are non-linearly dependent on the price level (such as 
36 In addition, RiskMetrics sets the mean return to zero. 
124 
options), can only be included as a linear approximation in the variance-covariance 
methodology. 
Furthermore, most of the variance-covariance models, including RiskMctrics, 
assume that risk factors are normally distributed. However, this assumption could 
create some problems as the distribution of financial asset price increments is known 
to be heavy tailed and significantly non-Gaussian (Neftci, 2000). This phenomenon 
is known as `fat tails' and indicates that the VaR figures could not sufficiently 
capture the possibility of extreme market moves. Tsai (2004) also argues that 
methods such as RiskMetrics that heavily depends on a multivariate normality could 
produce substantial bias if the distributional assumption is violated significantly. 
The normality assumption of the variance-covariance approach is discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
5.6.1.1 Normality Assumption of the Variance-Covariance Methodology 
While estimating VaR numbers, the parametric approaches generally assume that 
returns are normally distributed, which makes the VaR calculation straightforward. 
However, assuming normality is one of the most important weaknesses of the 
parametric VaR as it underestimates the frequency of extreme events of asset returns 
that exhibit `fat tails'. Since the main objective of the risk management models is to 
measure the probability of losses in the tails, this assumption is an important one that 
should be considered. 
Although the variance-covariance approach uses the normal distribution as a 
statistical basis, many empirical studies of time series data have shown that financial 
asset returns are not normally distributed and these series tend to be skewed and 
leptokurtic (Neftci, 2000). The degree of fat-tailness of a distribution is assessed by 
the kurtosis, which measures the relative peakedness or flatness of a given 
distribution compared to a normal distribution. The leptokurtosis (high kurtosis) 
indicates that there are more occurrences far away from the mean than is predicted 
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by a standard normal distribution. The kurtosis is defined as the fourth moment of the 
distribution, i. e. the mean to the power of four, divided by the square of the variance; 
Err a 
k=- 
nýa2) 2 
(5.7) 
where k is the kurtosis, r, is the return on day i, and Q2 is the variance. The normal 
distribution has a kurtosis of three. Any distribution that has a kurtosis greater than 
three is said to be leptokurtotic, i. e. fatter tails and lower central hump than the 
normal distribution. 
The skewness parameter indicates deviation from the normal distribution, which is 
symmetric around the mean. The coefficient parameter of the skewness can be 
expressed as; 
s 
sk =` 
n(az)siz 
(5.8) 
For the normal distribution skewness is zero. While a positive skewness indicates an 
asymmetric tail extending toward right side, a negative skewness indicates an 
asymmetric tail extending toward left. The parametric VaR is based on the 
volatilities and correlations that work well under normal market conditions. 
However, this approach could not be successful in times of market crisis. In order to 
correct for the weaknesses of parametric VaR, stress tests, such as extreme effects of 
financial crises that occurred in the past, and scenario simulations, such as 
hypothetical future events (increase in oil prices or in inflation), should be employed. 
Despite its disadvantages, the variance-covariance approach is one of the most 
popular VaR methodologies in practice. Therefore, users of VaR should consider the 
weaknesses of this approach when assessing the market risk of an institution. 
However, capturing only linear instruments is not the only problem that the users of 
VaR should consider. As VaR relies on the calculation of the 
volatility and 
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covariance estimates and the volatilities and correlations could vary through time, the 
accurate estimates of these parameters are crucial in calculating VaR. The next 
section discusses estimating volatility in the variance-covariance methodology. 
5.6.1.2 Estimation of Volatility 
Producing the estimates of volatility and correlation has an essential role in 
calculating VaR. Therefore, this section explains some fundamental models that are 
in use while producing the estimates of volatility and correlations. 
The volatility of a financial asset's return and risk are almost synonymous in finance. 
The volatility of a financial asset creates financial risk, which can be defined as the 
dispersion of unexpected outcomes as a result of the changes in asset prices. The 
volatility is measured by the standard deviation of these unexpected outcomes. An 
asset, which has no volatility, has no risk, as there is no unexpected outcome for that 
asset. Therefore, an asset without volatility needs no measurement and control. 
The volatility forecasts are. one of the most. important factors that affect the 
parametric VaR, as there are different types of volatility models ranging from 
historical and exponentially smoothed to GARCH models. While some basic models 
consider constant volatility, models like exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) and GARCH attempt to keep track of the variations in the volatility and 
correlation over time. 
Whether to use a static or conditional variance37 is an important issue that should be 
considered in the variance-covariance methodology. It is generally accepted that as 
variance changes over time horizons, the VaR estimates should not rely on the 
unconditional variances. Financial asset returns generally exhibit volatility 
37 The conditional volatility means that the volatility can be decomposed into predictable and 
unpredictable components and the predictable component 
in a return series is the conditional variance 
o of the series. By modelling a conditional variance, the relationship between the information 
available at time t and future volatility can be found. 
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clustering, or persistence38, which means that large changes tend to follow large 
changes and small changes tend to follow small changes. 
The problem with the constant volatility method is that, as indicated by the empirical 
evidence, the volatility is not constant but varies over time. Figlewski (1997) argues 
that because volatility changes randomly over time, optimal forecasting must take 
this into account. Therefore, the accurate forecasting of volatility is of vital interest to 
traders, investors and risk managers, as well as researchers seeking to understand 
market dynamics. 
There are several methods in the literature that are used to forecast volatility. The 
simplest one is the random walk, which says that the best forecast of the volatility of 
today is yesterday's realised volatility. Another simple model is the historical mean 
model, which indicates that the best forecast of the volatility today is an equally 
weighted average of all past volatility observations. Similar to the historical mean 
model, the moving average model also takes into consideration the past volatility 
observations. However, unlike the historical mean model, the moving average model 
employs a moving window of -fixed length to estimate the volatility. While the 
above-mentioned models presume constant volatility, assuming-that the volatility of 
an underlying asset is constant is far from perfect as the volatility of an asset price is 
a stochastic variable (Hull, 2000). 
Graph 5.2 demonstrates the return series of the EUR/USD parity from 1999 to 2003. 
As it can be seen from this graph, the volatility tends to cluster39. While high 
volatility in the exchange rate returns tends to follow each other, low volatility also 
tends to follow each other. Therefore, it would be misleading to use constant 
volatility in VaR calculations as the volatility clustering implies that recent 
observations should receive more weight. 
" `Persistence' measures the length of clustering. A series that has quite long clusters of unusual 
events is said to exhibit persistence. This feature implies a non-linear dependency between returns. 
"A statistical approach for detecting volatility clusters is based on the Ljung-Box statistic calculated 
on the squared returns. This statistic reveals whether the size of the movement today has any 
predictability for the size of the movement in the future. 
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Graph 5.2: Log Return of EUR/USD 
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While the equally weighted models give the same weight to all observations, in the 
exponential weighted and GARCH(1,1) models, the weights assigned to observations 
decrease exponentially as the observations become older. The GARCH(1,1) model 
differs from the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model as it also 
assigns some weight to the long-run average variance rate (Hull, 2000). The 
fundamental methodologies that. are used to forecast volatility, namely equally 
weighted moving average, exponentially weighted moving average and GARCA 
type models are presented below. 
5.6.1.2.1 Equally Weighted Moving Averages 
The equally weighted averaging is a standard statistical method to estimate 
unconditional variances and covariances. However, when they are applied to 
financial markets, the `ghost features', which result from the conditional 
heteroskedasticity characteristic of financial data, could pose substantial problems 
(Alexander, 1996). 
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In the equally weighted moving average model (EqWMA), a moving window of 
fixed length to estimate volatility is employed and the volatility estimate constructed 
from the moving average is: 
n-1 
C12 =r1) (rr-r -JU)2 
In-1 
(5.9) 
where a, ' denotes the estimated standard deviation of the portfolio at the beginning 
of day t, n is the observation period, r, _, 
is the change in the portfolio value (return) 
and p is the mean of returns. Equation 5.9 gives equal weights to all observations on 
past returns (all weights are equal and set to 1/n) and calculation is updated by 
adding new data and dropping the oldest information. 
However, although this modelling of volatility is simple to implement, it has some 
drawbacks. These are: 
1) The EqWMA methodology ignores the dynamic ordering of observations 
because, it receives the same weight as the older information (although 
recent data should be more relevant). 
2) As the window moves forward one by one, dropping a large return from 
the sample could substantially affect the volatility estimate. 
Indeed, financial asset returns do not show evidence of random process but exhibit 
conditional heteroskedasticity. This means that the return of the previous day 
influences the behaviour of the return on the following day, and this relevance 
decays with time. The further the data goes into the past, the less relevant it becomes 
to today's events. Furthermore, because each observation is equally weighted in the 
EqWMA approach, a large market move could significantly distort volatility. For 
example, when using a one-year historic volatility, a market shock that drops from 
the sample could cause a significant change in the VaR estimation. Alexander (1996) 
explains this phenomenon of `ghost features' by stating that: 
"When there is a large movement in the underlying time series such as a jump 
in market price, an equally weighted average of squared returns will jump up 
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to the very next day. This is an accurate reflection of the 'clustering' behaviour 
of volatility in financial markets. However, there are problems: Firstly, that 
one, large, squared return will continue to keep volatility estimates high for 
exactly one year (or however long the moving average) whereas the underlying 
volatility will have long ago returned to normal levels. Secondly, one year (or 
whatever) after a major market. event the equally weighted volatility estimate 
will jump down again as abruptly as it jumped . up. But there is nothing special 
about that day - what is seen is just a ghost of what happened one year ago, a 
correction in the estimate which is by then long over due. Because the average 
is taken over fewer observations, this correction will be much bigger in short- 
term volatility estimates. " 
A more sophisticated approach to modelling volatility is the exponentially weighted 
moving average (EWMA) and GARCH type models, where more weight is given to 
the recent observations. These models overcome the problem of the EqWMA 
approach. The EWMA and GARCH type models recognise that volatilities are not 
constant and the variance of the random process depends upon time. These models 
attempt to keep track of the variations in the volatility through time, as during some 
periods a particular volatility may be relatively low where as during some other 
periods it may be relatively high (Hull, 2000). The EWMA and GARCH models are 
introduced in the next two sub-sections. 
5.6.1.2.2 Exponentially Weighted Moving Averages 
In the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) methodology, which is also 
called as the exponential smoothing, the forecast of volatility depends on the 
immediate past observed volatility. In the EqWMA method, in order to estimate the 
variance, different observations in the sample are given equal weights. They are 
regarded as equally important in the estimate, since it is assumed that they come 
from the same distribution. A shock could increase the volatility sharply and 
volatility would be high until the particular observation drops out of the sample as it 
moves forward. The decline in volatility would then be just as sharp as the initial 
increase. However, in the EWMA methodologies, past observations are weighted by 
a smoothing constant, the decay factor (A). For the EWMA models, the variance is 
calculated as: 
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i= (1 _ 2)EX-1-1(t _, _, U)2 
(5.10) 
In this model, the exponentially weighted average on a given day is a combination of 
the weighted average on the previous day, which receives a weight of A and 
yesterday's squared deviation, which receives a weight of (1-A). The smoothing 
parameter (? ) is between 0 and 1. The decay factor determines the rate at which the 
influence of past observations decays as they become more distant. When the decay 
factor equals zero (A = 0), the EWMA model becomes an EqWMA. While lower A 
indicates faster decay in the influence of past observations, if A approaches to 1, 
then a higher weight is given to the last observations. 
The RiskMetrics model employs an exponentially weighted moving. average in order 
to model variances and uses only one decay factor for all series. In RiskMetrics, the 
value of the decay parameter is fixed at A=0.94 for daily data and A=0.97 for 
monthly data - (25 trading days).. As RiskMetrics use an exponential weighting 
scheme where the weight of past observations declines geometrically, a relatively 
short time period40 is required. The decay factor could be found from maximizing the 
likelihood function41. However, in practice, because there are several assets in a 
portfolio, it is a very difficult task to calculate decay factors for a portfolio (Jorion, 
1997). In addition, the decay factor could not only vary across series but also over 
time. 
The EWMA approach is a special case of the GARCH(l, l) process, where ao is 
zero and a, and f3 sum to unity (Jorion, 1997). Compared to GARCH, the 
estimation of the exponential model is relatively straightforward as it relies on only 
one parameter, i. e. the decay factor (A). These restrictions reduce the GARCH(1,1) 
40 RiskMetrics uses data series consist of six months of daily observations. 
Actually, maximum likelihood for GARCH model is more reliable than for RiskMetrics as 
maximum likelihood assigns more weights on large return squares 
for GARCH models (the bigger 
value the return square (r2 ), the more the algorithm tries 
bring o close to r, 2 ). However, 
maximum likelihood for RiskMetrics assigns equal weight to each data (no matter the value of t'jZ , it 
tries to bring o as close to r, 
2 as possible). 
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to a one parameter model only and make it significantly easier to estimate volatility. 
The GARCH models are explained in the next sub-section. 
5.6.1.2.3 GARCA Models 
Volatility clustering suggests that the disturbances of financial asset returns are 
serially correlated. This problem could be captured through modelling conditional 
heteroskedasticity by assuming normality of the conditional distribution of financial 
asset returns (ARCH/GARCH models). This class of models are specifically 
designed to model and forecast conditional variances. In these models, the variance 
of the dependent variable is modelled as a function of past values of the dependent 
variable and independent, or exogenous, variables. These models also handle the 
serial correlation of disturbances as well as capturing to a great extent the fat tail 
effect. The aim of this sub-section is to describe the basic GARCII model. 
ARCH is the acronym for autoregressive conditiona142 heteroskedasticity43 that was 
introduced by Engle (1982) as a model for macroeconomic uncertainty. As the 
volatility of asset returns appears to be serially correlated, in order to capture the 
serial correlation of volatility, Engle proposed ARCH models. The basic ARCH 
model is a moving average (MA) model where the variance is a function of previous 
squared error terms. In the ARCH specification, the expected volatility of today 
depends on the data (squared forecast errors) of the previous n days: 
P 
o =ao>a; rý2, (5.11) 
In the ARCH(q) process, the standard deviation at time t is a function of the observed 
data at t-l, t-2, t-3, t-q. 
'Z The conditional variance means that the forecast of the variance of a time series at time t is based on 
the previous data. 
" Heteroskedasticity means changing variance and indicates the lack of stationary volatility, i. e. the 
presence of periods of large standard deviation alternating with periods of small standard deviation. 
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Bollerslev (1986) extended ARCH into generalised ARCH, i. e. GARCH, which is 
the model extended to a full ARMA(p, q) model that includes both an autoregressive 
and a moving average polynomial. GARCH is a general approach to modelling 
volatility by not considering it as a parameter but as a process that evolves over time 
in random (Engle and Mezrich, 1995). The task of any volatility model is to describe 
the typical historical pattern of volatility and use this to forecast future episodes. The 
idea of GARCH modelling is that a set of parameters is used to compute the 
volatility for every day over the sample and if these volatilities fail to match the 
observed volatility clusters, new parameters are chosen. 
The GARCH model, which is the most popular class of the stochastic volatility 
models (Simons, 1997), assumes that the variance of returns follows a predictable 
process, where the return at time t (rt) is normally distributed with mean u and 
variance a,. In a GARCH(p, q) process, which is stationary, the standard deviation 
at time t depends on observed data at t-1, t-2, t-3, t-q, as well as observed standard 
deviation at 1-1, t-2, t-3, t -p, and conditional variance is a function of conditional 
variance up to time I -p and previous returns up to t-q. 
Q; =a0 +a, r, 
2, +a2r, 22 +... +agr, 2q +ý31Qý 1 +Aa; 2 +... +ßpal p 
(5.12) 
where, cr2 is the conditional variance and r is the return. 
In the GARCH(1,1) model, which is the most popular type of GARCH45 (Simons, 
1997), the conditional variance depends not only on the latest return but also on the 
previous conditional variance. The GARCH (1,1) can be expressed by: 
ai= a0 +a11+ ý3aý , (5.13) 
" The stationary assumption means that the mean, variance, skew and kurtosis of the underlying 
population distribution are taken to be stable through time, 
i. e. dynamics are assumed to be constant 
through time. 
41 The integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model is the non-stationary form (non-stationary is a statistical 
warning that the past is not necessarily a guide to the future) of the GARCH model. The exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH), on the other hand, diverges from other models by not being linear. 
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Empirical studies indicate that the GARCIi(1,1) models better forecast volatility of 
foreign exchange returns. Examining twenty time series volatility models across a 
wide variety of markets (including the stock market, equities, interest rates and 
foreign exchange rates), Ederington and Guan (1999) found that GARCIi(1,1) yields 
better out-of-sample forecasts than the historical standard deviation. However, it is 
not always necessary that GARCH type models always produce better estimates. For 
example, Figlewski (1997) found that while the GARCII(1,1) model has a lower root 
mean square error in predicting the S&P index volatilities, the forecasts produced by 
the historical variance46 models are better for the interest rate and foreign exchange 
assets. 
Since the GARCH model is non-linear, in order to estimate parameters ao, a, and 
fl in a GARCH(1,1) model, the maximum likelihood method should be applied to 
do a numerical optimisation, which involves using an iterative procedure to 
determine the parameter values that maximise the chance or likelihood that the 
historical data would occur (Hull, 2000). 
Similar to the GARCH approach, the EWMA models estimate daily volatility by 
applying a weighted average of past squared returns, with, recent squared returns 
weighted more heavily. However, while the EWMA model uses the same weights to 
calculate different class of assets, the GARCH approach computes different weights 
for each volatility calculation. The GARCH(1,1) model is also different from the 
exponential smoother as these models include a third term, which is a constant that 
has all the information for long run forecasting and contains the concept of mean 
reversion. 
The GARCH models have advantages compared to the EWMA and EqWMA 
models, which are relatively straightforward to implement. However, because of the 
computational complexity, it is very difficult to estimate volatilities and variances by 
applying the GARCH models (Alexander, 1996). 
" In the historical variance, i. e. EqWMA, all observations in the sample period back to a chosen cut- 
off point are weighted equally and observations before that time are ignored. However, in the GARCII 
model, the weights attached to successive observations decline exponentially and there is no cut-off 
date. 
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5.6.1.3 Estimation of the Covariances and Correlations 
For portfolios consisting from more than one risk factor, which are assumed to be 
correlated, VaR can be estimated by the portfolio volatility. In order to estimate the 
portfolio volatility, first the covariance matrix of the returns of these risk factors 
should be established by using the volatilities and correlations of the risk factors in 
the portfolio. 
The correlation between two return series, X and Y, can be written as 
cov(X, Y) 
ax cry 
where o and o are the standard deviations of X and Y and cov(X, Y) is the 
covariance between X and Y. The covariance between X and Y can be written as 
E[(X - Px)(Y - p1)], where , ux and p1 are the means of X and Y, and E denotes 
the expected value. The correlation always lies between +1 and -1. A positive value 
indicates that returns- move linearly in the same direction and a greater value 
indicates greater association between return series. On the other hand, a negative 
value indicates that returns move linearly in the opposite direction. 
However, because the magnitude of correlation depends on the variances of the 
individual components, using the covariance is a more convenient approach in 
calculating VaR. The covariance measures the strength and direction between two 
random variables. If two variables are independent, the covariance is zero. A positive 
covariance means that the two variables move in the same direction and a negative 
covariance means that the variables move in the opposite direction. 
It should be taken into account that calculating covariances (and correlations) 
becomes more difficult with the increase in the number of risk factors in the 
portfolio. If there are two risk factors in a portfolio, only one covariance should be 
calculated. For ten risk factors, the number of covariances that should be calculated47 
increases to 45. 
17 If there are n risk factors in a portfolio, n(n-1)/2 correlations should be calculated. 
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On the other hand, as in the case of the volatility estimation, various methods such as 
the equally weighted moving average, exponential weighted moving average and 
GARCH can be used to capture the time variation in covariance (and correlation). 
Equation 5.14 shows the estimate for the covariance between returns in X and Y 
calculated on day n by using an equally weighted method (it is assumed that the 
means of returns of these factors, x, and y,, are zero). 
1m 
cov 
m lýl 
(5.14) 
An alternative to the equally weighted method is the exponential weighted method, 
which could be used to determine the estimate for the covariance between returns in 
X and Y, where weights are given to the observations on x, y, 's decline as time 
passes. 
COVn = ACOVn-1+(1 -2)Xn-1Yn-1 (s. i 5) 
The GARCH models can also be used for updating covariance estimates and 
forecasting the future level of covariances. For example, the GARCH (1,1) model for 
updating a covariance is CoVn = C9+ arn-IYn-I +P coon-I and the long term 
covariance is 
co 
(1-a-, ß) 
0 
Accordingly, calculating the covariance and correlation coefficient statistics that 
measure the extent of the linear relationship between two variables are very 
important in estimating VaR under the parametric approach. However, as stated 
earlier in this chapter, the parametric approach is not the only methodology to 
calculate VaR. There are two more basic methodologies to calculate VaR, namely 
the historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation methodologies. 
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5.6.2 The Historical Simulation Methodology 
In the previous section, the variance-covariance methodology was explained. The 
objective of this section is to provide an understanding of the historical simulation 
methodology, which is an alternative approach to the parametric VaR. 
Based on the historical data, this approach generates the distribution of the profit and 
loss of the portfolio and calculates potential portfolio losses using actual historical 
returns of the risk factors. The variance-covariance methodology assumes normality. 
Therefore, applying this approach requires an estimate of the standard deviation. 
However, because the financial asset prices are leptokurtic and skewed as well as 
indicating a high degree of serial independence48, the variance-covariance models 
could produce unreliable estimates. 
However, the historical simulation methodology does not require explicit 
assumptions concerning the distribution of asset returns49. Instead, the historical 
simulation methodology takes a portfolio and values the portfolio as if each price 
change occurred from today's portfolio value by applying historical data for a certain 
observation period. Then, gains and losses of the portfolio are simulated for each day 
and then ranked in order. The VaR estimate is the lowest return corresponding to the 
desired confidence level. 
For example, if a 99 percent confidence interval is used, the VaR measure is equal to 
the largest loss corresponding to one percent, which means that the loss is not 
expected to exceed the VaR figure in- more than 1 percent of cases. As a result, this 
approach estimates the VaR figure by using percentiles of the actual historical 
portfolio returns of a certain observation period. 
`g Assuming serial independence means that what happened yesterday or the day before has no 
implications for what will happen today or tomorrow. 
`9 The only assumption that historical simulation makes is that returns are independent and identically 
distributed over time, which means that today's return is not dependent upon yesterday's return and 
the returns are generated by the same probability distribution. 
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The historical simulation methodology offers a number of advantages. First, because 
this approach estimates VaR on the basis of past data, it does not assume any specific 
statistical distribution of asset returns and therefore it does not face the leptokurtosis 
problem. Second, unlike the variance-covariance and Monte Carlo simulation 
methodologies, the historical simulation methodology does not depend on the 
volatility and covariance estimates. Therefore, this methodology captures the 
dynamic nature of volatilities and covariances as it uses the historical data of actual 
price movements to determine the actual portfolio distribution. The third advantage 
of this approach is that it could be applied for both linear and non-linear assets as risk 
factors are revalued by using the historical data. Finally, historical simulation also 
considers stress testing as it actually reflects the stress experienced by a portfolio 
during chaotic periods. 
However, the main disadvantage of this methodology is that there should be 
sufficient available past data to consider cyclical events. Therefore, the length of the 
data set is crucial in the historical simulation approach. While the length of the data 
set should be long enough to form a reliable estimate of the distribution, it should not 
be too long to create paradigm shifts. El Jahel et al. (1998), for example, do not 
recommend using a large number of observations because when a large number of 
observations are applied, the assumption that the observations are identically 
distributed will be less realistic as it is hardly likely that the distribution of the returns 
will not change over time. 
Another disadvantage of the historical simulation methodology is that it is more 
computationally intensive than the variance-covariance approach. Papageorgiou and 
Paskov (1999) specify three disadvantages of the historical simulation methodology: 
1) It assumes that the past represents the immediate future, i. e. the 
distribution is assumed to be stationary, 
2) The results are highly sensitive to the length of the time horizon. As this 
approach applies a fixed window of historical data, when extreme market 
moves are dropped from the window, there could be sharp changes in the 
VaR estimates. 
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3) It is difficult to collect consistent historical data. In particular, for new 
instruments the calculation of VaR under the historical simulation 
approach is very difficult because of the lack of data. 
As the problem of `ghost features' also appears to be valid for the historical 
simulation approach, simply by giving more weight to more recent data points in the 
historical distribution, an exponential weighting model could be used in a historical 
simulation methodology. 
Boudoukh et al. (1998) proposed an approach that combines the exponentially 
weighted variance-covariance methodology with the historical simulation 
methodology. This hybrid approach estimates the VaR of a portfolio by applying 
exponentially declining weights to past returns and then finds the appropriate 
percentile of this time weighted empirical distribution. Boudoukh et al. argue that as 
EWMA applies exponentially declining weights to past returns in order to calculate 
conditional volatility, the use of declining weights allows the user to capture the 
cyclical behaviour of the return volatility. On the other hand, in order to obtain VaR, 
the historical simulation methodology estimates the percentiles directly by using the 
empirical percentiles-of the historical return distribution. This approach captures fat 
tails directly. However, there are two problems associated with historical simulation. 
The first problem is that the extreme percentiles of the distribution are especially 
difficult to estimate with small datasets, which should be solved by extending the 
observation period. The second problem is that this approach essentially assumes that 
returns are independent and identically distributed and therefore does not allow for 
time varying volatility and correlation. However, if a large observation period is 
chosen to solve the first problem, then the second problem gets worse as the value of 
the recent information diminishes. Therefore, by combining the EWMA model and 
the historical simulation approach, it is possible to overcome these problems. 
In the hybrid approach, exponentially declining weights are attributed to historical 
returns while the historical approach attributes equal weights to each observation in 
establishing the return distribution. To obtain the VaR estimate by using the hybrid 
approach, Boudoukh et al. employ three steps. In the first step, to each of the most 
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recent returns a weight is assigned (the weight given to the observation n+1 days 
before is, A times the weight given to the observation n days before, where 
0<A< 1). In the second step, the returns are ordered in ascending order. Finally, 
starting from the lowest return, weights are accumulated until the desired percentile 
is obtained. 
5.6.3 The Monte Carlo Simulation Methodology 
The second approach of the VaR calculation based on a simulation is the Monte 
Carlo simulation methodology. In particular, this approach is used in the pricing and 
risk management of the complex financial instruments, such as options. 
Similar to the historical simulation methodology, this approach generates a large 
number of price samples from a return distribution to value the financial assets in the 
portfolio. However, while the historical changes in prices are used in the historical 
simulation methodology, in this approach the portfolio return distribution is 
generated by a Monte Carlo simulation. By using the actual historical returns of the 
risk factors, the Monte Carlo simulation methodology randomly generates a large 
number of simulations, which are used to calculate the volatility and correlation 
estimates. As the Monte CarlO simulation methodology uses the historic prices to 
estimate the variances and correlations, it is necessary to employ an assumption 
concerning the statistical distribution of the returns of the risk factors in the portfolio. 
The Monte Carlo simulation methodology is implemented in three steps. The first 
step corresponds to the scenario generation. In this step, the volatility and correlation 
matrixes for the risk factors are calculated, which generates a statistical distribution 
for returns of the underlying risk factors. The second step corresponds to the 
portfolio valuation. In this step, a large random sample is taken from the statistical 
distribution to re-price each risk factor and to determine the trial gain and loss. This 
process is then repeated for each trial, which provides a set of different values for all 
the risk factors under consideration and each set represents a scenario. In the third 
step, the scenarios are ordered and the VaR number is obtained according to the 
desired confidence level (by cutting the list at the desired confidence level). For 
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example, if a 99 percent confidence level is chosen, then the VaR estimate of the 
Monte Carlo simulation approach is defined as the result that is exceeded in 99 
percent of cases. 
While the variance-covariance methodology is not an adequate methodology in 
capturing the non-linear behaviour of options, the advantage of the Monte Carlo 
simulation approach is the ability to calculate the VaR estimate for the non-linear 
financial assets by revaluing them for each trial. Therefore, this approach captures 
the non-linear effects of securities such as options. While some argue that the Monte 
Carlo methodology is the most powerful and comprehensive methodology for 
measuring market risk (Jorion, 1997), the most serious disadvantage of this approach 
is its high computational cost. As Schreiber et al. (1999) demonstrate, the Monte 
Carlo simulation methodology produces the highest cost while calculating VaR. On 
the other hand, while the computational cost of the variance-covariance methodology 
is not extensive, there is not much difference concerning the cost between the 
historical simulation and variance-covariance methodologies. 
While choosing the appropriate method for calculating VaR, it is crucial to consider 
the cost of constructing and maintaining a model. Therefore, the cost benefit analysis 
of the VaR calculation through the Monte Carlo simulation methodology should be 
carefully considered. In addition, Minnich (1998) argues that for the portfolios 
consisting of linear financial assets, not much additional benefit could be obtained by 
using the Monte Carlo simulation methodology compared with the variance- 
covariance methodology. 
Another problem with the Monte Carlo simulation methodology is to determine the 
necessary number of scenarios to reasonably estimate VaR. In this approach, the 
accuracy of the estimated VaR increases with the square root of the number of 
simulation runs and in order to have a stable VaR result with a 99 percent confidence 
level, a large sample is needed, which makes the Monte Carlo approach a quite 
expensive practice. 
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5.7 A Rcvicw of VaR Literature 
Since the second-half of the 1990s, a large amount of research related to VaR has 
emerged and various aspects of VaR have been extensively documented. However, 
the aim of this section is not to review all these studies but to review the studies in 
which the outcomes of choosing different VaR methodologies were analysed. 
The choice of the methodology that is used in the VaR estimation process gives rise 
to very different results. The studies of Beder (1995), Hendricks (1996), Jackson et 
al. (1998), Boudoukh et al. (1998), Hull and White (1998) and Vlaar (2000) are 
among the works, which highlighted large variations in the VaR estimates depending 
on the methodology that is used to calculate VaR. 
Beder's (1995) study entitled `Seductive but Dangerous' is one of the most 
referenced studies in the VaR literature. In the article, Beder applied eight common 
VaR methodologies to three hypothetical portfolios. The differences in common 
_ 
VaRs emphasise the fact_that_-no single set of parameters, data, assumptions and 
methodology can be accepted as the correct approach. Beder used the historical and 
Monte Carlo simulation methodologies. For each methodology, VaR was calculated 
for a one-day and a ten-day time horizons. The first methodology, historical 
simulation, was performed twice, changing the database used from the past 100 
trading days to the past 250 trading days. The second methodology, Monte Carlo 
simulation, was also performed twice, changing the correlation estimates from the JP 
Morgan RiskMetrics data set to those from the Basle Committee approach. 
The VaR calculations were performed for three portfolios. Portfolio 1 exclusively 
consists of US Treasury strips, and portfolio 2 consists of outright and options 
positions on the S&P equity index contract. The third portfolio consists of the 
combination of portfolio 1 and portfolio 2, which are equally weighted. Beder shows 
that the VaR calculations differ significantly for the same portfolio. VaRs are found 
to be extremely dependent on parameters, data assumptions, and methodology. Beder 
calculated eight common VaRs for three hypothetical portfolios for the same 
portfolio and the calculated VaR ranged from a base level of 100 to 1,400, or up to a 
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fourteen-fold variation. The result of this study highlighted the picture of expected 
capital at risk is dependent upon the VaR methodology and the assumptions behind 
the specific calculation. 
Another study that investigates the performance of the VaR technique in practice was 
carried out by Hendricks (1996). Hendricks applied 12 VaR models to one thousand 
randomly chosen foreign exchange portfolios and compared the results. These 
models include; five equally weighted moving average approaches (50 days, 125 
days, 250 days, 500 days and 1,250 days); three exponentially weighted moving 
average approaches (A = 0.94, A=0.97, A=0.99) and four historical simulation 
approaches (125 days, 250 days, 500 days and 1,250 days). In the study the 95 and 
99 percent confidence levels over a one-day holding period were used. The data 
consists of daily exchange rates of eight currencies against the US dollar and the 
historical sample covers the period 1983-1994. 
Leaving the question of which methodology produces capital saving open, Hendricks 
aimed to understand how each VaR approach would have performed over a realistic 
range of portfolios containing -the eight currencies over the sample, period. The 
overall assessment of Hendricks is that the VaR approaches using longer observation 
periods tend to produce less variable results than those using shorter observation 
periods or weighting recent observations more heavily. He states: 
"The use of longer time periods may produce larger value-at-risk measures. 
For historical simulation approaches, this result may occur because longer 
horizons provide better estimates of the tail of the distribution. The equally 
weighted approaches, however, may require a different explanation. 
Nevertheless, in our simulations the time period effect is small, suggesting that 
its economic significance is probably low. " 
Hendricks found that none of the twelve models he examined is superior on every 
count and the choice of confidence level has a substantial impact on the performance 
of VaR models. Almost all the approaches produce accurate 95th percentile risk 
measures. However, he found that the 99th percentile risk measures are somewhat 
less reliable as they generally cover between 98.2th percent and 98.50' percent of the 
outcomes. 
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While Beder (1995) and Hendricks (1996) used hypothetical portfolios, the study of 
Jackson et al. (1998) was one of the first studies that compared the VaR 
methodologies by employing real life bank data. By using data on actual trading 
books from a bank with sizable trading exposure, covering equity, interest and 
foreign exchange risks, the study examined the various aspects of VaR analysis and 
its use as an instrument of banking regulation. In particular, they analysed the impact 
of the observation period (window length) and the impact of weighting returns data 
in the parametric VaR calculations. Furthermore, they also compared the empirical 
performance of the parametric and simulation based VaR models. They argue that as 
the Basle Committee amendment does not specify any model that banks should use 
to generate capital requirements, the penalties envisaged for banks whose models fail 
to forecast loss probabilities accurately make this analysis crucial. 
The data of the Jackson et al. 's study covers the period from July 1987 to April 1995 
and the VaR estimates were calculated for the period from June 1989. They found 
that while various approaches of VaR modelling differ widely in the accuracy with 
which they predict the fraction of times that a given loss would be exceeded, the 
historical simulation models produce more accurate VaR estimates. The advantage of 
the study of Jackson et al. is the use of actual portfolios. They state that, "using 
actual books ensure that the pattern of risk exposures along the yield curve and 
between markets is realistic and the amount of exposure taken at different points on 
the yield curve and between markets clearly reflects a bank's investment decisions ". 
They also claim that randomly generated portfolios cannot be representative and it 
would be difficult to build stylised books that were representative without basing 
them on actual books. 
While the above-mentioned studies employed most common VaR methodologies, 
which are variance-covariance, historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation, 
Boudoukh et al. (1998) and Hull and White (1998) propose the use of some 
combined approaches in the VaR calculations and compare this approach to other 
most common VaR methodologies. 
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Boudoukh et al. (1998) found that by using a hybrid approach that combines the 
exponentially weighted variance-covariance and historical simulation methodologies, 
a significant improvement in the precision of the VaR forecasts occurs. They 
estimated the VaR figures for four series by applying six models. These models arc; 
the equally weighted variance-covariance, historical simulation, exponentially 
weighted variance-covariance (0.97 and 0.99 decay factors), and hybrid approaches 
(0.97 and 0.99 decay factors). They calculated VaR estimates for the DEM/USD 
exchange rate, crude oil, S&P 500 index, and a general Brady bond index by using 
250 observations and the 95 and 99 percent confidence levels. They found that the 
hybrid approach provides an absolute error, which is 30 to 43 percent lower than the 
exponentially weighted variance-covariance approach and 14 to 28 percent lower 
than the historical simulation approach. Therefore, they recommend the use of this 
method as it combines the benefits of the two key VaR methodologies. 
Hull and White (1998) also compared the historical simulation methodology, the 
hybrid approach that is proposed by Boudoukh et al. (1998), and a new approach 
(Hull and White - HW) that they proposed as a straightforward extension of the 
traditional historical simulation50. Hull and White used daily data on 12 currencies 
(between 4 January 1988 and 15 August 1997) and 5 stock indices (between 11 July 
1988 and 10 February 1998). . For the hybrid approach they applied a 0.98 decay 
factor and for the HW approach, they applied a 0.94 decay factor. They used the 
most recent 500 days of data (2 years) and considered the 1 and 5 percentiles of the 
distribution. They also discussed whether to adjust the mean percentage change to 
zero in the historical simulation and test all approaches with and without a mean 
adjustment. They found that the results with mean adjustment are similar to those 
without mean adjustment. They. also found that the HW approach, which involves 
adjusting observations to reflect the difference between the volatility at the time of 
the observation and current volatility, provides better 1-percentile estimates of daily 
returns than the historical simulation and hybrid approaches. 
30 Hull and White explain this methodology by stating: "Suppose that 20 days ago the observed 
percentage change in a market variable was 1.6% and the daily volatility was estimated to be IV,,. If 
the daily volatility is now estimated to be 1. S% the sample percentage change corresponding to the 
observation 20 days ago is 2.4%. " 
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Hull and White also calculated the regulatory capital that would be required for an 
investment of USD 1 in each currency and stock index. They found that: 
1) The capital is significantly more variable under the HW and hybrid 
approaches than under the historical simulation methodology. 
2) In the historical simulation approach the risk capital is unchanged for 
long periods of time due to the length of the window and it is affected by 
large observations that appear in and drop off from the window. 
3) For long positions in a single foreign currency, they found that the 
required capital under the HW approach is on average 7.8 percent less 
than under the historical simulation methodology. For long positions in a 
stock index, they find that the required capital under the hybrid approach 
is on average 0.2 percent higher than under the historical simulation 
methodology and the required capital under the HW approach is on 
average 6.7 percent higher than under the historical simulation 
methodology. They comment that the hybrid approach scores higher 
figures if the objective is to minimise capital. 
4) Considering which method provides maximum protection against losses, 
they found that for currencies the hybrid and HW approaches produce 
better results than historical simulation while for stock indices the results 
are unclear. 
Vlaar (2000) also investigated the consequences of dynamics in the term structure of 
Dutch interest rates for the accurateness of VaR models. Using 17 years of daily 
data, he compared the out-of-sample performance of VaR standards calculated on the 
basis of the historical simulation, variance-covariance and Monte Carlo simulation 
models, as well as a combined variance-covariance Monte 
Carlo approach, for 25 
hypothetical portfolios consisting of Dutch government bonds of eight different 
maturities. He argues that as VaR is supposed to give the amount of money that can 
be lost with certain (for example 1 percent) probability, VaR is considered adequate 
if the frequency of actual losses in excess of the calculated VaR is approximately 1 
percent. He found that with a 99 percent confidence 
level and for a ten-day holding 
period, best results were obtained for a combined variance-covariance 
Monte Carlo 
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methodology in which the variance is derived from the Monte Carlo simulation and 
VaR is subsequently calculated on the variance-covariance methodology. Concerning 
other methods, he found that while the historical simulation methodology is 
satisfactory when a long history is studied, the Monte Carlo methodology requires a 
large number of samples to arrive at the theoretically correct size of the 1 percent 
exceedance level. Vlaar concludes that the differences in the VaR standards on the 
basis of different methods vary and accurate VaR calculations lead to higher capital 
requirements than inaccurate measures, which might not encourage banks to 
accurately calculate the VaR estimates. 
While the above-mentioned studies compared different VaR models, the studies of 
Dimson and Marsh (1997) and Crouhy et al. (1998) compared the required capitals 
that are calculated by using the standardised approach and the VaR models. 
Dimson and Marsh (1997) discussed a number of potential issues, which a financial 
institution might face when calculating appropriate levels of capital for multiple 
positions during periods of stress. In particular, they evaluated the performance of 
the leading methods for setting capital requirements for securities' firms trading 
books and found that the VaR type models are efficient in providing appropriate 
levels of capital to cover the position risk of equity trading books, while the building 
block approaches fail to provide effective cover. 
Another study that evaluated different VaR models is the study of Crouhy et al. 
(1998). Crouhy et al. compared the capital charges for market risk by using different 
approaches. Firstly, they compared the required market risk capital amounts of a 
bank's actual positions over a six-month period, where the capital amounts were 
produced by that bank. They mention that the capital savings, which is the reduction 
in capital charge realised by adopting an internal model instead of the standardised 
approach, varies between a low of 60 percent to a high of 85 percent. Secondly, they 
investigated the same issue, i. e. the extent of the capital charge differences between 
the standardised method and the internal model for five basic portfolios, which are 
limited to linear interest rate products. In their study, the amounts regarding the 
internal VaR method were provided from that bank's own system and comparisons 
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were made for only a one-day calculation. In addition, as the details of the bank's in- 
house VaR method were not classified in the study, it is not clear whether the 
requirements of the Basle Committee were met. For the first two portfolios, the 
adoption of the internal model did not allow any capital savings. On the contrary, the 
use of internal models generated a capital surcharge of 132 percent for the first and 
103 percent for the second portfolios. However, for the third, fourth and fifth 
portfolios, the use of internal models generate capital savings of 62 percent, 11 
percent and 51 percent, respectively. 
Reviewing the literature demonstrates that there is no `best VaR estimation method' 
and the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR methodology, parameters and 
data assumptions. However, the evidence concerning the accuracy of the VaR 
models that are used in the framework of the market risk capital regulations is 
limited. Beder (1995) found that not only the VaR estimates for the individual 
portfolios differ significantly, but also the magnitude of the differences does not 
follow a clear pattern. However, in her study Beder did not evaluate the accuracy of 
the VaR estimates that have been calculated by employing various VaR 
methodologies. 
Jackson et al. (1998) evaluated the VaR estimates but they only focused on the 
regulatory backtesting. Their results indicate that various approaches of VaR 
modelling differ widely in the accuracy with which they predict the fraction of times 
that a given loss would be exceeded. However, their conclusions rely on the 
regulatory backtesting methodology. 
Hendricks (1996) also evaluated various VaR models. Hendricks applied nine 
methods to evaluate VaR models". The studies of Dimson and Marsh (1997), 
Boudoukh et al. (1998), Hull and White (1998), Crouhy et al. (1998) and Vlaar 
(2000) also evaluated the VaR models by applying a number of tests, including the 
regulatory backtesting. However, earlier research could not employ more 
51 These methods are: mean relative bias, root mean squared relative bias, annualised percentage 
volatility, fraction of outcomes covered, multiple needed to attain 
desired coverage, average multiple 
of tail event to risk measure, minimum multiple of tail event to risk measure, correlation between risk 
measure and absolute value of outcome, and mean relative 
bias for risk measure scaled to desired 
level of coverage. 
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sophisticated backtests due to the absence of some of these tests when most of these 
studies were carried out. 
However, because the VaR estimates are extremely dependent upon the VaR 
methodology, parameters and data assumptions, it is crucial to supplement the VaR 
models with more sophisticated backtesting methodologies to validate the accuracy 
of these models. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
In this -chapter, after providing an insight into the concept of VaR, the statistical 
framework for the derivation of VaR was introduced. In addition, the advantages and 
disadvantages of VaR and major methodologies for estimating VaR were provided. 
Furthermore, the related literature on the applications of VaR was reviewed. 
Quantifying the financial risk of loss has been a common concern to those who have 
done business throughout history. However, until very recently, risks of investments 
were only guessed at, as predicting future events with certainty is not possible. The 
developments in the finance theory and innovations in technology, allowed those 
involved in business to start measuring their risks during , the twentieth century. 
Increased volatility in the financial markets after the breakdown of Bretton Woods 
also accelerated the need for measurement and management of financial risks that the 
companies have been facing in their operations. The attention to the management and 
measurement of financial risks increased during the first half of the 1990s, and 
accelerated in 1995, after the collapse of Barings and the bankruptcy of Orange 
County. As a result, market risk has become one of the most significant concerns of 
the participants of the financial markets. These developments made VaR popular for 
measuring market risk. 
The introduction of VaR is a milestone in the development of risk management and 
VaR has become a key concept in the analysis of market risk. Although the concept 
of VaR is straightforward, there are two fundamental issues that the users should 
follow in the VaR calculation process. First, the-time horizon over which the user of 
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VaR wishes to estimate a potential loss should be determined. This time horizon 
could be a one-day period, i. e. the next trading day, or a longer period. While traders 
and financial risk managers are generally interested in a one-day time horizon, 
regulators and participants considering illiquid markets generally prefer a multiple- 
day time horizon while calculating their market risk with VaR. As a result, in each 
case the time horizon is required to be specified by the user of VaR. Second, the 
degree of certainty required, i. e. the confidence interval for the estimate, should be 
selected. 
There are three major methodologies for estimating VaR. These are; the variance- 
covariance methodologies (equally weighted and exponentially weighted), the 
historical simulation methodology and the Monte Carlo simulation methodology. 
Although banks have integrated these models into their market risk management 
systems, VaR models have some limitations and pitfalls. Table 5.1 summarises the 
strengths and weaknesses of VaR methodologies. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses of VaR Methodologies 
Method Strengths Weaknesses 
Variance-Covariance " Easy to understand " Does not properly 
" Least computationally incorporate options or 
-intensive other non-linear 
" Industry standard instruments 
" Fat tails problem 
Historical Simulation " Naturally addresses the fat " Computationally 
tail problem intensive 
" Performs well under back- " Relies on history; 
testing therefore its output 
" Can fully capture non-linear depends heavily on the 
risks time period selected 
" Easiest to explain to the (history must repeat 
non-mathematically inclined itself) 
and easiest to implement " Data intensive 
from a systems perspective 
Monte Carlo Simulation " Incorporates any statistical " It is computationally 
distribution for the risk intensive 
factors " Sampling error 
" Fully captures non-linear 
instruments 
Adopted from Minnich (19W ) 
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This chapter also provided the literature review concerning the applications of VaR. 
The conclusion that has been arrived at in the literature review is that there is no best 
VaR estimation method and the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR 
methodology, parameters, and data assumptions. In addition, the evidence 
concerning the accuracy of the VaR estimates that are obtained by employing various 
models for different portfolios is limited. In addition to that, it is crucial to validate 
the accuracy of VaR models with more sophisticated backtesting methodologies. The 
backtesting methodologies are presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BACKTESTING 
6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, several financial institutions have employed the VaR methodology to 
estimate the potential losses that could arise from market risk. In addition, the 1996 
Basle Committee amendment has also required international banks to calculate the 
market risk capital since the beginning of 1998. 
The 1996 Basle Committee amendment is a revolution in financial regulation as it 
allows financial institutions to use their own models to determine required capital to 
cover market risk. While the original accord imposed capital requirements to cover 
credit risk based on a uniform approach, the 1996 amendment requires additional 
minimum capital to cover market risk based on either a standardised approach or any 
type of internal VaR models approach, of which the latter is subject to the approval 
of national regulators. If financial institutions choose to determine the required 
capital on the basis of their own internal VaR models, they are required to report 
their daily VaR at the 99 percent confidence level and over a ten-day horizon. 
On the other hand, verifying the accuracy of internal VaR models is crucial. As 
described by Hendricks and Hirtle (1997): 
"The actual benefits from this information depends crucially on the quality 
and accuracy of the VaR models on which the estimates are based. To the 
extent that these models are inaccurate and misstate banks' true risk 
exposures, then the quality of the information derived from any public 
disclosure will be degraded More significantly, inaccurate VaR models or 
models that do not produce consistent estimates over time will undercut the 
main benefit of a models-based capital requirement: the closer tie between 
153 
capital requirements and true risk exposures. Thus, validation of the 
accuracy of these models is a key concern and challenge for supervisors. " 
As it is crucial to have an accurate VaR model that forecasts the maximum portfolio 
loss that could occur over a given holding period with a specified confidence level, 
the backtesting of VaR models is essential to risk practitioners and regulators. 
Therefore, this chapter provides a survey of backtesting methods that are used to 
validate the VaR models. The understanding of backtesting is essential as the 
framework that is provided in this chapter is used to evaluate different VaR models 
in the eighth chapter. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The second section introduces the concept of 
backtesting. The regulatory backtesting required by the Basle Committee amendment 
is explained in the third section. The statistical backtests are provided in the fourth 
section. In particular, the binomial frequency tests proposed by Kupiec (1995) and 
the conditional frequency test proposed by Christoffersen (1998) are explained in this 
section. The fifth section provides the ranking tests proposed by Lopez (1998) and 
Blanco and Ihle (1999). Finally, a chapter summary is provided'in the sixth section. 
6.2 The Concept of Backtesting 
Backtesting is an application that can either be used to determine whether the 
estimates of a VaR model are consistent with the assumptions on which the model is 
based, or to rank the VaR models against each other (Dowd, 2002). This 
methodology provides information concerning the quality and accuracy of a VaR 
model by comparing an institution's VaR estimates with the actual trading profits 
and losses of the activities that are subject to the VaR measurement. 
In its simplest form, the backtesting procedure consists of calculating the number of 
times that the observed returns fall below the negative VaR estimate and comparing 
that number to the confidence level. If the VaR estimate exceeds trading loses at a 
greater frequency than indicated by the chosen confidence level, this indicates that 
the model is not an accurate one. 
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As demonstrated in Figure 6.1, a general backtesting framework consists of 6 steps. 
To implement a backtesting methodology, first the VaR estimate should be 
calculated by using an appropriate model. Second, the confidence level should be 
selected. In practice, it is common to select some arbitrary confidence level such as 
95 percent. However, the market risk amendment of the Basle Committee requires 
banks to predict VaRs on a confidence level of 99 percent. 
Figure 6.1: A General Backtesting Framework* 
Model 
Confidence Level 
Positions Results of Backtest 
Market Data 
Backtest Procedure 
* Adopted from Dowd, 2002. 
After constructing a VaR model at a certain confidence level, the next step of the 
backtesting process is the collection of profit and loss data for the backtesting 
purposes. In backtesting, two types of profit and loss data could be used. These are 
`actual' and `hypothetical' profits and losses. The actual profit and loss includes all 
gains and losses from market moves, trading revenues and fee incomes. On the other 
hand, the hypothetical profit and loss is the profit and loss that would have resulted if 
the portfolio had stayed constant and excludes trading revenue and fee income. The 
Basle Committee proposes the use of both methods. However, Dowd (2002) argues 
that for the risk measurement purposes it is crucial to use the profit and loss data that 
reflect the underlying volatility rather than the accounting prudence. Therefore, in 
order to compare VaR against the profit and loss data, components such as fee 
income, hidden profits and losses from trades carried out at prices different from the 
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mid bid-ask spread, unrealised profit and loss and provisions should be omitted from 
the profit and loss data. Otherwise, a hypothetical profit and loss data that is obtained 
by revaluing trading positions from one period to the next should be used. 
The profit and loss of a portfolio is obtained by applying market data to the positions. 
For example, for a foreign exchange portfolio that consists of currencies, the profit 
and loss is calculated by using the appropriate market data on the foreign exchange 
positions. Then, in order to attain the accuracy of the VaR models, the backtesting 
procedure is applied and the results are obtained. 
Due to the importance of using accurate VaR models in calculating the required 
market risk capital, one of the qualitative criteria of the internal models approach is 
the use of backtesting. The method that is required by the Basle Committee is the 
simplest form of backtesting method, in which penalties are set depending on the 
frequency of exceptions. However, this method does not provide sufficient 
information to examine VaR performances. In addition to counting the number of 
exceptions, there are a variety of tests that have been proposed to determine the 
accuracy of VaR models. -While these tests differ in their details, their- base is a 
particular transformation of VaR and the realised profit and loss. 
These tests are classified into two groups: the statistical backtests and ranking tests. 
In particular, these tests are applied to answer the following questions: 
1) Given a VaR model, how could a risk practitioner or regulator statistically 
test that this model is accurate? 
2) Given different VaR models, how could a risk practitioner or regulator 
compare these models? 
" In order to answer these questions, a risk practitioner' or a regulator could use three 
general methods, namely, the regulatory backtesting, statistical 
backtests and ranking 
tests. These methods are explained in the following sections. 
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6.3 The Regulatory Backtesting 
The Basle Committee explains the supervisory framework for the use of backtesting 
in conjunction with the internal models approach in its paper published in January 
1996. The Basle Committee believes that backtesting offers the best opportunity for 
incorporating suitable incentives into the internal models approach in a manner that 
is consistent and that will cover a variety of circumstances. 
The regulatory backtesting process requires a financial institution to compare on a 
quarterly basis its daily net profits and losses to daily VaR measures using a 99 
percent confidence level and a one-day period of rate and price movements. Each 
day, for which net daily trading loss exceeds the VaR estimate, is counted as an 
exception. 
The regulatory backtesting is based on the binomial assumption and it is the simplest 
backtesting method as it only counts the number of days on which an exception 
occurs. As a VaR number is reported at the confidence interval, c,. the number of 
exceptions E in a total of n observations is n(1-c). In the regulatory backtesting, the 
VaR model is accepted or rejected- depending on the E. This is what the Basle 
Committee requires by its amendment to the capital regulations. The Basle 
Committee recommends national regulators to backtest the financial institutions' 
VaR models by evaluating the frequency of exceptions, i. e. the frequency of daily 
losses exceeding VaR, starting one year after a financial institution initiates 
calculating the market risk capital charges. 
The Basle Committee amendment also sets penalties depending on the frequency of 
exceptions. For models that systematically underestimate risk exposures, bank 
regulators charge a multiplication factor. If the 
frequency of exceptions is high, then 
regulators should increase the multiplier that is used to determine the market risk 
charge from three to up to four. Additional corrective actions 
in response to a high 
number of exceptions are also left to the discretion of the national regulators. 
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The Basle Committee has laid down three error levels. These are: 
1) Green zone, which means satisfactory (up to four exceptions), 
2) Yellow zone, which means a warning signal (up to nine exceptions), 
3) Red zone, which requires an immediate adjustment to the capital 
adequacy multiplier (10 or more exceptions). 
The number of exceptions guides the size of potential regulatory action in a financial 
institution's capital requirement. If a financial institution has five or more exceptions, 
it is supposed to have an inaccurate VaR model. Then, the financial institution is 
required to increase the multiplication factor from three up to a maximum of four, 
depending on the number of exceptions. 
It should be noted that while the VaR estimates used for the capital purposes 
consider a ten-day holding period, backtesting requires a one-day standard. In their 
amendment, the Basle Committee (1996) explains this by stating that; 
"It is often argued that VaR measures cannot be compared against actual 
trading outcomes, since the actual outcomes will inevitably be `contaminated' 
by changes in portfolio composition during the holding period. (.. ) This 
argument is persuasive with regard to the use of VaR measures based on price 
shocks calibrated to longer holding periods. That is, comparing the ten-day, 
99th percentile risk measures from the internal models capital requirement with 
actual ten-day trading outcomes would probably not be a meaningful exercise. 
In particular, in any given ten-day period, significant changes in portfolio 
composition relative to the initial positions are common at major trading 
institutions. For this reason, the backtesting framework described here involves 
the use of risk measures calibrated to a one-day holding period. " 
The backtesting process is not only a requirement of the regulatory framework but 
also a tool that banks use to determine the accuracy of their VaR models. Therefore, 
banks also exercise more formal statistical tests to validate their models. These are 
explained below. 
6.4 The Statistical Backtests 
Counting the number of days that losses exceed the VaR estimate is a simple 
backtest procedure and does not measure the accuracy of the models. Therefore, the 
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VaR models should be evaluated through backtesting by employing more formal 
statistical methodologies. 
The first condition of the statistical backtesting is to obtain exceptions (tail losses). 
When an institution's loss on the trading activities is less than its ex ante VaR 
estimate, this is called as an exception. Indicating the portfolio profit and loss over a 
fixed time interval, the number of losses that exceed VaR is determined by the 
following hit function; 
It _1 
if x,,, +1 <_ -VaRI(a) tE {1,2,..., n} (6.1) 
0 if x,,,., > -VaR, (a) 
where xr1+, represents the profit or loss between the end of date t and date t+l; 
VaR, (a) represents reported VaR on date t at a specific confidence level (a). If an 
institution's loss on the trading activities between the end of date t and date t+I is 
less than or is equal to its negative VaR calculated on date t, this is called as a 
success (1). If an institution's loss on the trading activities between the end of date t 
and date t+l exceeds the negative VaR calculated on date t, this is called as a failure 
(0). The negative sign arises from the convention of reporting VaR -as a positive 
number. 
The hit function sequence indicates the events when an institution's loss on the 
trading activities is less- than its ex ante VaR estimate. After constructing the hit 
function sequence (e. g.; 0,1,0,0,1,1,0,..., 0) for all observations, the next step is to 
specify the null hypothesis. Then, a significance level should be selected and the 
probability associated with the null hypothesis being true should be estimated. If the 
estimated value of this probability exceeds the significance level, the null hypothesis 
is accepted. If the estimated value of this probability does not exceed the significance 
level, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
The basic statistical test based on the frequency of tail losses is a binomial test 
proposed by Kupiec (1995). This approach tests whether the observed frequency of 
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losses that exceed VaR is consistent with the frequency of the tail losses that is 
predicted by the model. Kupiec argues that daily profits and losses determine the 
outcome of a binomial event. If an institution's loss on the trading activities is less 
than its ex ante VaR estimate, this is called as a success. If an institution's loss on the 
trading activities exceeds the ex ante VaR estimate, this is called as a failure. When 
daily forecasts are efficient, potential loss estimates are independent and the 
performance data are distributed as a series of draws from an independent Bernoulli 
distribution. 
The objective of the binomial test is to test whether the observed frequency of 
exceptions is consistent with the predicted frequency of exceptions. Under the null 
hypothesis that a model is correct, the number of exceptions follows a binomial 
distribution. Therefore, the probability of observing x exceptions in a sample of size 
It is; 
binomial [n, x] = 
(n )(l_ 
p)"-s px = 
n! (1- p)"-" px (6.2) 
x x! (n - x)! 
where binomial 
[n, x] signifies the binomial coefficient for n objects taken x at a time, 
x is the number of successes, n is the number of observations, p is the predicted 
probability of a success on any one of the independent trials (which equals to 1 
minus the confidence level). 
For example, for 1,000 observations and at the 99 percent confidence level, the 
model predicts that p =1- a=0.01, which indicates that the null hypothesis is 
Ho : P=0.01. Therefore, the model predicts 10 exceptions (n*p=1,000*0.01=10) for 
this sample. If there are 15 exceptions in the sample, this indicates that observed 
A 
frequency (p = 0.015) exceeds p (0.01) and- for that reason a one-sided alternative 
hypothesis should be specified (H, :p>0.01). The probability value of the test is 
then the probability under the null that x>-15 and this could be calculated as 
1- Pr[x < 15]. For n=1,000 observations and at the 1 percent significance level, the 
cumulative probability of 15 or fewer exceptions is 0.95 and therefore 
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1- Pr[x < 15] =0.05. As this value is higher than p, the model is acceptable. Table 6.1 
demonstrates the non-rejection level of exceptions for alternative sample sizes for a 
one-sided test. 
Table 6.1: The Non-Rejection Level of Exceptions for Alternative Sample Sizes 
Null Hypothesis 
Probability Level 
Non-Rejection 
for x 
n= 250 days 
Non-Rejection 
for x 
n= 500 days 
Non-Rejection 
for x 
n=1,000 days 
0.010 x5 6 x< 10 x< 17 
0.025 x<_ 10 x<_ 19 x<_ 34 
0.050 x< 17 x< 32 x< 61 
0.075 x< 24 x< 45 x< 86 
0.100 x< 30 x< 58 x< 111 
As an example, Table 6.1 demonstrates that when p=0.01 and n=1,000, then the 
model will not be rejected as long as x: 5 17. However, a value of x greater than 17 
indicates that the VaR model is not acceptable and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
While a one-sided binomial test provides a single cut-off point, testing a two-sided 
alternative hypothesis estimates a confidence interval for the number of exceptions 
and then controls whether the observed number of exceptions lies within this 
interval. This approach tests the hypothesis that E[I, ]=p against the alternative 
E[I, I#p. Kupiec (1995) presents the use of the likelihood ratio (LR) test in order to 
test the null hypothesis, as this test is the uniformly most powerful test for a given 
sample. 
The likelihood under the null hypothesis is; 
L(p; I,, I2,..., I)=(1-p)n-" px 
and under the alternative; 
L(7r; Ii, I2,..., I) _ (1-7, )n-x; r x 
Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio test statistic is given by; 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
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A 
LR=-2Ln L(p; I,, I2,..., I)/L(;; I,, I2,..., I) _z2(s-1)=x2(1) (6.5) 
A 
where ;r= (x/n) is the maximum likelihood estimate of it and s=2 is the number of 
possible outcomes of the sequence. By substitution, the following likelihood ratio is 
obtained; 
LR = -2 Ln[(1- p)"-s px 
]+ 2Ln[(1- x/n)"-" (x/n)x 
] 
(6.6) 
where p is the predicted probability of a failure, x is the number of exceptions in the 
sample, n is the number of observations and x/n is the observed frequency of 
exceptions. 
Under the null hypothesis that p is the true probability, the LR test statistic has an 
asymptotic x2 distribution with one degree of freedom. If the test statistic does not 
exceed the relevant critical z2 value, the null hypothesis is accepted. However, if 
the test statistic exceeds the relevant critical x2 value, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
Kupiec (1995) also demonstrates confidence regions for the number of tail losses and 
then verifies whether the expected number of tail losses lies within this interval. The 
confidence levels for the number of tail losses are constructed by using the inverse of 
the tail-loss binomial distribution. Table 6.2 demonstrates the number of failures (x) 
that could be observed in a sample size n without rejecting the indicated null 
hypothesis thatp is the correct probability at the 95 percent confidence level. 
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Table 6.2: The Non-Rejection Regions for the Kupiec Test for Alternative Sample Sizes 
Null Hypothesis 
Probability Level 
Non-Rejection 
Region for x 
n= 255 days 
Non-Rejection 
Region for x 
n= 510 da s 
Non-Rejection 
Region for x 
n=1,000 da s 
0.010 x<_ 6 2 <x< 10 5: 5x< 16 
0.025 3 <x<_ 11 7 
_5x<_ 
20 16<x< 35 
0.050 7 <x< 20 17 <x<_ 35 38<x< 64 
0.075 12 <x<_ 27 28 <x<_ 50 60<_x<_ 91 
0.100 17 <_x<_ 35 39 <x<_ 64 82<x<_ 119 
Source: Kupiec (1995) 
For example, if n=1,000 days (four years of data), then at the 95 percent confidence 
level the number of exceptions is; 
p= n(1- c) =1,000 x (1- 95%) -- 50 (6.7) 
However, when p=0.05, then the model will not be rejected as long as 
xE 
(38,64). For example, if there are x=55 exceptions out of n=1,000 
observations, then it is expected under the null hypothesis that at the 95 percent 
confidence interval the model is true and therefore it could be concluded that the 
VaR model is acceptable. Values of x greater than 64 indicate that the VaR model 
underestimates the probability of large losses and values of x less than 38 indicate 
that the VaRmodel overestimates the probability of large losses. 
Table 6.2 demonstrates that the interval for -exceptions is dependent on the null 
hypothesis probability level (p). A smaller p leads to a smaller interval for x, which 
makes it easier to reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, a larger p leads to a larger 
interval for x, and makes it easier to accept the VaR model. 
The drawback of the statistical test proposed by Kupiec is that if there is not a 
relatively long historical performance, there are significant statistical difficulties 
surrounding the verification of VaR estimates. Therefore, a reliable performance 
based on the verification techniques requires a relatively long comparison sample 
period. Dowd (2002) also argues that because the Kupiec approach focuses solely on 
the frequency of tail losses, it does not use potentially valuable information 
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concerning the sizes of tail losses. Furthermore, the Kupiec approach assumes that 
exceptions are independent of each other and therefore this test does not take into 
account information concerning the temporal pattern of exceptions. Christofferson 
(1998) develops the backtesting methodology proposed by Kupiec and suggests a 
conditional backtesting procedure. 
The Christoffersen approach separates out the particular null hypothesis that the 
model has the correct frequency of independently distributed exceptions into its 
constituent parts and then tests each sub-hypothesis separately. These sub-hypotheses 
are: 
a. Coverage hypothesis: The model generates the correct frequency of 
exceptions. 
b. Independence hypothesis: The exceptions are independent; i. e. the 
exceptions should not be clustered over time. 
Even if the model generates the correct frequency of exceptions, the indication of 
exception clustering would suggest that the model is inaccurate. However, in 
addition to the frequency of exceptions, a risk practitioner or regulator should be 
cautious about the clustering of exceptions, which could imply high autocorrelation 
in risks. 
The Christoffersen approach tests both the coverage and independence hypotheses at 
the same time. If the model fails, where the model failure arises is straightforward to 
establish as this approach enables the user to test each hypothesis separately. 
After setting the hit function sequence, {I I}, which 
is constructed from a given 
interval forecast, the second step of the Christoffersen approach is to test the 
coverage hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis that E[Ij= p is tested against the 
alternative E[I, 
I# p. As demonstrated above while explaining the Kupiec test, the 
likelihood ratio of the coverage hypothesis is given by; 
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"- LRc =-2Ln[(1-p)"-xps]+2Ln[(1-x/n)"-x(x/n)x] (6.8) 
where LR, is the test statistic of the coverage hypothesis. 
This test implicitly assumes that the exceptions are independent. However, the 
clustered exceptions might represent a signal of the model misspecification. 
Therefore, the next step of the Christoffersen approach is to test the independence of 
exceptions. The independence hypothesis is tested against an explicit first-order 
Markov alternative. First, a binary first-order Markov chain, {I}, is considered, with 
transition probability matrix; 
1-901 901 
I-; r,, 9,11 
(6.9) 
where ; ry = Pr(I1 = jII, _, = 
i) (7tß is the probability of an i on date t-1 being followed 
by aj on date t). The approximate likelihood under the null hypothesis for this 
process is; 
)=(1-itO1yoo; rn, (1-9ill)nio; r11l 12ý... 
ýI n 01 (6.10) 
where n. is the number of observations with value i followed by j. The maximum 
likelihood estimates of ; ro, and ; r are presented below; 
- 
n01 
and T, I= 
ni 1 
of noo +n01 n1o +nit 
(6.11) 
For a hit function sequence of {I, } that consists of Os and Is, there are only four 
cases for any two consecutive days. These are; 00,01,10 and 11. In order to 
implement backtesting based on the Christoffersen approach, the hit function 
sequence is transformed into a duration series and the number of days for the 
following processes is obtained: 
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n.: The number of days that date t and date t+1 are failures. 
no, : The number of days that date t is a failure and date t+1 is a success. 
n, o : The number of 
days that date t is a success and date t+1 is a failure. 
n : The number of days that date t and date t+1 are successes. 
The next step of the Christoffersen approach is to maximise the log-likelihood 
function and solve the parameters, which are ratios of the counts of the appropriate 
cells; 
noo no, 
r1l 
A 
= 
noo + not noo + not 
nio ni t 
nio +nii n! o +nl! 
(6.12) 
Then, Christoffersen (1998) considers the output sequence, {I, ), from an interval 
model and estimates a first-order Markov chain model on the sequence and tests-the 
hypothesis that the sequence is independent by noting that the following matrix 
corresponds to independence; 
11 2 
lit 
21- 
't2 ii2 
The approximate likelihood under the null hypothesis for this process is; 
L(n2; '1,129... 9In) _ 
(1-ý2)ýný+nio)ýZnoi+nlJ (6.14) 
and the maximum likelihood estimate is; 
AA 
II2 = 22 = 
(n01 +n,, ) (6.15) 
(noo + nio + no, + n11) 
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Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio test statistic is given by; 
LR,,, d =-2Ln L(II2; Il, 12,..., I)/L(II1; I,, I2,..., In) _z2(s-1)2 =x2(1) (6.16) 
where LRmd is the test statistic of the independence hypothesis and s=2 is the number 
of possible outcomes of the sequence. The LRId test statistic has an asymptotic 
Z2 distribution with one degree of freedom. By substitution, the likelihood ratio test 
statistic of the independence hypothesis is given by; 
LR. = -2L n[(1-; t 
)ý^oo+^ro) 
ma(not+1h1), + 2Ln[(1- )noo no, (1- ý )nlo; r "" 
] (6.17) 
rnd -22 Ol O1 11 11 
If the sample has n11 = 0, which could be easily observed in small samples and with 
small coverage rates, then the first-order Markov likelihood is calculated as 
(Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2003); 
LR,,, d = -2 Ln[(1-; t2 
)(noo+^l0)ý2nol+^lt) ý+ 2Ln[(1- ýoi) ýoýn°i 
1 
(6.18) 
The final step of the Christoffersen approach is to combine the above tests for 
unconditional coverage and independence to form a combined test of conditional 
coverage. Effectively, the null of the unconditional coverage test is tested against the 
alternative of the independence test. Under the null-hypothesis, the likelihood ratio 
test statistic is given by; 
LRcc =-2Ln L(p; 1,, 12,..., In)/L(II,; I, , I21.... In) X2(S(S_1))=x2(2) (6.19) 
where LRR, is the test statistic of the combined hypothesis of the correct conditional 
., 
test coverage and s=2 is the number of possible outcomes of the sequence. The LR, 
statistic has an asymptotic x2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. 
Christoffersen (1998) conditions on the first observation in the test for unconditional 
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coverage and finds = ýr2 =112 , which implies that if the first observation is 
ignored, then the test statistic of the combined hypothesis is; 
LRcc = LRuc + LR; d (6.20) 
The advantage of applying a joint full null hypothesis in a standard frequency-of-tail- 
losses test is that, the model generates a correct frequency of exceptions, as well as 
that the exceptions are independent of each other (Dowd, 2002). However, the 
disadvantage of this backtesting method is that it has relatively small power in 
realistic small sample settings (Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2003). In addition, the 
statistical backtests do not allow the users to rank the VaR models. Therefore, these 
tests should be supplemented by the ranking tests, which are introduced in the next 
section. 
6.5 The Ranking Tests 
The backtests that were discussed in the previous sub-section are the statistical tests 
that focus on analysing the behaviour of the hit function. However, while the 
statistical backtests determine the performance of individual VaR models, different 
models can be compared to each other by giving them a score in terms of a loss 
function. 
Lopez (1998)-provides an alternative evaluation method that is not based on a 
hypothesis-testing framework. Instead, Lopez uses the standard forecast evaluation 
techniques; the accuracy of the VaR estimates is determined by how well they 
minimise a loss function that represents regulators' concerns. 
The loss function evaluation method proposed by Lopez is based on assigning a 
numerical score, which reflects specific regulatory concerns, to the VaR estimates. 
This approach ranks the models depending on this numerical score. A loss function 
that gives a score for each observation is obtained by evaluating profit and loss for 
each period and their associated VaR estimates. The score depends on the 
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comparison of past data on profits and losses and the correspondent VaR numbers. 
The general form of this loss function is; 
C(YaR ,x 
)= 
{f(xt+iVaRt) if xtt+15 -VaR, (a) tE {1,2,..., n} (6.21) `(a) `. t+l g(x VaR) if X t. 1 -VaR t, t+l ýtt, t+l t(a) 
where f(x,, +l, 
VaR(a)) and g(x«+l, VaA(a)) are functions such that 
f (x, 
f+t, 
VaR(a)) ý! g(x,,,,,, Vagr(a)) , which ensures that tail losses do not receive a 
lower value than other profit and loss observations; x,, +, represents the loss between 
the end of date t and date t+l, VaRg(a) represents reported VaR on date t at a specific 
confidence level (a). This general loss function measures how well the VaR model 
predicts losses when they occur. 
One of the most important issues of the ranking process is to specify the loss 
function. Lopez proposes two loss functions. These are: 
a) The loss function implied by the binomial method, 
b) The loss function that addresses the magnitude of the exceptions. 
The loss function implied by the binomial method is; 
1 
C(VaR, (a), x, ) = to 
if xrý+i ý -VaR((a) 
if xt,, +1 > -VaRI(a) 
(6.22) 
This approach uses the same information that is used in the binomial method; i. e. the 
number of exceptions, and a score of 1 is imposed for the exceptions and a score of 0 
otherwise. 
On the other hand, the loss function that addresses the magnitude of the exceptions 
uses a quadratic term that takes the sum of the number of exceptions and their 
squared distance from the corresponding VaR; 
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11 
+(x,., - VaR, («) )2 if xr, r+i <- -VaR«(, ) C(Yar(Q), x, ý+ý) = 
(6.23) 
0 U. x+l > -VaR, () 
The advantage of this loss function is that in addition to imposing a score of 1 when 
an exception occurs, a quadratic term is added based on the magnitude of the 
exceptions. The numerical score increases with the magnitude of the exception and 
could provide additional information on how the underlying VaR model forecasts the 
lower tail of the distribution. 
The backtesting is then performed by generating numerical scores for each individual 
VaR model and the score for any model is based on the sample average loss; 
^n 
C =-ýC(VaR, (a), x,, +, 
) 
n r=t 
(6.24) 
Different VaR models could be compared by ranking the models depending on the 
score (C) of each model and more accurate VaR estimates generate the lowest score. 
Lopez also suggests constructing benchmarks to evaluate the performance of a set of 
VaR estimates after a loss function is defined and (C) is calculated. Therefore, a 
score function that takes the loss function and a benchmark as its inputs should be 
established to rank VaR models. The appropriate benchmark for a loss function 
implied by the binomial method is p (p=1-confidence level), which is the expected 
value of E[C]. 
Lopez suggests the following quadratic probability function as the score function 
implied by the binomial method; 
QPS=Z (C- p)2 
n t_, 
(6.25) 
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which takes a value in the range of [0,2] and a lower QPS value indicates a better 
model. 
However, it is more difficult to construct a benchmark for a loss function that 
addresses the magnitude of the exceptions as the underlying distribution is unknown. 
Therefore, the benchmark should be estimated by some other means, such as Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
Furthermore, the loss function that addresses the magnitude of the exceptions only 
takes into account the size of the exceptions and by squaring them the intuition 
behind the loss function is lost, as squared monetary returns do not have a monetary 
interpretation. 
Blanco and Ihle (1999) suggest an alternative way to deal with the problem of 
aggregating the frequency with the size of the exceptions. They also stress that it is 
important to consider both the frequency and the size of the violations. However, 
they focus on the average size of the exception and create a weighted average 
indicator that captures both the size and the frequency of the exceptions. 
The loss function proposed by Blanco and Ihle gives each exception a weight equal 
to the difference between the tail loss and the VaR estimate, divided by the VaR 
estimate. 
(xrý+j-VaRZ(a))/VaR: (a) if x1,, +1 <_-YaRI(a) size ` (6.26) 
0 if xt,, +l > -VaR, (Q) 
The advantage of this loss function is that it ensures that higher tail losses get higher 
Cf1eq"e" Y values without the impaired intuition introduced by squaring the tail loss. 
Blanco and We also suggest a final indicator (Cm) that incorporates both the size 
and the frequency of the exceptions; 
Cm = 2Csue + (1- 
2)Cfrequency (6.27) 
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where A is a weighting factor that reflects the relative importance of each type of 
violation, C"" is the Blanco-Ihle size loss function (equation 6.26) and Cfreq"e"`y is 
the Lopez frequency loss function (equation 6.22). 
The advantage of the loss function methodologies that were explained above is that 
as they are not statistical tests, forecast evaluation approaches do not suffer from the 
low power of standard tests (Dowd, 2002) and they provide a measure of relative 
performance that could be used to monitor the performance of the VaR estimates. 
However, as these approaches do not consider any statistical inference, the results 
could not indicate whether the performances of the models are significantly better or 
worse. Therefore, the backtesting procedures that were described in this chapter are 
not substitutes for but complements to each other. 
As a conclusion, the use of accurate VaR models is very important in the market risk 
management of banks, as banks use the internal VaR models to calculate the required 
capital for their market risks. Therefore, regulators require banks to do backtesting in 
order to determine the accuracy of VaR models. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
The simplest test of a VaR model is to count the number of days on which the 
realised portfolio loss is greater than the VaR estimate. This is the base of the Basle 
Committee's regulatory backtesting procedure. However, this approach cannot 
evaluate the accuracy of a VaR model. As the model validation is a crucial process of 
checking whether a model is adequate, more formal methodologies, such as the 
statistical tests and the ranking tests should be used. 
As well as the regulatory backtesting, this chapter introduced the statistical tests and 
the ranking tests. The assessment of these backtesting models has a crucial role as 
these models are used to evaluate different VaR models in Chapter Eight. Before 
that, in order to investigate the variations among banks' VaR methodologies, 
disclosure practices of a sample of international banks are examined in the next 
section. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DISCLOSURE OF 
VALUE AT RISK 
7.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the ability to understand, measure, and manage market risk has 
become a competitive necessity for financial institutions. Therefore, financial 
institutions have begun to reveal more information concerning the market risk in 
their annual reports. Disclosure of information is a major prerequisite of the market 
discipline theory. Therefore, the Basle Committee strongly encourages banks to 
continue their efforts to develop their market risk disclosures. 
On the other hand, although VaR has become a standard in the measurement of 
market risk, there is still no industry consensus on the methodology for calculating 
VaR. In addition, within the framework of the market risk capital regulations, banks 
are not restricted to use any specific type of VaR model. 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to analyse the outcomes of using different 
VaR methodologies on the required capital amounts. Therefore, it is important to 
determine the discrepancies in bank VaR methodologies. In order to find out the 
differences concerning the VaR practices of banks, a documentary analysis is 
conducted in this chapter. In particular, this analysis addresses the question of `What 
kind of VaR models and parameters do banks use in their market risk measurement 
framework? ' 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the second section, the emergence of the 
disclosure of market risk is explained. In the third section, the annual reports of a 
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bank are investigated in order to demonstrate how the market risk disclosures have 
evolved. In the fourth section a documentary analysis is carried out by surveying the 
annual reports of 25 international banks. The objective of this survey is to assess the 
dissimilarities between the market risk measurement methodologies of banks. The 
final section explains the results of the survey. 
7.2 Disclosure of Market Risk 
Over the last decade, financial institutions have expanded their businesses in 
derivative and trading activities. Consequently, bank regulatory agencies have 
-- recommended 
disclosure of more information related to quantitative and qualitative 
market risk measures. 
In June 1999, the Basel Committee introduced a proposal for a new capital adequacy 
framework in order to replace the 1988 Capital Accord. Also known as Basel II, 
which will be implemented by 2007, this new framework consists of three pillars, 
namely; the minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process and 
effective use of market discipline. Regarding the third pillar of this framework, 
which is the market discipline, the Basle Committee seeks to encourage high 
disclosure standards and to enhance the role of market participants to encourage 
banks to hold adequate capital. 
In January 2000, the Basle Committee published detailed guidance concerning 
market discipline. In this guidance, in order to increase market discipline, the Basle 
Committee recommends six disclosure practices to enhance effective disclosure, 
which should be made at least annually by banks. The underlying motive to enhance 
effective public disclosure is explained by the Basle Committee as: 
"Market discipline performs an essential role in ensuring that the capital of 
banking institutions is maintained at adequate levels. Effective public 
disclosure enhances market discipline and allows market participants to assess 
a bank's capital adequacy and can provide strong incentives to banks to 
conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner. " 
This guidance presents recommendations regarding disclosure in the areas of capital 
structure, risk exposures, and capital adequacy. However, because the focus of this 
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research is on the market risk capital regulations and the VaR methodologies, the 
recommendations that are related to the market risk management, which gained 
importance in the second half of the 1990s, are discussed below. 
In the Basle Committee guidance, there are two recommendations related to market 
risk of banks. These are, `Risk Exposures' and `Capital Adequacy Measures'. 
According to the `Capital Adequacy Measures', banks are requested to disclose 
measures of risk exposure calculated in accordance with the Basel Committee capital 
regulations for market risk. In particular, banks are requested to provide relevant 
information concerning their market risk capital calculations under the standardised 
or internal models approach, whichever is appropriate, as well as providing capital 
charges for every risk factor. If a bank prefers to use the internal models approach, 
there should be sufficient disclosed information to allow outsiders to understand the 
models used, which at least should cover the broad VaR data, parameters, 
backtesting, and stress testing information. 
The Basle Committee's recommendation concerning the disclosure of `Risk 
Exposures', requires banks to publicly disclose qualitative and quantitative 
information about their risk exposures. In addition, banks are required to provide 
comparative information concerning the previous years' data. Regarding detailed 
recommendations on the disclosure of risk exposures, the guidance points out 
another publication of the Basle Committee as a reference, entitled 
`Recommendations for Public Disclosure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of 
Banks and Securities Firms'. This report, which was published jointly with the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO Technical Committee in October 1999, makes 
recommendations for public disclosures of trading and derivatives activities of banks 
and securities firms. The recommendations regarding market risk in this report are 
presented in Appendix 7.1. 
As a matter of fact, the first regulatory effort that introduced the disclosure of market 
risk is the `Discussion Paper on the Public Disclosure of Market and Credit Risks by 
Financial Intermediaries', which is known as the `Fisher Report'. Recommended by 
the Euro-Currency Standing Committee, this report was published by the governors 
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of the G-10 central banks in September 1994. This report addresses disclosure issues 
relating to the risk exposures and risk management performance of trading activities 
of financial intermediaries. In addition, this report complements disclosure formats 
for financial trading activities to further develop the public debate concerning the 
disclosure of risk exposures and risk management performances. 
The Basel Committee explains the role and the characteristics of public disclosure in 
another publication entitled `Enhancing Bank Transparency', published in September 
1998. According to this report, in order to establish market discipline, which is based 
on the recognition that markets contain disciplinary mechanisms by rewarding banks 
that have effective risk management and by penalising those which do not, market 
participants should have access to meaningful information that enable them to 
determine a bank's financial condition. This report answers the question of `What 
makes information meaningful? ', by defining the characteristics of transparent 
information. These are: 
- Comprehensiveness, 
- Relevance and timeliness, 
- Reliability, 
- Comparability, 
- Materiality. 
Considering the objective of this research, the comparability concept is worth 
detailed examination. According to this concept, the comparability of information 
across banks should enable users to assess the relative financial position and the 
performance of banks. 
As accurate financial information in annual reports is especially essential for 
establishing efficient market discipline, bank regulators and in particular the Basle 
Committee has urged financial institutions to disclose more information. This trend 
started with the 1996 market risk amendment and continued with Basel II, which 
strongly recommends that banks should' disclose their VaR. Although the disclosure 
of VaRs by financial institutions increased after 1995 with the recommendations of 
the Basle Committee, it should be noted that this was a period that was followed by 
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the collapse of Barings and the announcement of huge losses by some corporations 
due to their trading activities52. These made financial institutions disclose market risk 
practices in order to convince their investors and shareholders that they have efficient 
risk management systems, especially for market risk associated with derivatives. 
The accuracy of financial risk information in annual reports is extremely important 
for analysts and investors. Linsmeier and Pearson (1997) point out that a common 
characteristic of firms reporting large losses arising from their market risk positions 
is that "... information about (financial or derivative) instruments and their 
associated risks was not well disclosed. Investors were surprised by the reported 
derivatives losses and, thus, public (market risk) disclosures became an important 
topic. " Therefore, it is crucial for financial institutions to reveal appropriate and 
adequate information for market participants. According to the Basle Committee 
(1996), financial institutions should disclose both qualitative and quantitative 
information. Qualitative disclosures should include: 
a) An overview of the financial institution's overall business activities and 
risk-taking philosophy, 
b) Major risks arising from the financial institution's activities and the 
methods used to manage these risks, 
c) The principal internal control procedures, significant valuation, and 
accounting policies. 
Financial institutions should also disclose quantitative information produced by their 
own risk management systems. This quantitative information should include: 
a) The financial institution's exposure to financial risks (in particular credit 
and markets risks) and its performance in managing these risks, 
b) Summary information concerning the composition of trading portfolios, 
c) Disclosures based on internal risk measurement systems, in particular the 
VaR models and the underlying assumptions of the VaR estimates. 
52 As of year-end 1998, the Basle Committee surveyed- 71 financial institutions' annual reports and 
found that 66 of them disclose the VaR-figures (BIS, 1999). 
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Although regulators encourage banks to continue their efforts to develop their market 
risk disclosures, there is not much evidence on the efficiency of quantitative and 
qualitative market risk disclosures as firms generally do not voluntarily provide 
sufficiently detailed information regarding these issues (Ahmed et al., 1999). Dowd 
(2000a) examined the disclosure practices on VaR in firms' annual reports and his 
findings indicate that while firms vary considerably in the amount of VaR 
information that they report, even the most detailed reports provide insufficient 
information. 
The findings of Dowd are consistent with the study of Liljestrom et al, (2000) who 
surveyed the financial risk management information in the annual reports of banks 
operating in Europe. The findings of Liljestrom et al. indicate that there are 
substantial differences in the level of disclosure of risk information among European 
banks. These differences were found to be largely due to the variations in the size of 
banks and the cultural discrepancies. They also argue that Nordic, British, Irish and 
German banks tend to disclose more information ou risks than others and larger 
banks disclose more information than smaller banks. 
On the other hand, Jorion (2002) provides evidence on the information content of the 
VaR disclosures by investigating the relation between publicly disclosed quarterly 
bank VaR measures and the absolute value of the unexpected trading revenue in the 
subsequent quarter for a small sample of US commercial banks consisting of eight 
major banks, both cross-sectionally and over-time. In the study, Jorion estimated the 
volatility in quarterly trading revenues from the daily volatility using the square root 
of time rule. His findings indicate that especially in cross sections, VaR-based 
volatility forecasts based on the publicly available VaR disclosures of banks are 
significantly related to future market risk. His findings also indicate that banks with 
large VaR measures experience higher fluctuations in the unexpected trading 
revenues. He argues that the VaR disclosures are informative measures of risks and 
they could be used to predict the variability of banks trading revenues. He also 
argues that analysts and investors could use VaR disclosures to compare cross 
sectional risk profiles of trading portfolios. 
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Although Jorion converted different reporting time horizons and different confidence 
levels into a quarterly standard deviation assuming normal distributions and 
identically and independently distributed returns, the literature on VaR 
methodologies indicate that employing different VaR methodologies results in 
significant differences in the VaR estimates. Therefore, if banks use different 
methodologies, the comparison of bank VaR estimates might be misleading. 
In order to assess the usefulness of financial risk disclosures, Woods and Marginson 
(2004) examined the annual reports of UK banks from a user perspective. They 
found qualitative disclosures to be general and quantitative disclosures to be 
incomplete and not always comparable. They also found that there are significant 
variations in the scale, content, and format of disclosures among the UK banks. They 
point out the difficulty for a user to combine qualitative and quantitative information 
in order to understand a bank's financial risk-taking. They argue that, in relation to 
the particular market risk. disclosures of the UK banks, the usage of market risk 
information is limited because of three reasons. These are: 
1) Reliability of market risk disclosures is not strong because of the 
potential for bias in the selection of a VaR methodology. 
2) Comparability is constrained as the VaR models and the assumptions 
could vary across institutions. 
3) Understandability requires that users of market risk disclosures should be 
well informed concerning the VaR methodologies and should know how 
to read disclosed information. 
Woods and Marginson (2004) also argue that the existence of fundamental problems 
concerning the mathematical models used to calculate VaR creates a 
dangerous 
environment for users of the financial statements because they could take an 
inaccurate estimate too seriously while looking for information on which to base an 
economic decision. 
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As a result, expanded disclosure concerning financial risk is a major prerequisite of 
the market discipline theory. However, comparing VaR models could mislead market 
participants, as the VaR estimates are dependent upon the methodology, parameters, 
and data assumptions. Therefore, it is not a straightforward task for market 
participants to assess a financial institution's risk-taking, in particular in relation to 
market risk, by comparing the VaR models and the assumptions underlying these 
models. 
In recent years, as a result of the importance of managing and measuring market risk, 
financial institutions have begun to reveal more information concerning the market 
risk management in their annual reports. In order to demonstrate the improvements 
of banks disclosure practices, annual reports of HSBC were surveyed. As HSBC is a 
major international bank and its annual reports were easily accessed, HSBC was 
chosen as the subject of the case study and the annual reports from 1993 to 1999 
were surveyed. This case study is presented in the next section. 
73 A Case Study: HSBC 
Most of the major financial institutions have implemented risk management systems 
and publish their VaR models and estimates in their annual reports. As an example, 
the HSBC case was analysed to demonstrate to what extent the market risk 
disclosures of a bank have evolved. The 1993 annual report of the bank does not 
have any information related to risk management and value at risk. In the 1994 
annual report, the financial review of the company covered the credit risk 
management, market risk management, liquidity management, and OBS financial 
instruments. Although there is some information concerning the VaR calculations, no 
VaR figure is published. Concerning market risk, the bank announced in the 1994 
annual report that: 
"Market risk is managed within risk limits approved by the Group Executive 
Committee. (... ) Risk limits are determined for each portfolio, subject to 
restrictions on product, currency, interest rate repricing and market volatility 
risks. Liquidity considerations are also taken into account in determining the 
limits set. Only certain offices within major subsidiaries, with sufficient 
derivative product expertise and appropriate control systems, are authorised to 
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trade derivative products. Actual risk levels compared with approved limits are 
monitored daily by each subsidiary and Group Market Risk". 
In addition, the bank states in the 1994 annual report that VaR is computed for 
principal treasury centres across the group on a regular basis. 
In the 1995 annual report the VaR numbers are released for the first time. It is stated 
in the report that the estimation of potential losses that could occur on risk positions, 
taken due to the movement in market rates and prices, is a key component of the 
market risk management. In order to assess the potential loss that could occur due to 
the change in the value of treasury portfolios, the bank employs the value at risk 
methodology. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the VaR calculations are augmented 
by stress testing, both on the individual portfolios and on a consolidated basis. 
Compared with the earlier annual reports of the bank, the 1998 annual report has an 
extensive VaR disclosure. In this report, especially the amount of information 
concerning the issue of market risk management and VaR methodologies has 
improved dramatically. In this report, the bank states that VaR is calculated on a 
variance-covariance basis by using a 95 percent confidence level and historical one- 
day movements in the market rates and prices. The one-day movement in the market 
prices is calculated by reference to two years of 
historical data. The aggregation of 
VaR from different risk categories is based upon the assumption of independence 
between risk types. In addition, although the bank uses VaR as a major market risk 
management tool, the limitations of this methodology are also emphasised in the 
1998 report. Indicating that VaR should not be viewed as a maximum amount that 
the bank can lose on its market risk positions, the bank draws attention to the 
following limitations and assumptions of the VaR methodology. 
- Although the changes 
in the risk factors follow a normal distribution, this 
may not be the case in reality and may lead to an'underestiimation of the 
probability of extreme market movements, 
- Although all positions can 
be liquidated or hedged in one day, the use of 
a one-day holding period does not fully capture the market risk arising 
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from times of illiquidity, when one day liquidation or hedging may not be 
possible, 
- Any loss might occur beyond the 95 percent confidence level, 
- The use of historical data as a proxy for estimating future events may not 
encompass all potential events, particularly those which are extreme in 
nature, 
- The assumption of independence between risk types may be incorrect, 
- VaR is calculated at the close of each business day with intraday 
exposures not being subject to intraday calculations, 
- VaR does not necessarily capture all of the higher order market risk and 
may underestimate VaR. 
HSBC recognises these limitations by augmenting the VaR limits with other 
positions and sensitivity limit structures, as well- as with stress testing, both on the 
individual portfolios and on a consolidated basis. Therefore, they emphasize that 
their stress-testing regime enables the senior management to assess the impact of 
extreme events on the market risk exposures. 
The case study of HSBC demonstrates how rapidly the VaR disclosures have 
evolved and how banks have begun to give higher importance to disclose detailed 
information concerning the market risk management. However, the information that 
is disclosed by banks concerning their market risk measurements differs widely. 
Furthermore, the internal VaR models that banks use to measure their market risk 
exposure and the underlying assumptions of these models also differ widely. This 
makes it very difficult to compare the risk-taking activities of financial institutions. 
The next section provides a documentary analysis that demonstrates the differences 
in the VaR practices of banks. 
7.4 A Survey of Bank Annual Reports 
In the previous sections, the global standards for the market risk disclosures of 
financial companies were provided and the evolution of bank market risk disclosures 
was demonstrated. The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to find out whether 
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banks use dil1crent methodologies for their market risk management purposes. In 
order to do so, the annual reports of 25 international banks are surveyed. This 
documentary analysis is not intended to imply recommendations Ir 'hest practice' 
disclosures or to provide evidence on the efficiency of' market risk disclosures. 
Instead, the aim of this section is to demonstrate the diliercnces in VaR practices. 
In order to assess the discrepancies among the financial disclosures related to market 
risk and VaR practices, a documentary analysis was conducted. In this respect, the 
1999 year-end annual reports of 25 banks were surveyed. Banks included in the 
survey are required to be large national banks and an additional precondition is to 
have easy and prompt access to their annual reports. 
'l'he survey is only concentrated on the disclosure of market risk information 
presented in the annual reports. As well as supplying reliable and valid information, 
the documentary analysis also provides information on banks operating in diflcrent 
locations. One of' the main disadvantages of interviews is the difficulty of reaching 
institutions in different locations. That is the reason the survey has. hcen conducted 
by using annual reports. 
The annual reports of 25 banks were surveyed. Country distribution of the sample is 
as follows: 10 US banks, 9 UK banks, 2 German banks, 2 Swiss banks, I Canadian 
bank and I Dutch hank (Graph 7.1). 
Graph 7.1: Country Distribution of Banks 
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The results of the survey concerning the comparison of differences in VaR 
methodologies are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: The Market Risk Disclosures of Banks 
Methodologies and Parameters of the Models 
Institution Country Methodology Holding 
Period 
Confidence 
Level (%) 
Observation 
Period 
Royal Bank of Scotland UK Various 1 day 97,5 1 year 
Lloyds TSB UK Various I day 95 3 years 
IISBC UK Variance-Covariance 10 day 99 2 years 
Barclays UK Historical Simulation 1 day 98 1 year 
National Westminster UK Historical Simulation 1-10day 95 2 years 
Bank of Scotland UK Variance-Covariance I day 99 2 years 
Abbe National UK Sensitivity Analysis I day 95 N/A 
Fleemin s UK Scenario Analysis 
Schroders UK Loss Risk Po tential 
Chase US Historical Simulation I day 99 1 year 
Bank of New York US Monte Carlo I day 99 N/A 
Bank of America US Variance-Covariance I day 99 N/A 
State Street US Historical Simulation I day 99 1 year 
Citico - 
US Variance-Covariance 1 day 99 N/A 
Fleet Boston US Variance-Covariance N/A 99 N/A 
lP Morgan US Hist. Sim. (Hybrid) I day 95 N/A 
Bank One US Variance-Covariance 1 day 99 N/A 
First Union US Variance-Covariance N/A 97,5 1 year 
Ke US N/A I day 95 N/A 
ABN Amro Holland Historical Simulation I day 99 4 years 
Deutsche Bank Germany N/A 1 day 99 N/A 
Nord/LB Germany Var-Cov E WMA 10 day- 99 1 year 
Credit Suisse Switzerland Var-Cov & Hist. Sim. 10 day- 99 N/A 
UBS Switzerland Historical Simulation 1-10 day 99 5 years 
Roval Bank of Canada Canada Historical Simulation I day 99 2 years 
Table 7.1 demonstrates the following observations concerning the market risk 
disclosures of banks: 
1) The banks in the sample employ three different methodologies in order to 
calculate their VaR estimates. These methodologies are; the historical 
simulation, variance-covariance and Monte Carlo simulation 
methodologies. Graph 7.2 demonstrates the share of each methodology 
that is employed by the sample banks to calculate their VaRs. 
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Graph 7.2: Methodologies Used in VaR Calculation 
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2) 36 percent of the banks (8 banks) in the sample report that they use only 
the variance-covariance methodology. While Nord/L, B particularly states 
using the equally weighted variance-covariance methodology and First 
Union states using the exponentially weighted variance-covariance 
methodology, other banks do not disclose any specific information 
concerning the type of the variance-covariance methodology. In addition, 
the annual reports of the banks that use the variance-covariance 
methodology do not contain any information concerning the decay 
factors. 
3) 36 percent ofthe banks (8 banks) in the sample report that they use only 
the historical simulation methodology. However, one of' the banks (. JP 
Morgan) particularly states that it employs the hybrid approach of the 
historical simulation methodology (exponentially weighted historical 
simulation methodology). 
4) There are two banks that changed their methodology in 1999. Barclays 
had been using the exponentially weighted variance-covariance 
methodology, NatWest had been using both the variance-covariance and 
historical simulation methodologies. In 1999, both of these banks started 
to use only the historical simulation methodology. 
5) There is only one bank (Credit Suisse) that employs both the variance- 
covariance and historical simulation methodologies. 
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6) The Bank of New York is the only bank in the sample that uses the 
Monte Carlo simulation methodology. 
7) Two UK banks in the sample, namely the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Lloyds TSB, report that they employ various VaR models. However, 
while specifying the assumptions of the VaR calculations, these banks do 
not identify any specific model and report that they employ various 
models. 
8) While 22 banks in the sample employ VaR methodologies in their market 
risk measurement framework, there are 3 banks that employ other 
methodologies. While the Fleemings Bank reports that it uses the 
`scenario analysis' in its market risk measurement framework; the 
Schroders Bank reports that it uses the `loss risk potential'. However, 
these banks do not disclose any particular explanation or assumptions 
related to their risk measurement frameworks. 
9) The Abbey National reports that it uses the `sensitivity analysis' to 
measure its market risk exposure. The sensitivity analysis measures the 
impact of the hypothetical changes in interest rates or market prices on 
banks' earnings or net assets. The Abbey National reports that it-uses a 
one-day holding period and a 95 percent confidence level in this analysis, 
however, it does not disclose any information concerning the observation 
period. 
10) As a result, among the banks in the sample that employ VaR 
methodologies- in their market risk measurement framework, most of 
them (77 percent) employ a historical simulation methodology, a 
variance-covariance methodology, or both of these. 
11) Among the banks in the sample that employ VaR methodologies in their 
market risk measurement framework, the assumptions such as the 
holding periods, confidence levels and observation periods that banks use 
to estimate their VaR also differ significantly. 
12) As shown in Graph 7.3, while 68 percent of the banks in the sample (15 
banks) report that they estimate the VaR figures by using a one-day 
holding period, 14 percent of the banks (3 banks) report that they employ 
a ten-day holding period. There are two banks in the sample that report 
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using both a one-day and a ten-day holding period. On the other hand, the 
remaining two banks do not disclose any information concerning the 
holding period. 
Graph 7.3: Holding Periods Used in VaR Calculation 
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13) The banks in the sample that employ VaR methodologies in their market 
risk measurement framework use 4 different confidence levels ranging 
from 95 percent to 99 percent. As shown in Graph 7.4, while 68 percent 
of the banks (15 banks) in the sample employ a 99 percent confidence 
level, 18 percent of the banks (4 banks) report that they estimate the VaR 
figures based on a 95 percent confidence level. In addition, 9 percent of 
the banks (2 banks) report that they employ a 97.5 percent confidence 
level, while only one bank in the sample reports that it employs a 98 
percent confidence level. 
Graph 7.4: Confidence Levels Used in VaR Calculation 
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14) It is worth mentioning that while some banks in the sample (lo nut 
provide information concerning the VaR methodology and holding 
period, all of'them disclose inthrmation concerning the confidence level. 
In addition, in line with the Basic Committee regulations, most of' the 
banks use a 99 percent confidence level. 
15) As shown in Graph 7.5, while 27 percent of the banks (6 banks) in the 
sample use a one-year observation period, 18 percent of the banks (4 
banks) employ a two-year observation period. In addition, there is one 
bank that employs a three-year, one bank that employs a lour-year and 
one hank that employs a five-year observation period to calculate their 
VaR estimates. The banks that employ longer observation periods are 
also observed to use the historical simulation methodology. 
27'; 
40% 
  1-Year Q 2-Year Q 3-Year   4-Year   5-Year Q n/a 
16) While 60 percent of the banks that use a VaR methodology in the sample 
disclose their observation periods, there are 9 banks (40 percent) that do 
not report any information concerning the observation period. 
As a result, the survey of disclosures concerning the VaR practices presented in the 
annual reports of 25 banks located in 6 countries reveals that the methodologies and 
parameters that are used to calculate the VaR estimates differ substantially. I lowcver, 
one of the most important results of this documentary analysis is that, 77 percent of 
the banks in the sample that employ VaR methodologies in their market risk 
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Graph 7.5: Observation Periods Used in VaR Calculation 
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measurement framework employ either a historical simulation or a variance- 
covariance methodology, or both of these. Therefore, it could be claimed that these 
two methodologies are the most common methodologies that banks use to calculate 
the VaR estimates. 
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the regulatory efforts to increase disclosure concerning the qualitative 
and quantitative market risk information were introduced. In addition, in order to 
understand the variations among VaR methodologies of banks, the disclosure 
practices of a sample of international banks were compared. The sample was chosen 
from a search of banks that report market risk information in their annual reports. 
Although there are only 25 annual reports used, what is important for the purpose of 
this analysis is not to find out the best practice but provide an indication of how VaR 
models and parameters vary across banks. 
The results of this study indicate that in recent years financial institutions were 
tending to give out more detailed VaR. information in their annual reports. On the 
other hand, the market risk management information gathered from bank annual 
reports indicates that the VaR systems that financial institutions use differ widely 
across institutions. 
According to the survey results, there are two major VaR methodologies that are in 
use by banks in their market risk management systems. These are the variance- 
covariance and historical simulation methodologies. In addition, there are differences 
in the underlying assumptions, such as the holding period, confidence interval, or 
historical observation period. These findings are consistent with the studies of Dowd 
(2000) and Liljestrom et al. (2000) and Woods and Marginson (2004), who find 
substantial differences in the level of disclosure of risk information by surveying the 
financial risk management information in the annual reports of financial institutions. 
Under the framework of the market risk capital regulations, banks may employ either 
a standardised approach or their own internal VaR models to calculate the required 
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capital. Although the market risk capital regulations prescribe some quantitative 
standards, such as a 99 percent confidence level, a ten-day holding period and at least 
one-year of historical data, these regulations do not set the specific type of VaR 
model to be used. However, even when the same parameters are used, applying 
different methodologies may create different outcomes. As a result, an outsider 
would not be able to make any comparison as no additional calculation could be 
. made to convert these figures to a common basis when different methodologies are 
used. Therefore, it is very difficult for financial market participants to make 
comparisons across institutions and to evaluate the risk-taking of individual banks by 
looking at single VaR values. 
One of the first decisions, and may be the most difficult one that risk practitioners 
face with regard to VaR is to decide which model is more appropriate for them. The 
reliance on allowing financial institutions' to choose the VaR methodology could 
generate an incentive for them to prefer a methodology that calculates the minimum 
capital requirement. Therefore, it is important to find out whether any methodology 
results in capital savings for a financial institution. Furthermore, as obtaining 
accurate VaR estimates is crucial for risk practitioners and regulators, the following 
chapter also provides a backtesting process to assess the accuracy of VaR models. 
I 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AN EVALUATION OF THE STANDARDISED AND THE 
INTERNAL MODELS APPROACHES OF THE 
MARKET RISK CAPITAL REGULATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Since 1998, international banks have been required to set aside capital to cover their 
market risk, either by employing a standardised approach or by using the internal 
VaR models. The regulatory capital requirements for the market risk exposure of 
banks are explicitly based on the VaR estimates in the US; however, other 
industrialised countries allow banks to use either a standardised approach or an 
internal model. 
Although bank regulators integrated the VaR models in the framework of capital 
adequacy regulations, these models have limitations and pitfalls. The aim of 
establishing a set of minimum capital levels is not only necessary to strengthen the 
safety and soundness of the banking system but also necessary to ensure a `level 
playing field' for financial institutions in order to eliminate the competitive 
inequalities. On the other hand, giving an option to banks to determine the VaR 
methodology could create a moral hazard problem as banks may choose an 
inaccurate model that provides less required capital amounts. Therefore, it is very 
important to examine whether different methodologies that are allowed to be used in 
the market risk capital regulations have any potential to create such a moral hazard 
problem. Furthermore, as the market risk capital regulations are under close 
examination in many countries, it is crucial to understand not only the impact but 
also the limitations and drawbacks of these regulations. 
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The main problem concerning the use of VaR models is that there is no best VaR 
estimation method and the VaR estimates are extremely dependent upon the VaR 
methodology, parameters, and data assumptions. On the other hand, the use of these 
models differs widely across financial institutions. 
The survey results provided in the previous chapter indicate that there are three main 
VaR methodologies that are used by banks in their market risk management systems. 
In addition, there are also differences in practice concerning the underlying 
assumptions, such as the holding period, the confidence interval or the historical 
observation period. On the other hand, the evidence concerning the accuracy of the 
VaR models that are used in the framework of the market risk capital regulations is 
limited. However, it is crucial to validate the accuracy of VaR models with 
sophisticated backtesting methodologies. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer as to whether the market risk capital 
regulations could create a moral hazard problem as the institutions may have an 
incentive to choose inaccurate models that report less capital requirements. In order 
to find an answer to this question, the required capital amounts, based on both the 
standardised approach and three different VaR methodologies, of two foreign 
exchange portfolios are compared. The main objective of these simulations is to 
assess the impact of using different models on capital levels. In addition, the 
accuracy of VaR models is evaluated by applying three backtesting methodologies. 
in particular, the following research questions are answered in this study. 
1) To what extent do the approaches of the market risk capital regulations 
produce different required capital amounts? 
2) Do the market risk capital regulations provide a `level playing field'? 
3) Do the internal VaR models provide accurate VaR estimates that reflect 
banks' market risk exposures? 
4) Do the market risk capital regulations create a moral hazard problem? 
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The chapter is organised as follows. The second section explains the general 
framework of the analysis. The third section provides the underlying assumptions of 
the choice of portfolios. The data and data sources are explained in the fourth 
section. This section also presents the methodology related to the calculation of daily 
returns of the currencies and the descriptive statistics of daily returns. The fifth 
section provides the methodologies that are applied to calculate required capital 
charges for the foreign exchange portfolios. The sixth section provides the empirical 
results. Then, the VaR models that are used in the analysis are evaluated through 
backtesting in the seventh section. The final section explains the empirical results of 
the study. 
8.2 The Framework of the Analysis 
VaR has become an industry standard for measuring market risk, especially after the 
recognition of it in the regulatory framework. However, in order to calculate the 
required capital, the market risk capital regulations allow the use of a standardised 
approach as well as the use of internal VaR models. The standardised approach is a 
building block approach, which is relatively more straightforward to use. On the, 
other hand, the VaR approaches require sophisticated models to calculate the market 
risk of an institution, and its complexity increases with the increase in the number of 
risk factors. One of the major objectives of this study is to find out the impact of 
choosing different approaches when calculating the required market risk capital. In 
order to do so, simulations are carried out. In these simulations, a number of different 
models are applied to foreign exchange portfolios and the required market risk 
capitals are calculated accordingly. Furthermore, in order to assess and compare the 
usefulness of VaR models, the performances of different VaR models are tested 
through backtesting. The conceptual framework of this analysis is presented in 
Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1: The Framework of the Analysis 
1) Portfolio Setting & Data Collection 
2) Portfolio 3) Simulation 
Valuation & Methodology 
Data Analysis 
Standardised II Internal Models 
Approach Approaches 
Var-Cov Var-Cov Historical 
(EqVC) (ExpVC) Simulation 
Required Required Required Required 
Capital Capital Capital Capital 
4) ANALYSIS 
Comparison and Evaluation of Different Approaches 
i 
5) EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As demonstrated in Figure 8.1, the analysis consists of five steps. These steps are 
explained below. 
1) The analysis process starts with the portfolio setting and data collection. 
First, the exposure to market risk that corresponds to the market value of 
the position in the investor base currency is determined as the US dollar. 
Then, a fixed and an active hypothetical portfolio are set up. Each 
portfolio consists of 10 foreign exchange rates against the US dollar. As 
the foreign exchange rate risk is one of the most important risks that 
financial institutions face in their activities, the foreign exchange 
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positions are chosen. The database consists of daily returns of currencies 
from 2 January 1986 until 30 June 2000. 
2) The daily returns of currencies, which are defined as logarithmic 
changes, are calculated for each day. Furthermore, the descriptive 
statistics of daily returns are examined. 
3) The required market risk capitals are calculated by using both the 
standardised and internal model approaches. Three major VaR 
methodologies are used to calculate the required market risk capital. 
These methodologies are: 
- The equally weighted variance-covariance (EqVCV) methodology 
(2500-day, 1250-day, 750-day, 500-day, and 250-day), 
- The exponentially weighted variance-covariance (ExpVCV) 
methodology (A=0.93, A=0.94, A=0.95, A=0.96, A=0.97, 
A=0.98), 
- The historical simulation (HS) methodology (2500-day, 1250-day, 
750-day, 500-day, and 250-day). 
4) The performances of the standardised-and VaR approaches are assessed 
by comparing the required capitals. Furthermore, the VaR approaches are 
evaluated by employing the regulatory backtesting, the statistical tests 
and the ranking tests. 
5) Finally, the empirical results of the study are provided. 
8.3 Portfolio Setting 
In order to compare the standardised approach and the three most commonly used 
VaR methodologies, two hypothetical foreign exchange portfolios are set up. The 
main reason for selecting portfolios consisting of foreign exchange positions is that 
the foreign exchange rate risk is one of the most important risks that financial 
institutions face in their activities. 
The market risk capital comparison is made for a fixed portfolio and an active 
portfolio and the modelling of these portfolios are not irrelevant to the market 
practices. Two small banks are considered (Bank A and Bank B). Each bank has a 
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similar portfolio consisting of limited exposure in foreign exchange and these banks 
are subject to the market risk capital regulations. The foreign exchange traders of 
these banks are allowed to make investments in 10 currencies and to take USD 1 
million equivalent exposure (long or short) in each currency. 
The trader of Bank A (Trader A) is a conservative trader who is not active in the 
foreign exchange market. The portfolio of Trader A is named as the fixed portfolio 
and the amount that is invested in each currency stays constant over the period in 
question. The trader of Bank B (Trader B) is more active in the foreign exchange 
market and revises the portfolio every day based on his/her market expectations and 
forecasts. However, this portfolio generates losses every trading day due to the 
wrong decisions of Trader B. Therefore, the portfolio of Trader B is called the worst- 
case portfolio. This assumption allows especially bank regulators to understand the 
performances of the market risk capital requirements in an unpleasant setting. 
The limitation of these models is that while the composition of the fixed portfolio 
stays constant over the period in question, the composition of the worst-case 
portfolio is revised daily. However, a financial institution's risk profile could be 
significantly altered by intraday changes in positions, as there are buys and sells 
during a trading day. 
The general conditions of these two portfolios are: 
1) Time is discrete and indexed by tE {1,2,3,..., 1137) (the total number of 
trading days covered by the data is 1,137). 
2) The traders take positions in 10 assets and all of these assets are 
currencies. 
3) The base currency for calculating the required capital, which is typically 
the currency of equity capital and reporting currency of a bank:, is the 
USD. 
4) P,,, is the foreign exchange rate of the : t' currency against USD at time t. 
The return on P,,, between period t-1 and period t is denoted by r,,, and 
defined as logarithmic changes. 
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5) The traders have USD 1 million equivalent exposures (long or short) in 
each currency and the investment amount of. USD 1 million is held 
constant to keep the discretion at a minimum. 
6) The exposures in foreign exchanges are in cash and are not invested in 
any interest-earning asset; i. e. there is no interest gain on these assets. 
7) The positions are marked-to-market every day and the profit or loss is 
realised. 
8) The profit or loss is not added to the investment amount; i. e. the 
portfolios exclude trading revenues or losses. Therefore, whatever the 
previous day's profit or loss, the traders have an investment of USD I 
million equivalent exposures (long or short) in each currency every day. 
9) The foreign exchange positions are not hedged. 
10) At the end of each day, the banks report the required market risk capital 
charge as well as the actual profit or loss over that reporting day to the 
regulator. The banks are required to maintain capital for their foreign 
exchange positions as demanded by the market risk capital regulations. 
The specific conditions of the fixed and worst-case portfolios are presented below. 
The Fixed Portfolio: 
The foreign exchange positions are fixed in Trader A's portfolio. The specific 
conditions of this portfolio are presented below. 
1) The trader has a conservative trading approach and does not change 
his/her portfolio position. 
2) The exposure in each currency has a value equivalent to USD 1 million 
long position. 
3) The trader rolls over the same portfolio in each trading day. 
4) If the ith currency appreciates against the USD (r,, > 0), the bank makes 
a profit and if the 1th currency depreciates against the USD (r,, < 0), the 
bank makes a loss. 
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The daily actual profits and losses of the fixed portfolio from January 1996 to June 
2000 are illustrated in Graph 8.1. This graph demonstrates that the maximum loss of 
the fixed portfolio is-approximately USD 140,000. 
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The Worst-Case Portfolio: 
Trader B's portfolio builds upon an active hypothetical portfolio and this trader takes 
long or short positions in currencies based on his/her market expectations and 
forecasts. This trader reviews his/her trading activity each trading day. However, the 
simulation is set such that the trader always makes wrong decisions and every day 
the investment in each currency makes a loss. 
This portfolio is called as the worst-case portfolio as it generates losses every trading 
day. The loss-generating portfolio is set up for two reasons. First, if the capital 
charges cover the loss of the portfolio, then it could point out that the market risk 
capital charges are sufficient to cover losses of a portfolio that makes a loss every 
day. Second, although randomly selected and real portfolios were investigated in the 
literature, a hypothetical loss-generating portfolio was not considered. 
The specific conditions of this portfolio are presented below. 
1) The trader has an active trading activity and takes either a long or short 
foreign exchange position. 
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2) The trader revises his/her portfolio position each trading day and any 
asset traded at date t-1 matures at date t and is reinvested at date t. 
However, there are no intraday portfolio changes. 
3) The investment amount of each currency has a value equivalent to either 
USD +1 million (long position) or USD -1 million (short position). 
4) If r,,, +l >0 
(the next trading day the it' currency appreciates against the 
USD), in order to allow the portfolio to make a loss on date t, the 
investment amount of the th currency is set as USD -1 million, which 
indicates a short position in that currency. 
5) If r, ý+l <0 (the next trading day the it' currency depreciates against the 
USD), in order to allow the portfolio to make a loss on date t, the 
investment amount of the it' currency is set as USD +1 million, which 
indicates a long position in that currency. 
Graph 8.2 illustrates the daily actual losses of the worst-case portfolio from January 
1996 to June 2000. This graph demonstrates that the maximum loss of the worst-case 
portfolio is approximately USD 210,000. 
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8.4 Data 
In this analysis, the banks take positions in 10 traded assets and all of these assets are 
currencies. Both of the portfolios consist of currencies against the USD for the 
following 10 currencies: Deutche mark (DEM), French franc (FRF), Italian lira 
(ITL), Netherlands guilder (NLG), Belgian franc (BEF), Japanese yen (JPY), British 
pound (GBP), Canadian dollar (CAD), Swedish krona (SEK) and Swiss franc (CI IF). 
All of these currencies are represented in the US dollar index, which is a weighted 
basket of world currencies and a trademark of the Financial Instrument Exchange 
(FINEX) in New York. 
The data consists of daily foreign exchange rates against the USD and this data has 
been gathered from the DataStream database. The data for the; 
- JPY, GBP, CAD, SEK and CHF covers the period from 2.1.1986 to 
30.6.2000, i. e. 3,635 observations, 
DEM, FRF, ITL, NLG and BEF covers the period from 2.1.1986 to 
31.12.1998, i. e. 3,254 observations, 
- EUR covers the period from 2.1.1999 to 30.6.2000, i. e. 382 observations. 
Daily capital requirements for the standardised approach and VaR methodologies are 
calculated for the period from 2.1.1996 and to 30.6.2000. The data from the earlier 
period is used to construct the first VaR estimate. The simulation is repeated for 
1,137 days and the analysis period covers the South Asia crisis in 1997 and the 
LTCM and Russian crises in 1998, which are periods of high market volatility. 
The analysis period also covers the introduction of the euro, which is a structural 
change in the global financial markets. As the euro was introduced at the end of 1998 
and replaced 11 currencies, this is an important issue that should be considered in the 
analysis. When the participating currencies to the European Monetary Union were 
replaced by the euro, consequently there became only one currency, which does not 
have any history. On the other hand, the variance-covariance and historical 
simulation methodologies rely on historical data and without any data for the euro it 
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is not possible to calculate the VaR estimates by using these methodologies. 
Therefore, the data history of the Deutche mark was used for the euro; as the 
Deutche mark money market and swap rates are suitable proxies for a curo history in 
the respective euro markets for these instruments (Brooks et al., 1998). 
Therefore, the history of the Deutche mark replaces the euro in the dataset. As five 
currencies in the sample, namely DEM, FRF, ITL, NLG and BEF were replaced by 
the euro, starting from 1999 the euro investment was weighted by the equivalent 
USD 5 million long or short position in each trading day. 
As the VaR estimate depends on the input data, the frequency of data is another 
important issue that should be considered in the VaR calculation. However, the high 
frequency data is not necessarily better than the low frequency data due to the noise 
it may be associated with and the cost of storage. On the other hand, the low 
frequency data has the possibility of missing some critical events (Tsai, 2004). As the 
VaR estimate assumes that the portfolio's composition does not change over the 
holding period, the solution of choosing data frequency depends on the investment 
strategies. In addition, due to the assumption that the portfolios' position changes 
daily, daily data of currencies is employed in this study. In addition, as the Basle 
Committee requires the use of at least one year of data, the minimum data period that 
is used in the simulations is one year. 
8.4.1 The Calculation of Daily Returns 
The next step in the analysis is the calculation of daily returns of the currencies. The 
return of an asset (portfolio), i. e. the profit or loss, which is denoted as AP, is the 
difference between the asset prices (portfolio values). That is, AP =P-P, _j , where 
P and P, _, are 
the asset prices (portfolio values) at time t and 1"1, respectively. 
However, instead of using the absolute differences in the asset prices, the rate of 
return should be calculated to demonstrate the magnitude of differences. There are 
two methodologies to calculate the rate of return. These arc, the arithmetic and 
geometric methodologies. 
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r, -'!; represents the arithmetic returns on an asset, and (ti. I ) p r 
r, = In(P,, /1; I); represents the logarithmic returns on an asset. (8.2) 
In this study, each series was transfiorn ed to a set of' continuously Compounded 
changes (logarithmic returns). As an example cif the return diistrihutiun, ( irahh 8.1 
demonstrates the compounded daily returns of' the Fl IR/IISI) parity and also the 
frequency distribution of this parity fier the period from January 1999 to Jun c 2000. 
Graph 8.3: The EUR/USU Daily Returns and the Frequency Distribution 
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8.4.2 The Descriptive Statistics of Currency Returns 
The descriptive statistics of daily returns are given in "fahle 8.1 ti)r 10 currencies 
(USD against DI: M, FRF, ITL, NLG, BEF. WY, G13P, CAI), SI: K and ('III) from 
2 January 1986 until 30 June 2000 (Panel A) and for the FURT BSI) parity from 
2 January 1999 to 30 June 2000 (Panel 13). 
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Table 8.1: The Descriptive Statistics on Daily Returns in Risk Factors (%)* 
A) 1/86 - 6/00 Std. Jarque 
Risk Factor Obs. Mean Max. Min. Dev. Kurtosis Skew. - Bern Prob. 
DEMIUSD 3254 -0.0115 3.4650 -3.5017 0.7071 5.0798 0.0502 587.85 0.0000 
FRF/USD 3254 -0.0087 4.3590 -4.8133 0.6972 7.7670 -0.1271 1932.8 0.0000 
ITLIUSD 3254 -0.0001 13.186 -14.478 0.8622 59.301 -0.2109 429792.6 0.0000 
NLG/USD 3254 -0.0116 4.8430 -5.7140 0.7177 7.2545 -0.0698 2456.85 0.0000 
BEFIUSD 3254 -0.0112 9.3192 -9.6017 0.7675 20.535 -0.2922 41736.0 0.0000 
JPY/USD 3635 -0.0173 5.8305 -7.6773 0.7714 10.545 -0.6262 8859.68 0.0000 
GBP/USD 3635 -0.0015 4.2758 -3.4090 0.6526 5.9919 0.2294 1387.63 0.0000 
CADIUSD 3635 0.0015 1.4555 -1.8811 0.2341 5.9412 0.0234 1310.57 0.0000 
SEKIUSD 3635 0.0041 6.8344 -4.1720 0.6609 9.2498 0.4207 6023.29 0.0000 
CIIF/USD 3635 -0.0062 4.8500 -5.3882 0.7922 5.8570 -0.1133 1244.05 0.0000 
B) 1/99 - 6/00 Std. Jarquc 
Risk Factor Obs. Mean Max. Min. Dcv. Kurtosis Skew. - Bera Prob. 
EURIUSD - 382 0.0538 1.8692 -2.0576 0.6531 3.5091 -0.2517 8.1380 0.0171 
* The statistics concerning DEM, FKF, ITL, NLG and BEF cover the period up to the introduction of curo. 
Table 8.1 demonstrates the following observations for the return series: 
1) The means of daily returns vary from +0.05 percent to -0.02 percent and 
all of them are very close to zero. The ITIJUSD parity has the lowest 
mean (-0.0001) and the EUR/USD parity, which has the lowest 
observation sample, has the highest mean (0.0538). 
2) The ITL/USD parity has -the minimum (14.5 percent) and maximum 
(13.2 percent) daily returns. 
3) The CADIUSD parity has the lowest standard deviation (0.2341) and the 
standard deviations of the other currencies vary from 0.6526 to 0.8622. 
4) The kurtosis that is presented in the seventh column measures the relative 
flatness of the return distribution of currencies compared to a standard 
normal distribution. The kurtosis is calculated by the expected fourth 
power of deviations from the mean and the kurtosis. estimates are highly 
sensitive to extreme returns. 
5) High kurtosis or leptokurtosis indicates that there are more occurrences 
far away from the mean than predicted by a standard normal distribution. 
A distribution with a kurtosis greater than three is called leptokurtic or 
fat-tailed and the coefficients of kurtosis that are shown in Table 8.1 
indicate that all of the returns have kurtosis higher than three. 
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6) The EUR/USD parity has the minimum kurtosis, which is 3.51 and the 
Jarque-Bera statistic53 is significant at the 5 percent level. The kurtosis of 
the other 10 currencies varies from 5 to 59 and the Jarque-Bora statistics 
are significant at the 1 percent level. As the Jarque-Bcra test statistics 
demonstrate that the kurtosis of all currencies are significantly different 
from zero, normality for all return series is rejected. 
7) In particular, the ITL/USD parity has the highest kurtosis. The return 
series of the ITL/USD parity has a kurtosis coefficient of 59.3, which 
indicates an extremely heavy tail. The BEF/USD parity also has a very 
heavy tail (the kurtosis is 20.5). 
8) The skewness parameter that is presented in the eighth column 
characterises the degree of asymmetry of the distribution around its mean 
and it is measured by the expected third power of deviations from the 
mean. 
9) The coefficients of skewness that are shown in Table 8.1 indicate that all 
of the returns have non-zero skewness. 
10) While the returns on DEMIUSD, GBP/USD, CAD/USD and SEK/USD 
are positively skewed, the returns on FRF/USD, ITLIUSD, NLG/USD 
BEF/USD, JPY/USD, CHF/USD and EUR/USD have negative 
skewness. The return series that have negative skewness indicate that 
large negative returns are more likely than large positive returns. The 
return series that have positive skewness indicate that large positive 
returns are more likely than large negative returns. 
11) As the `excess kurtosis' and the skewness should be zero for a standard 
normal distribution, none of the currency series exhibits a standard 
normal distribution. Besides, the Jarque-Bera test statistics reject 
normality for all return series. 
"The Jarque-Bera statistic has an asymptotic Z2 distribution with two degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of normally distributed errors. If the residuals are normally distributed, the histogram 
should be bell-shaped and the Jarque-Bera statistic would not be significant. 
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One of the most important outcomes of the descriptive statistics of daily returns on 
currencies is that some return series, such as the return series of ITIJUSD, exhibit 
extremely heavy tails. Extreme heavy tails might suggest a distribution with an 
infinite variance and in these cases the VaR estimates that are calculated by assuming 
a normal distribution cannot provide appropriate measures of market risk as the tail 
behaviour of asset returns is not captured adequately. Therefore, instead of a normal 
distribution, the use of leptokurtic (fat-tailed) distributions could lead to more 
prudent risk measures (Lucas and Klaassen, 1998). 
The stable distribution is one of the distributions that could be used to deal with the 
infinite variance as the variance and other higher moments do not exist in this 
distribution. However, Simons (1997) argues that since the use of stable distributions 
in finance has always been controversial, the use of jump diffusion and stochastic 
volatility models are more applicable in practice to deal with extreme heavy tails, as 
these models produce fat tails while preserving the finite variance. 
On the other hand, the stable distribution aims to capture not only the fat tails but 
also the whole distribution of the returns. Therefore, Nefici (2000) points out that if 
the distribution of asset returns is heavy tailed, it is likely that the use of a non- 
parametric procedure based on the extreme value theory of Wilks (1948) will lead to 
more satisfactory results when applying VaR techniques. 
Although the assumption of the normal distribution simplifies the computation of 
VaR, the descriptive statistics of currency returns indicate that currency returns are 
fat-tailed, which implies that extreme events occur much more than are predicted 
based on the assumption of normality. As a matter of fact, the observed non- 
normality of the currency return distributions provides a strong motivation for not 
using parametric approaches, where the normal distribution is assumed in the 
calculation of VaR estimates. On the contrary, the historical simulation methodology 
does not suffer from the fat tail problem, as it does not rely on the normal distribution 
assumption. Despite this banks widely use the parametric variance-covariancc 
models in their risk management framework. Therefore, these parametric models are 
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also simulated in this analysis. The next section presents the methodologies that are 
applied to calculate required capital charges for the foreign exchange portfolios. 
8.5 The Simulation Methodology 
The aim of this section is to present the simulation methodology that provides a 
comparison of the regulatory market risk capital for two foreign currency portfolios. 
In these simulations, the required capital charges are calculated for each day in the 
sample, by applying both the standardised and the internal models approaches. As 
the results of the documentary analysis that was provided in the previous chapter 
demonstrate, the VaR methodologies of banks differ in a wide range. Therefore, 
three different VaR techniques and 16 different VaR models are used in the analysis. 
The simulation methodology that is presented in this section involves all of the steps 
of the VaR calculation framework that was provided in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
The first step of the simulation is to establish the database of portfolio positions. For 
each portfolio, a particular- database is -established. These databases are also used to 
calculate the daily returns of the portfolios. The change in the market value of the 
portfolios is simulated by using the returns on the underlying currencies. The second 
step of the simulation methodology is the calculation of the required capital. The 
required capital charge is calculated for a time period starting from 1996 and ending 
at 30.6.2000 (1,137 days) on a rolling basis. 
The calculations of the required capital for market risk for the standardised approach 
and VaR models were made by using the Excel software. First, the required market 
risk capital is calculated by applying the standardised approach. Then, the required 
market risk capitals is calculated by applying 16 VaR models. 
The first VaR technique, the EqVCV methodology, is performed using five different 
models by altering the amount of historical data. For this methodology, 250,500, 
750,1250 and 2500 days of equal weights are applied. The second VaR technique, 
the ExpVCV methodology, is performed using six different models. For this 
methodology, decay factors of 0.93,0.94,0.95,0.96,0.97 and 0.98 are applied. In 
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addition, a 250-day historical data set is used. The third VaR technique, the historical 
simulation methodology, is also performed by using five different models by altering 
the amount of historical data. For this methodology, the same historical data sets that 
are used in the EqVCV methodology are utilized. 
The procedure that is followed to simulate the required capital charges by using both 
the standardised and the internal models approaches are explained below. 
8.5.1 The Standardised Approach 
The calculation of the required capital charge for the foreign exchange rate risk under 
the standardised approach is straightforward. In order to calculate the capital 
requirement under the standardised approach, firstly the banks' net positions in each 
currency are calculated after the position in different foreign exchanges are converted 
into the USD. The net positions in each currency are calculated by using the daily 
spot rates. Secondly, the net long and net short positions are added separately across 
currencies: In the standardised approach, the changes in long and short positions for 
the same currencies offset one another. Then, an eight percent capital charge is 
applied to the higher of net long or net short position, i. e. net open position. 
While the capital charges for the worst-case portfolio vary from USD 400,000 to 
USD 800,000, capital charges for the fixed portfolio are fixed at USD 800,000, as the 
value of the portfolio is stable at USD 10 million. 
8.5.2 The Internal Models Approaches 
Calculating the required capital by utilizing internal model approaches is more 
complicated. As the financial institutions' VaR practices indicate, the variance- 
covariance (EqVCV and ExpVCV) and historical simulation methodologies are two 
broad types of VaR models. Therefore, in this study capital charges for the foreign 
exchange portfolios are calculated by using the variance-covariance and historical 
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simulation methodologies54. These methodologies were explained in the fifth chapter 
of this thesis. 
In order to follow the regulatory framework, calculations are made in accordance 
with the 1996 Basle Committee amendment. Therefore, the holding period is used as 
10 holding days and the confidence level is taken as 99 percent. 
For the variance-covariance and historical simulation55 methodologies, first daily 
VaRs are calculated. The VaR calculations are based on the returns within the 
historical window. If the rolling window is set to 250 days, the VaR calculation for 
the first day (t=1) is based on the observed exchange rates within the last year (from 
date t-1 to t-250). For the second date (t=2), the window is moved one day forward 
and VaR is calculated by using the data from date t and t-249. The VaR estimates are 
calculated on a daily basis, starting at 2.1.1996 and ending at 30.6.2000 (1,137 days). 
Second, the VaR estimates are multiplied by a factor of 1105. The Basle Accord 
recommends that multi-period volatility predictions are to be obtained by multiplying 
the one-day volatility estimates by the square root of the time horizon (in days). 
Finally, the VaR estimates are based on a 99 percent confidence level and 10 holding 
days are multiplied by a multiplication factor of three. The Basle Committee 
amendment requires that if the market risk capital requirements are calculated by a 
VaR methodology, a multiplication factor of three should be used. This means that 
the amount calculated by the VaR model should be multiplied by three. On the other 
hand, regulators could increase the multiplication factor depending on the 
backtesting results. 
54While the GARCH method has found widespread empirical support from academics, as it requires a 
complicated computer-intensive procedure in estimating volatilities (Hopper, 1996), this method has 
not been adopted in this analysis. 
 For the historical simulation methodology, the ten-day holding period VaR numbers were also 
estimated by actual 10 day returns. 
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According to the Basle Committee amendment, the capital charge for the general 
market risk should be equal to the greater of the average of the VaR estimates on 
each of the preceding 60 days, times the scaling factor or the previous days' VaR 
estimate calculated in accordance with specific quantitative standards. The formula 
that is used to determine the required capital is presented below: 
Ct =Max VaR, (MF) 
1 60 
-ýVaR, 60 ; _, 
(8.3) 
where C, is the required capital level at time t, MF is the multiplication factor, 
VaR1_, is the VaR estimate which is calculated at date t-1, VaR, _, 
is the VaR 
estimate which is calculated at date t -j. 
Another issue that should be considered when applying the internal models approach 
is that there is no consensus on the preferred length of the simulation period. 
However, because the Basle Committee requires at least 1 year of historical data, 
these VaR calculations are based on this requirement. However, in addition to the 
250 days of historical data, four different, window lengths are applied for the EqVCV 
and historical simulation methodologies. These historical rolling windows are; 500 
days (two years), 750 days (three years), 1,250 days (five years) and 2,500 days (ten 
years). 
8.5.2.1 The Variance-Covariance Methodologies 
There are two major techniques of the variance-covariance methodology. These are 
the equally weighted moving average and the exponentially weighted moving 
average techniques. In this analysis, both of these techniques are used to estimate 
VaRs. The equally weighted moving average (EqVCV) methodology is performed 
using five different models by altering the amount of historical data. For this 
methodology, 250,500,750,1250 and 2500 days of equal weights are applied. The 
second technique is the exponentially moving average methodology (ExpVCV), in 
which exponentially weighted moving averages with different smoothing parameters 
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(including those of RiskMetrics use) are used to estimate VaRs. The calculations of 
VaRs for the ExpVCV methodology are carried out by applying six decay factors 
(0.93,0.94,0.95,0.96,0.97 and 0.98) and a window of 250 lagged daily returns. 
In order to calculate the required capital under the variance-covariance 
methodologies, first the estimates of the variance and covariance of risk factors are 
calculated. Then, in order to calculate the variance of the portfolio's profit and loss, 
matrixes of the estimates of variance and covariance are generated. In this 
calculation, the variance-covariance matrix is obtained by taking the standard 
deviation matrix and multiplying it by the covariance matrix. The advantage of using 
matrixes is that, a weighted matrix for several assets that has only one row could be 
easily set up from a covariance coefficient matrix and a volatility matrix. As pointed 
out by Hull (2000), the variances and covariances are calculated consistently. This 
means that, when VaR is calculated by applying the equally weighted variance- 
covariance methodology, the variances and covariances are both calculated by giving 
an equal weight to the last 250 observations for a one year data set. When VaR is 
calculated by applying the exponentially weighted variance-covariance methodology, 
the variances and covariances are updated by using the identical decay factor. 
In the ExpVCV methodology, past observations are weighted by using six smoothing 
constants, i. e. decay factors (A), which vary from 0.93 to 0.98. In this methodology, 
the observation of n days before in the historical data set is multiplied by X. 
Therefore, as the decay factor decreases, the earlier observations have a smaller 
impact, although information contained in more lagged observations is not totally 
ignored. As a result, as Alexander (1996) points out, "Extreme events have less of an 
impact on variances and covariances as they move further into the past, and the 
`ghost features'should no longer appear. " 
In the simulation of the variance-covariance methodologies, the means (u) are fixed 
at zero. Jackson et al. (1998) state that "Fixing the means at zero might seen: an 
unconventional statistical procedure, but the estimation error associated with badly 
determined mean estimates in relatively small samples may reduce the efficiency of 
the estimated volatilities. " Furthermore, Figlewski (1997) argues that if the true mean 
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returns are very close to zero, fixing them at zero could enhance the forecasts. 
Figlewski also shows that, by setting the average daily return to zero, over the entire 
data period better forecasts are obtained. ' Therefore, while calculating VaRs by 
applying the variance-covariance methodologies, the mean of the currency returns 
are assumed to be zero. 
8.5.2.2 The Historical Simulation Methodology 
The historical simulation methodology calculates the VaR estimates by using a past 
period of the historical returns of the portfolios over one-day and ten-day holding 
periods. The returns exceeded in 99 percent of the cases are taken out as the VaR 
estimate. In this approach, the scenarios are directly drawn from the historical data 
and the portfolio returns are calculated for each" date represented in the historical data 
set. As the historical simulation approach does not make any assumptions of 
normality or serial' dependence, VaR has to be recalculated for each confidence level. 
This means that the 99 percent and 95 percent confidence levels are not constant 
multiples of each other and the holding periods other than one day are not fixed 
multiples of the one-day VaR estimate. The calculations of VaRs by applying the 
historical simulation methodology are carried out by using five historical rolling 
windows (250 days, 500 days, 750 days, 1,250 days and 2,500 days). 
8.6 Empirical Results 
In the previous section, the simulations that are used in the calculation of the required 
capital charges for two foreign exchange portfolios were explained. In these 
simulations, the required capital charges are calculated by applying the standardised 
and 16 VaR models. These VaR models are 5 EqVCV models (2500-day, 1250-day, 
750-day, 500-day, and 250-day), 6 ExpVCV models (A = 0.93, A=0.94, A=0.95, 
A=0.96, A=0.97, A=0.98) and 5 HS models (2500-day, 1250-day, 750-day, 500- 
day, and 250-day). The capital charges are calculated for 1,137 days from 2 January 
1996 to 30 June 2000. 
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This section illustrates the empirical results of the simulation procedures that were 
described in the previous section. The aim of these simulations is to find out to what 
extent two market risk capital approaches and various VaR models produce different 
capital requirements. First, the results concerning the capital charges for the fixed 
portfolio are presented. Second, the results concerning the worst-case portfolio are 
provided. 
8.6.1 Capital Charges for the Fixed Portfolio 
The required capital amounts for the fixed portfolio are calculated by using the 
standardised approach and 16 VaR models. The maximum, minimum, mean, median 
values and the standard deviations of the required capital amounts for the fixed 
portfolio are given in Table 8.2. In addition, the maximum, minimum -and mean 
values of the required capital amounts are illustrated in Graph 8.4. For the 
standardised approach and each VaR model, the required capital charges are 
calculated on a daily basis between 2 January 1996 and 30 June 2000 for a total of 
1,137 days. 
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Table 8.2: Capital Charges for the Fix ed Portfolio 
METHOI)OIA)(. V (million (SI)) Maxiinuin Minimum Wan 1 ledian tild. I)c%. 
Standardised Approach 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 u iiu 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 2500-day) 1.31 1.18 1.23 1.22 0.0( 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 1250-day) 1.3.1 0.98 1.09 1.03 11.1() 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 750-day) 1.1.1 0.88 0.99 1.00 0.00 
Variance-Covariance (FgVCV 500-day) 1.111 0.83 0.98 1.01 0.08 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV 250-day) 1.20 0.64 0.9.1 1.01) 0. I ; 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.93) 1.24 0.56 0.94 0.98 0.18 
Variance-Covariance (F, xpVCV: A=0.94) 1.23 0.56 0.94 0.98 11.18 
Variance-Covariance (l? xpVCV: A=0.95 ) 1.22 0.57 0.91 0.98 0.18 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.96) 1.20 0.58 0.94 0.98 0.17 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.97) 1.17 0.59 0.94 0.99 0.17 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.98) 1.16 11.61 0.94 11.98 0.10 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 1.52 1.31 1.42 I.. 1I 0.07 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 1.71 1.02 1.25 1.18 (1.18 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 1.31 0.93 1.1() 1.07 1.3 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 1.31 0.93 1.00 1.00 11.1 .1 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 1.96 0.73 1.08 1.112 0.24 
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The empirical results concerning the fixed portfolio demonstrate the tioIlo%%ing 
observations: 
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1) As the investment amount is held constant in the case of the fixed 
portfolio, the required capital amounts that are produced by the 
standardised approach are permanently USD 800,000. 
2) The EqVCV models produce average required capital amounts that vary 
from USD 940,000 to USD 1,230,000 and the standard deviations vary 
from 0.03 to 0.13. The average capital amounts that the EqVCV models 
produce increases in accordance with the length of the observation 
periods. 
3) The 'EqVCV 2500-day' model that produces the highest average amount 
. (USD 1,230,000) has the, lowest standard deviation (0.03) and the 
'EqVCV 250-day' model that produces the lowest average amount (USD 
940,000) has the highest standard deviation (0.13). Compared with the 
ExpVCV and HS models, the EqVCV models produce lower standard 
deviations. 
4) The EqVCV models produce maximum capital levels ranging from USD 
1,140,000 to USD 1,340,000 and minimum capital levels ranging from 
USD 640,000 to USD 1,180,000. Compared with the ExpVCV models, 
the EqVCV models produce lower minimum amounts. 
5) When the required capital is calculated by using different ExpVCV 
models, the means do not change and the changes in the standard 
deviations and the maximum and minimum amounts are negligible. The 
average required capital amount of each ExpVCV model is USD 
940,000. The maximum required capital amounts of the ExpVCV models 
vary from USD 1,160,000 to USD 1,240,000 and the minimum amounts 
vary from USD 560,000 to USD 610,000. 
6) When the required capital amount is calculated by using the ExpVCV 
models, the maximum required capital amount decreases and the 
minimum required capital amount increases as reliance on recent data 
increases. 
7) The standard deviations of the capital amounts that the ExpVCV models 
produce vary from 0.16 to 0.18 and the 'ExpVCV 0.98' model has the 
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lowest standard deviation. The standard deviations of the capital amounts 
decrease in accordance with the increase of the decay factors. 
8) Compared with the EqVCV and HS models, the ExpVCV models 
produce the lowest averages but the highest standard deviations. 
9) The maximum required capital amounts that the HS models produce vary 
from USD 1,310,000 to USD 1,960,000 and the minimum capital 
amounts vary from USD 730,000 to USD 1,310,000. Compared with the 
EqVCV and ExpVCV models, the HS models produce higher maximum 
and minimum required capital amounts. 
10) Among all the HS models, the `HS 750-day' and `HS 500-day' models 
produce the lowest maximum capital (USD 1,310,000). The 'I IS 250- 
day' model produces the highest maximum capital amount (USD 
1,960,000) and the highest standard deviation among all the VaR models. 
11) The average required capital amounts that the HS models produce vary 
from USD 1,060,000 to USD 1,420,000. While the 'HS 500-day' model 
produces the lowest mean among all the HS models, the 'UUS 2500-day' 
model produces the highest mean among all the VaR models. 
12) The major observations for this simulation are that; (i) the standardised 
approach is found to produce the lowest required -capital amount, (ii) 
together with the 'EqVCV 250-day' model, the ExpVCV models produce 
the lowest average required capital amounts among all the VaR models, 
(iii) the `HS 2500-day' model produces the highest average required 
capital amount, (iv) together with the ExpVCV models, the `HS 2500- 
day' model also produces higher standard deviations. 
The empirical results concerning the fixed portfolio indicate that, the VaR estimates 
are dependent upon the VaR methodology. An example of how the required capital 
amounts differ from each other is illustrated in Graphs 8.5. These graphs demonstrate 
the required capital amounts for the fixed portfolio derived from the standardised 
approach and three VaR models. These VaR models are; the historical simulation 
(one-year observation period), the equally weighted variance-covariance (one-year 
observation period) and the exponentially weighted variance-covariance (A = 0.94). 
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"I'hcsc visual indicators also demonstrate that the required capital ditlcrs substantially 
depending on the model that is applied. 
Graphs 8.5: Required Market Risk Capital Amounts for the Fixed Portfolio 
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8.6.2 Capital Charges for the Worst-Case Portfolio 
The required capital amounts for the worst-case portfolio are calculated hý using the 
standardised approach and 16 VaR models. The maximum, minimum, mean, median 
values and the standard deviations of the required capital amounts for the NNorst-case 
portfolio are given in Table 8.3. In addition, the maximum. minimum and mean 
values of the required capital amounts are illustrated in Graph 8.6. For the 
standardised approach and each VaR model, the required capital charges are 
calculated on a daily basis between 2 January 1996 and 30 June 2000 ti)r a total of' 
1.137 days. 
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Takle 8.3: Capital Charges for the Worst-Case Portfolio 
METHODOLOGY (million USD) Maximum Minimum Mean Median Sid. I)eN. 
Standardised Approach 0.80 0.40 0.64 0.6.1 0. I I 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV 2500-day) 1.02 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.05 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 1250-day) 0.91 0.72 0.82 0.82 lº. ll $ 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 750-day) 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.06 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 500-day) 
L 
0.59 0.76 0.74 ((. 08 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV 250-day) 9 0.46 0.74 0.76 n. 1 3 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.93) . 0.40 0.74 0.76 0. I8 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.94) 1.04 0.40 0.74 0.76 0.18 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.95) 1.04 0.41 0.74 0.76 ((. 18 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.96) 1.03 0.42 0.74 (1.76 0.17 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.97) 1.02 0.43 0.74 0.77 0.17 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.98) 1.01 0.44 0.74 0.77 0.16 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 1.19 0.90 1.06 1.07 0.1)6 - 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 1.09 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.05 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 1.02 0.76 0.91 0.92 0.06 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 1.09 0.67 0.89 0.91 0.09 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 1.29 0.53 0.91 0.89 0.17 
mio USD Graph 8.6: Capital Charges for the Worst-Case Portfolio 1.4 
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The empirical results concerning the worst-case portfolio demonstrate the fiolloww ing 
observations: 
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1) When the required - capital for market risk is calculated by using the 
standardised approach, the maximum capital amount is USD 800,000 and 
the minimum capital amount is USD 400,000. The average capital 
amount that this approach produces is USD 640,000 and the standard 
deviation of the capital amounts is 0.11. Compared with the VaR models, 
the standardised approach produces the lowest required capital amount. 
2) Compared with the ExpVCV and HS models, the EqVCV models 
produce lower maximum amounts. The EqVCV models produce 
maximum capital levels ranging from USD 880,000 to USD 1,020,000 
and minimum capital levels ranging from USD 460,000 to USD 770,000. 
3) The average capital amounts that the EqVCV models produce vary from 
USD 740,000 to USD 910,000 and the means increase in accordance 
with the length of the observation periods. While the 'EqVCV 2500-day' 
model produces the highest- average capital amount (USD 910,000) 
among all the EqVCV models, the 'EqVCV 250-day' model produces the 
lowest (USD 740,000). 
4) On the other hand, although the 'EqVCV 250-day' model produces the 
lowest mean, this model produces the highest standard deviation among 
all the EqVCV models. 
5) The standard deviations of the EqVCV models vary from 0.04 to 0.13. 
Compared with- the ExpVCV and HS models, the EqVCV models 
produce lower standard deviations in general. 
6) When the required capital is calculated by using different ExpVCV 
models, the means do not change and the changes in the standard 
deviations and the maximum and minimum amounts are negligible. The 
average required capital amount of each ExpVCV model is USD 
740,000. The maximum required capital amounts of the ExpVCV models 
vary from USD 1,010,000 to USD 17,050,000 and the minimum amounts 
vary from USD 400,000 to USD 440,000. 
7) The standard deviations of the capital amounts that the ExpVCV models 
produce vary from 0.16 to 0.18 and the 'ExpVCV 0.98' model has the 
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lowest standard deviation. The standard deviations of the capital amounts 
decrease in accordance with the increase of the decay factors. 
8) Compared with the EqVCV and HS models, the ExpVCV models 
produce the lowest averages but the highest standard deviations. 
9) The maximum required capital amounts that the I IS models produce vary 
from USD 1,020,000 to USD 1,290,000 and the minimum capital 
amounts vary from USD 530,000 to USD 900,000. Among all the 1IS 
models, the `HS 750-day' model produces the lowest maximum capital 
(USD 1,020,000). While the `HS 250-day' model produces the highest 
maximum capital amount (USD 1,230,000), this model also produces the 
lowest minimum capital amount (USD 530,000). However, the `11S 250- 
day' model has the highest standard deviation among all the HS models. 
10) The average required capital amounts that the HS models produce vary 
from USD 890,000 to USD 1,060,000. While the `HS 500-day' model 
produces the lowest mean among all the HS models, the `u1S 2500-day' 
model produces the highest mean. 
11) The major observations for this simulation are that; (i) the standardised 
approach produces the lowest average required capital amount, (ii) 
together with the 'EqVCV 250-day' model, the ExpVCV models produce 
the lowest average required capital amounts among all. the VaR models, 
(iii) the `HS 2500-day' model produces the highest average required 
capital amount, (iv) together with the ExpVCV models, the 'I IS 2500- 
day' model also produces higher standard deviations. 
12) Compared with the case of the fixed portfolio, the models produce 
relatively lower required capital amounts due to the diversification 
impact of investment. 
The empirical results concerning the worst-case portfolio indicate that, similar to the 
results of the fixed portfolio, the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR 
methodology. An example of how the required capital amounts differ from each 
other is illustrated in Graphs 8.7. These graphs demonstrate the required capital 
amounts for the worst-case portfolio derived from the standardised approach and 
three VaR models. These VaR models are; the historical simulation (one-year 
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observation period), the equally weighted variance-covariance (one-year observation 
period) and the exponentially weighted variance-covariance (A _- 0.94 ). thcsc visual 
indicators also demonstrate that the required capital dilicrs suhstantiallý (depending 
on the model that is applied. 
Graphs 8.7: Required Market Risk Capital Amounts for the Worst-Case Portfolio 
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The empirical results that are provided in this section demonstrate that diticrent 
approaches produce different required market risk capital levels. Ilhcsc results imply 
that banks with the same risk could have different capital amounts depending only on 
the selected methodology for calculating the required market risk capital. This is a 
weakness of the market risk capital regulations, as these regulations cannot ensure a 
'level playing field' for financial institutions in order to eliminate the competitive 
inequalities. Therefore, giving an option to banks to deterniine the VaR methodology 
could create a moral hazard problem as banks may choose an inaccurate model that 
provides less required capital amounts. As an example. the simulation of the \Norst- 
case portfolio illustrates that if a financial institution that use,, a IIS 2500-day' 
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Variance-Covariance (Equally Weighted) 
Variance-Covariance (Exponentially Weighted) 
model switches over to the standardised approach to calculate the required market 
risk capital; that institution could provide 66 percent capital savings on average. 
Although the objective of implementing the market risk capital regulations is to 
secure the stability and solvency of the financial system, such a moral hazard 
problem might lead banks to use a model that produces lower levels of capital 
amounts and not choose the one that provides more accurate risk estimates. In 
addition, as the use of alternative models might yield different capital charges, an 
outsider such as a shareholder or a regulator may not make reliable comparisons 
based on these numbers. Therefore, bank regulators should be very cautious when 
approving the use of different approaches for banks that have similar portfolios. 
In addition, supervisors should allow models that provide accurate risk estimates. 
The methodologies that produce inaccurate estimates would not provide capital 
charges that reflect individual banks' true risk exposures and accordingly would not 
provide a sufficient cushion to cover possible losses due to market risk. Furthermore, 
market participants, which attempt to assess individual banks' risk taking, might be 
misled when these models produce inaccurate estimates. Therefore, the assessment 
of the accuracy of the VaR models is a key concern for risk practitioners and 
regulators. The accuracy of 16 VaR models that are applied to the fixed and worst- 
case portfolios is examined in the next section. 
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8.7 The Backtesting Process of the VaR Models 
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that applying different methodologies to 
a particular portfolio could yield significantly different assessments of risk. In this 
section, the models that provided the VaR estimates are validated by backtesting. As 
financial institutions use the VaR models to measure their market risk, the accuracy 
of the VaR estimates is of concern to risk practitioners and regulators. Therefore, risk 
practitioners use backtesting to verify the accuracy of their VaR models and 
regulators require a regular backtesting from banks that use internal VaR models for 
calculating the required market risk capital. 
The aim of this section is to provide an assessment of whether different VaR models 
that are applied to the fixed and worst-case portfolios measure market risk 
efficiently. Therefore, the VaR estimates are compared with their respective portfolio 
profit-and loss for 1,136 days using the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 29 
June 2000. If the daily loss on the trading activities is less then the ex ante VaR 
estimate, this situation is defined-as `an exception'. 
As backtesting is a process that compares the realised returns with the model 
generated risk measures, the primary steps of this process are to provide the portfolio 
profit and loss and to calculate the VaR estimates. The calculation of the VaR 
estimates by using. the variance-covariance (EqVCV and ExpVCV) and historical 
simulation approaches was explained in the previous sections. In this section, in 
order to test the validity of 16 VaR models that are used to calculate the VaR 
estimates, backtesting is applied. While the VaR estimates that are calculated for the 
capital purposes are based on a ten-day holding period, the Basle Committee requires 
banks to apply backtesting to the VaR estimates that are based on a one-day holding 
period. In addition, the Basle Committee amendment requires that the VaR estimates 
should be based on a 99 percent confidence level. Therefore, backtests are applied to 
the VaR estimates that are based on a one-day holding period and at a 99 percent 
confidence level. 
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The most straightforward way to backtest is to plot the daily profit and loss against 
the ex ante VaR estimate and to demonstrate the exceptions. The graphs that are 
presented in Appendix 8.1 plot the observed returns divided by the VaR estimates. In 
each graph, the points that are below the horizontal line demonstrate the exceptions. 
These graphs indicate how VaR models behaved over time-and provide a good visual 
indication of the behaviour of the exceptions. 
As demonstrated by these graphs, the exceptions are relatively high when VaR is 
calculated for the worst-case portfolio. This visual indication might imply that the 
risk measures of the VaR models are probably too low or these models are not 
_- adequate 
to calculate the VaR estimates. On the other hand, the exceptions are 
relatively small when VaR is calculated for the fixed portfolio. This might imply that 
the VaR models provide overestimated risk measures. 
Although plotting the observed returns divided by the VaR estimates provides a good 
visual indication, verifying the accuracy of a model by plotting the exceptions is a 
very simple method. Therefore, the performances of the VaR models are backtested 
by applying the more formal -methodologies that were explained in the sixth chapter 
of this thesis. These methodologies are; the Basle Committee approach, statistical 
backtests and ranking tests. The results that are obtained by applying these three 
methodologies are presented below. 
8.7.1 The Basle Committee's `Traffic Light' Approach 
The first method that is used to backtest the accuracy of VaR models is the 
methodology required by the market risk regulation of the Basle Committee. This 
method is based on the binomial assumption and it is the simplest back-testing 
method. This approach only counts the number of days on which portfolio loss is 
greater than the VaR estimate. Such days are defined as the VaR exceptions and the 
proportion of the VaR exceptions should be consistent with the stated confidence 
level. 
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In the regulatory backtesting, banks are required to count the number of days over 
the prior year (250 trading days) on which the portfolio loss exceeded the 99 percent 
VaR forecast. If a bank's VaR model has generated zero to four exceptions over a 
250-day period, it is said to be in the green zone. If it has generated five to nine 
exceptions,. it is in the yellow zone and if there are more than ten exceptions, it is in 
the red zone. Therefore, this approach is also called the `traffic light approach'. 
Table 8.4 shows the 'number of exceptions and Table 8.5 shows the realised 
percentages of exceptions for the fixed and worst-case portfolios. If the VaR models 
perform well, it is expected that at the 99 percent confidence level, the exception 
- -ratio should be 1 percent. If the exception ratio is greater than 1 percent, then the 
VaR model underestimates market risk. (The percentage should correspond to 
approximately 100 percent minus the VaR confidence level that is selected. For a 99 
percent confidence level, it is expected to have losses that exceed the VaR number l 
percent of the time. ) 
According to the Basle. Committee requirements, as long as the VaR estimate does 
not exceed- four times or less in the previous 250-day period (or 2 percent of the 
time), the multiplication factor remains at its minimal value of three. If there are 
more than four exceptions, the bank is required to apply a multiplication factor that is 
more than three. 
In this study, the VaR estimates are calculated using the variance-covariance 
(EqVCV and ExpVCV) and historical simulation approaches at the 99 percent 
confidence level and therefore it is expected to have losses that do not exceed the 
VaR number only 1 percent of the time. As it is shown in Table 8.5, the VaR 
calculations for the fixed portfolio do not produce exceptions of more than 2 percent. 
However, for the worst-case portfolio, the number of exceptions exceeds the 1 
percent value considerably, indicating that the required market risk capital generated 
for this portfolio is not sufficient to cover losses. 
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Table 8.4: BacktestinL, Results- Number of Exccntions 
Fixed Portfolio 
VaR Models 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 2500-day) 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV: 1250-day) 0 0 1 4 3 8 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 750-day) 0 2 2 4 2 10 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 500-day) 0 4 2 4 2 12 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 250-day) 3 7 2 4 1 17 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.93) 7 3 2 4 3 19 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.94) 7 3 2 4 3 19 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.95) 7 3 1 4 3 18 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.96) 6 3 1 4 2 16 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: 2= 0.97) 5 2 1 3 1 12 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.98) 4 2 1 3 1 11 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 0 0 1 4 2 7 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 0 3 2 4 2 11 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 3 2 2 3 1 11 
Worst-Case Portfolio 
VaR Models 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 2500-day) 16 32 30 20 19 117 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 1250-day) 15 41 40 31 23 ISO 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 750-day) 19 45 50 32 20 166 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 500-day) 18 57 44 27 20 166 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 250-day) 27 62 40 27 18 174 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.93) 51 41 42 26 16 176 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.94) 50 41 42 26 15 174 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.95) 50 43 40 25 15 173 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.96) 48 43 39 26 16 172 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.97) 45 44 40 27 16 172 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.98) 40 47 40 26 16 169 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 11 25 25 12 8 81 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 10 26 29 22 11 98 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 11 31 35 23 10 110 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 11 43 37 25 9 125 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 22 45 29 15 7 118 
* Year 2000 estimates are based on 6 months. 
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Table 8.5: Backtesting Results- Pereentaue of F ec+ntinnc (01-1 
Fixed Portfolio 
VaR Models 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 2500-day) 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV: 1250-day) 0 0 0 2 2 1 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 750-day) 0 1 1 2 2 1 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 500-day) 0 2 1 2 2 1 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 250-day) 1 3 1 2 1 2 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.93) 3 1 1 2 2 2 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.94) 3 1 1 2 2 2 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.95) 3 1 0 2 2 2 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.96) 2 1 0 2 2 1 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.97) 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.98) 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 0 0 0 2 2 1 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 0 1 1 2 2 1 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Worst-Case Portfolio 
VaR Models 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 2500-day) 6 13 12 8 15 10 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV: 1250-day) 6 16 16 12 18 13 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV: 750-day) 8 18 20 13 16 15 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV: 500-day) 7 23 17 11 16 15 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV: 250-day) 1 25 16 11 14 15 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.93) 20 16 17 10 13 16 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.94) 20 16 17 10 12 15 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.95) 20 17 16 10 12 15 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.96) 19 17 15 10 13 15 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A= 0.97) 18 18 16 11 13 15 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV: A=0.98) 16 19 16 10 13 15 
Historical Simulation (2500-day) 4 10 10 5 6 7 
Historical Simulation (1250-day) 4 10 12 9 9 9 
Historical Simulation (750-day) 4 12 14 9 8 10 
Historical Simulation (500-day) 4 17 15 10 7 11 
Historical Simulation (250-day) 9 18 12 6 6 10 
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On the other hand, the results indicate that the historical simulation methodology 
with 2,500 days of data appears to work better than the other methodologies. 
The evaluation of the VaR models through backtesting is important because in order 
to measure and manage market risk, it is crucial to have an accurate model. However, 
counting the number of days that losses exceeded the VaR number is a simple 
backtest procedure and does not measure the accuracy of the models. Therefore, the 
accuracy of models is also backtested by applying statistical backtests and ranking 
tests. These tests are provided below. 
8.7.2 The Statistical Backtests 
Backtests based on the statistical frequency tests are also used to validate VaR 
models and the frequencies of exceptions are tested by using both binomial tests 
proposed by Kupiec (1995) and the conditional- frequency test proposed by 
Christoffersen (1998). 
Backtesting is a process that validates the VaR models by comparing the VaR 
estimates to their respective realised portfolio profit and loss., After constructing the 
portfolio profit and loss over a daily time interval, the number of exceptions was 
determined by the following hit function: 
II 
if xr, r+, : -VaR«(, ) tE {1,2,..., n} (8.5) r+ý -0 if xr,, +1 > -VaRr(=) 
where xr, r+l represents the profit or 
loss between the end of date t and date t+l; and 
VaR, (a) represents the reported VaR. If an institution's loss on the trading activities 
between the end of date t and date t+1 is less then or equals its negative VaR 
calculated on date t, this situation is defined as an exception (1). If an institution's 
loss on the trading activities between the end of date t and date 1+1 exceeds the 
negative VaR calculated on date t, this situation is defined as a failure (0). 
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In order to construct the hit function sequence (e. g.; 0,1,0,0,1,1,0,..., 0) for all 
observations, this process is rolled forward by comparing the VaR estimates to their 
respective realised portfolio profit and loss for 1,136 days using the sample period 
from 2 January 1996 to 29 June 2000. 
After constructing the hit function sequence, the performances of the VaR models arc 
backtested by applying three statistical tests. These are; the one-sided binomial test, 
the two-sided binomial test and the Christoffersen test. 
-- The statistical backtests are based on a standard hypothesis-testing paradigm. First, 
the null hypothesis is specified and then a significance level is selected and the 
probability associated with the null hypothesis being true is estimated. If the 
estimated value of the probability exceeds the significance level, the null hypothesis 
is accepted. If the estimated value of the probability does not exceed the significance 
level, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
For the statistical backtests, the null hypothesis is that the VaR estimates exhibit a 
specified property characteristic of accurate VaR estimates. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the VaR estimates do not exhibit the specified property and the underlying 
VaR model could be said to be inaccurate. If the null hypothesis is accepted, then the 
model could be said to be accurate. 
As VaRs are calculated at the 99 percent confidence level, the significance level is 
selected as 1 percent. A small significance level indicates that it is less likely to 
accept the null hypothesis and more likely to incorrectly reject an accurate model. 
However, choosing a small significance level also indicates that it is less likely to 
incorrectly accept a false model56. 
The first statistical test that is used to validate the VaR models is the onc-sidcd 
binomial test based on the frequency of tail losses. This approach tests whether the 
Incorrectly rejecting an accurate model is called as Type I error. A Type lI error is the probability of 
accepting a false null hypothesis. 
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observed frequency of losses that exceed VaR is consistent with the frequency of tail 
losses that is predicted by the model. 
At the 1 percent significance level, the model predicts that p= I -a = 0.01, which 
indicates that the null hypothesis is H. :p=0.01. As there are 1,136 observations in 
the sample, the model predicts 11 exceptions (n*p=1136*0.01=11). If the observed 
frequency rate (p) exceeds p (0.01), a one-sided alternative hypothesis is specified 
(H, :p>0.01). The probability value of the test is then the probability under the null 
that x? observedfrequency and this could be calculated as 
1- Pr[x < observedfrequency]. If this probability value is higher than p (0.01), then 
the model is acceptable. 
In order to implement a one-sided binomial test, the number of observations (n), the 
number of exceptions (x) and the significance level (p) are used (the test statistics 
were calculated by using the `binomdist' function in Excel). Table 8.6 demonstrates 
the total number of exceptions and probability values of the VaR models. 
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Table 8.6: Backtesting Results for the One-Sided Binomial Test 
n=1,136; =0.01 Fixed Portfolio Worst-Case Portfolio 
Number of Probability Number of Probability 
VaR Models Except ons Value Excc tions Value 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV) 
1) 2500-day 3 0.9964* 117 0.0000 
2) 1250-day 8 0.7998* 150 0.0000 
3) 750-day 10 0.5831* 166 0.0000 
4) 500-day 12 0.3509* 166 0.0000 
5) 250-day 17 0.0408* 174 0.0000 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV) 
6) A=0.93 19 0.0123* 176 0.0000 
7) A=0.94 19 0.0123 * 174 0.0000 
8) A=0.95 18 0.0229* 173 0.0000 
9) A. = 0.96 16 0.0692* 172 0.0000 
10) A. = 0.97 12 0.3509* 172 0.0000 
11) A= 0.98 11 0.4638* 169 0.0000 
Historical Simulation (HS) 
12) 2500-day 1 0.9999* 81 0.0000 
13) 1250-day 3 0.9964* 98 0.0000 
14) 750-day 7 0.8798* 110 0.0000 
15) 500-day 11 0.4638* 125 0.0000 
16) 250-day 11 0.4638* 118 0.0000 
" indicates that the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent significance level. 
The results of the binomial test are presented below by considering first the fixed 
portfolio and then the worst-case portfolio. 
The Fixed Portfolio: The probability values of all models that calculate VaR 
estimates are higher than the 1 percent probability level. Therefore, all models are 
acceptable. The 'HS 2500-day' model has the highest probability value and the 
`ExpVCV-0.93' and `ExpVCV-0.94' models have the lowest probability value. 
The Worst-Case Portfolio: The probability values of all models that calculate VaR 
estimates for the worst-case portfolio are lower than the 1 percent probability level 
(p). Therefore, all models are rejected. When the 10 percent significance level is 
chosen, all historical simulation models and the 'EqVCV 2500-day' model arc 
accepted. 
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Table 8.7 presents the non-rejection levels for different probability levels when the 
number of observations is equal to 1,136 (n=1,136). The second column of the table 
demonstrates the number of exceptions (x) that could be observed in a sample size of 
1,136 days without rejecting the indicated null hypothesis that p is the correct 
probability. 
Table 8.7: Non-Rejection Level of Exceptions for n= 1136 days 
Null Hypothesis Probability Level Non-Rejection for x 
0.010 X :s 19 
0.025 x< 38 
0.050 x: 5 68 
0.075 x: 5 97 
0.100 x: 5 126 
Table 8.7 demonstrates that when p=0.10 and n=1,136, then the model will not be 
rejected as long as x: 5 126. However, values of x greater than 126 indicate that the 
VaR model is not acceptable as the null hypothesis is rejected. The number of 
exceptions for the variance-covariance models that calculate VaR for the worst-case 
portfolio (excluding the 'EqVCV 2500-day' model) are higher than 126. As a result, 
even at the 10 percent significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected for the 
EqVCV and ExpVCV models excluding the 'EqVCV 2500-day' model, which has 
an exception number of 117. On the other hand, all the historical simulation models 
are accepted when the coverage rate is 0.10. 
The one-sided binomial test results indicate that when the fixed portfolio is 
considered, the models provide accurate VaR estimates at the 1 percent significance 
level. However, when the worst-case portfolio is considered, at the 1 percent 
significance level all VaR models are rejected and only 6 VaR models out of 16 
provide accurate VaR estimates at the 10 percent significance level. 
The one-sided binomial test provides a single cut-off point. On the other hand, the 
two-sided binomial test can be used to test whether the observed number of 
exceptions lies within a confidence interval. This test, which is based on the binomial 
distribution, shows when a systematic underestimation or overestimation of the VaR 
model seems to be taking place. 
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This approach tests the hypothesis that E[I I= p against the alternative E[! ]*p. 
Kupiec (1995) presents the use of the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in order to 
test the null hypothesis and therefore this test is known as the Kupiec test. 
The null hypothesis for the Kupiec test is that the empirically determined probability 
matches the given probability. When the VaR coverage rate, p, is chosen to be 1 
percent, the following null hypothesis is tested; 
A 
Ho: p=p=xln=0.01 (8.6) 
where x represents the number of exceptions and n represents the number of 
backtesting points. Under the null hypothesis thatp is the true probability, the LR test 
statistic has an asymptotic x2 distribution with one degree of freedom (the LR test 
statistics were calculated by following the steps that were described in the sixth 
chapter of this thesis and using the Excel software). 
Table 8.8 demonstrates the LR test statistics for the models that calculate the VaR 
estimates for the fixed and worst-case portfolios. If the test statistic does not exceed 
the relevant critical x2 value, the null hypothesis is accepted. If the test statistic 
exceeds the relevant critical x2 value, the null hypothesis is rejected. The relevant 
critical X2 value for one degree of freedom is 6.6349; therefore the model is 
rejected if LR> 6.6349. 
Table 8.8 also presents the probability values for each model, which is the 
probability of the x2 distribution of the LR test statistic with one degree of freedom 
(the probability values were calculated by using the `chidist' function in Excel). If 
the estimated value of the probability exceeds the significance level, the null 
hypothesis is accepted. If the estimated value of the probability does not exceed the 
significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 8.8: Backtesting Results for the Kuniec Test (Two-Sided Binomial Test) 
n=1,136; =0.01 Fixed Portfolio Worst-Case Portfolio 
VaR Models Number of LR Probability Number of LR Probability 
Failures Statistic Value Failures Statistic Value 
Variance-Covariance (EgVCV) 
1) 2500-day 3 8.8 0.0030 117 344.7 0.0000 
2) 1250-day 8 1.1* 0.2900* 150 514.7 0.0000 
3) 750-day 10 0.2* 0.6789* 166 520.2 0.0000 
4) 500-day 12 0.0* 0.8500* 166 603.4 0.0000 
5) 250-day 17 2.5* 0.1172* 174 649.1 0.0000 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV) 
6) A=0.93 19 4.3* 0.0377* 176 660.7 0.0000 
7) A=0.94 19 4.3* 0.0377* 174 649.1 0.0000 
8) A=0.95 18 3.3* 0.0681 * 173 643.4 0.0000 
-9) A=0.96 16 1.7* 0.1924* 172 637.6 0.0000 
10) A=0.97 12 0.0* 0.8500* 172 637.6 0.0000 
11) A=0.98 11 0.0* 0.9141* 169 620.4 0.0000 
Historical Simulation (HS) 
12) 2500-day 1 16.0 0.0001 81 183.3 0.0000 
13) 1250-day 3 8.8 0.0030 98 255.9 0.0000 
14) 750-day 7 2.0* 0.1617* 110 311.1 0.0000 
15) 500-day 11 0.0* 0.9141* 125 384.2 0.0000 
16) 250-day 11 0.0* 0.9141 * 118 349.6 0.0000 
* indicates that the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent significance level. 
The results of the two-sided binomial test are presented belöw by considering first 
the fixed portfolio and then the worst-case portfolio. 
The Fixed Portfolio: The likelihood ratio test statistics of the 'EqVCV 2500-day', 
'HS 2500-day' and 'HS 1250-day' models are higher than the relevant critical X2 
value for one degree of freedom. Although these models have the lowest exception 
numbers, they are rejected. The results of the two-sided binomial test indicate that 
models other than the 'EqVCV 2500-day', `HS 2500-day' and `u S 1250-day' 
models calculate accurate VaR estimates for the fixed portfolio. 
The - Worst-Case Portfolio: The likelihood ratio test statistics of all models that 
calculate VaR estimates for the worst-case portfolio are higher than the rclcvant 
critical x2 value for one degree of freedom. Therefore, all models arc rejected at 
the one percent significance level. However, when the 10 percent significance lcvcl 
is selected, it is found that the 'EqVCV 2500-day', 111S 1250-day', `IiS 750-day', 
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'HS 500-day' and 'HS 250-day' models are accepted. In addition, the'IIS 2500-day' 
model is also found to be accurate whenp=0.075. 
Table 8.9 presents the confidence intervals for different probability levels when the 
number of observations is equal to 1,136 (n=1,136). 
Table 8.9: Non-Rejection Regions for the Ku icc Test for it = 1136 days 
Null Hypothesis Probability Level Non-Rejection Re ion for x 
0.010 4<x< 21 
0.025 18: 5x: 5 40 
0.050 43: 5x: 5 71 
0.075 70<x< 101 
0.100 98<x<130 
The above table indicates that, when p equals 0.01, the null hypothesis is accepted as 
long as the number of exceptions is in the [3(x)22] confidence interval. The number 
of failures less than 4 indicates that the VaR model is overly conservative and 
overestimates the probability of large losses. If the number of failures is more than 
22, then the VaR model underestimates the probability of large losses. For the fixed 
portfolio, the number of exceptions ranges from 1 to 11 and there are only three 
models that have less than 4 exceptions. These are; the `HS 2500-day', `HS 1250- 
day' and 'EqVCV 2500-day' models which have 1,3 and 3 exceptions, respectively. 
These models are rejected as they are overly conservative and overestimate the 
probability of large losses. 
When p equals 0.10, then the null hypothesis is accepted as long as the number of 
exceptions is in the 
[97(x)131] confidence interval. The number of failures less than 
97 indicates that the VaR model is overly conservative and overestimates the 
probability of large losses. If the number of failures is more than 131, then the VaR 
model underestimates the probability of large losses. For the worst-case portfolio, the 
number of exceptions ranges from 81 to 176 and at the 10 percent significance level, 
there are five models (EqVCV 2500-day, HS 1250-day, I IS 750-day, IiS 500-day 
and HS 250-day) that the confidence interval includes the number predicted by the 
model. The 'HS 2500-day' model has 81 exceptions and overestimates the risk 
measure at the 10 percent significance level. However, the 
[70(x)101 confidence 
234 
interval includes the number predicted by the `HS 2500-day' model, which indicates 
that the model is acceptable at the 7.5 percent level. The ExpVCV and EqVCV 
models other than the 'EqVCV 2500-day' model are found to be inaccurate and 
therefore it could be concluded that these models underestimate the risk measures. 
The two-sided binomial approach provides better results than the one-sided binomial 
test as the latter only provides a cut-off point and does not provide any information 
whether a risk model overestimates the risk measure or not. However, the drawback 
of both approaches is that they implicitly assume that the exceptions are independent 
of each other and therefore they do not take into account any information about the 
temporal pattern of exceptions. In order to deal with this problem, Christofferson 
(1998) suggests the conditional backtesting procedure. 
The Christoffersen approach separates out the particular null hypothesis that the 
model has the correct frequency of independently distributed exceptions into two 
components. These are the coverage and independence hypotheses. Then, these two 
hypotheses and a joint conditional coverage hypothesis are tested separately. 
The coverage hypothesis, which implies that the model generates the correct 
frequency of exceptions, is the same hypothesis that is provided by the two-sided 
binomial test. Therefore, under the null hypothesis that p is the true probability, the 
LRc test statistic has an asymptotic x2 distribution with one degree of freedom. 
The independence hypothesis implies that the exceptions are independent. In order to 
calculate the likelihood ratio test statistic (LR. ) of the independence hypothesis, 
after transforming the hit function sequence into a duration series, the number of 
days for the following processes is determined. 
n.: The number of days that date t and date t+1 are not exceptions. 
no, : The number of days that date t is not an exception and date 1+1 is an exception. 
n, o : The number of 
days that date t is an exception and date t+1 is not an exception. 
n : The number of days that date t and date t+1 are exceptions. 
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The LRind test statistic has also an asymptotic x2 distribution with one degrcc of 
freedom. 
The final step of the Christoffersen approach is to combine the above tests for 
unconditional coverage and independence to form a combined test of conditional 
coverage. The test statistic of the combined hypothesis is; 
LRc, = LRuc + LRmd (8.7) 
which has an asymptotic x2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. 
The results for the conditional coverage test are shown in Tables 8.10 and 8.11 (the 
likelihood ratios presented in these tables were calculated by following the stcps that 
were described in the sixth chapter of this thesis and using the Excel software). 
Table 8.10: Backtesting Results for the Conditional Coverage Test (The Fixed Portfolio) 
n=1 136, p=0.01 Independence Test Conditional Test 
VaR Models 
LRwc noo no, nto flil LRuwi Probability LRa Probability 
Statistic Statistic Value Statistic Value 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV) 
1) 2500-day 8.8 1129 3 3 0 0.0* 0.8997' 8.8' 0.0122' 
2) 1250-day 1.1* 1119 8 8 0 0.1* 0.7361' 1.2' 0.5398' 
3) 750-day 0.2* 1115 10 10 0 02' 0.6733' 0.3' 0.8398' 
4) 500-day 0.0* 1111 12 12 0 0.3* 0.6126' 0.3' 0.8641" 
5) 250-day 2.5* 1101 17 17 0 0.5' 0.4721 3.0' 0.2264' 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV) 
6) A=0.93 4.3* 1097 19 19 0 0.6' 0.4212' 5.0' 0.0836' 
7) a=0.94 4.3* 1097 19 19 0 0.6' 0.4212' 5.0* 0.0836' 
8) A=0.95 3.3* 1099 18 18 0 0.6' 0.4463' 3.9' 0.1416' 
9) A=0.96 1.7* 1103 16 16 0 0.5' 0.4988' 2.2' 0.3402' 
10) A= 0.97 0.00 1111 12 12 0 0.3' 0.61260 0.3' 0.8641' 
11) A=0.98 0.00 1113 11 11 0 02" 0.6426' 0.2' 0.8927' 
Historical Simulation (HS) 
12) 2500-day 16.0 1133 1 1 0 0.0' 0.9665' 16.0 0.0003 
13) 1250-day 8.8 1129 3 3 0 0.0' 0.8997' 8.8' 0.0122" 
14) 750-day 2.0' 1121 7 7 0 0.1* 0.7682' 2.0' 0.3597" 
15) 500-day 0.00 1113 11 11 0 0.2' 0.6426' 0.2' 0.8927" 
16) 250-day 0.0' 1113 11 11 0 02' 0.6426' 0.2' 0.8927' 
* indicates that the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent significance level. 
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Tah1n R_11 RarktPetina Rnenlte for thn Cnntutinnni Cnvor! ine Test (The Worst-Case Portfolio) 
n=1136, =0.01 Independence Test Conditional Test 
VaR Models 
LRyc noo not nto ntt Mind Probability LRM Probability 
Statistic Value Statistic Value 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV) 
1) 2500-day 344.7 909 109 109 8 1.9* 0.1701 * 346.6 0.0000 
2) 1250-day 514.7 847 138 138 12 4.6* 0.0321 * 519.3 0.0000 
3) 750-day 520.2 818 151 151 15 5.4* 0.0201 * 608.8 0.0000 
4) 500-day 603.4 820 149 149 17 3.2* 0.0719* 606.7 0.0000 
5) 250-day 649.1 807 154 154 20 2.5* 0.1152* 651.6 0.0000 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV) 
6) A=0.93 660.7 802 157 157 19 3.8* 0.0508* 664.5 0.0000 
7) A=0.94 649.1 805 156 156 18 4.3* 0.0385* 653.4 0.0000 
8) A=0.95 643.4 806 156 156 17 5.1* 0.0240* 648.5 0.0000 
9) A=0.96 637.6 808 155 155 17 4.8* 0.0284* 642.4 0.0000 
10) A=0.97 637.6 809 154 154 18 3.8* 0.0526* 641.4 0.0000 
11) A=0.98 620.4 813 153 153 16 5.1* 0.0242* 625.5 0.0000 
Historical Simulation (HS) 
12) 2500-day 183.3 977 77 77 4 0.7* 0.4020* 184.1 0.0000 
13) 1250-day 255.9 945 92 92 6 0.9* 0.3327* 256.9 0.0000 
14) 750-day 311.1 922 103 103 7 1.7* 0.1905* 312.8 0.0000 
15) 500-day 384.2 892 118 118 7 4.9* 0.0265* 389.1 0.0000 
16) 250-day 349.6 910 107 107 11 0.2* 0.6820* 349.7 0.0000 
* indicates that the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent significance level. 
If the likelihood ratio test statistics do not exceed the relevant critical x2 value, the 
null hypothesis is accepted. If the likelihood ratio test statistics exceed the relevant 
critical x2 value, the null hypothesis is rejected. The critical values for the 
likelihood ratio statistics are shown in Table 8.12. The relevant critical x2 value for 
one degree of freedom is 6.6349; therefore the model is rejected if LRw > 6.6349. 
The relevant critical z2 value for two degrees of freedom is 9.2104; therefore the 
model is rejected if LR,, > 9.2104.57 
Table 8.12: The Critical Values for the Lk,, LR,,, d and LR,, Statistics 
Confidence Level (c) 99 % 95 % 90 % 
Asymptotic x2 (1) (LRu, and LI. d) 
6.6349 3.8415 2.7055 
Asymptotic %2 (2) (L&) 9.2104 5.9915 4.6052 
57 Tables 8.10 and 8.11 also present the probability values of the LRw and LR,, test statistics. 
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The results of the conditional coverage test are presented below by considering first 
the fixed portfolio and then the worst-case portfolio. 
The Fixed Portfolio: For the independence test, the likelihood ratio test statistics of 
the VaR models are lower than the relevant critical x2 value for one degree of 
freedom. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent significance 
level, which indicates that the exceptions are independent. For the conditional 
coverage test, the likelihood ratio test statistics of the VaR models are also lower 
than the relevant critical x2 value for two degrees of freedom, except for the `11S 
250-day' model, which has only one exception. The results of the conditional 
coverage test indicate that models other than the 'HS 2500-day' model provide 
accurate VaR estimates for the fixed portfolio. On the other hand, the results of the 
coverage hypothesis demonstrate that the 'HS 2500-day' model overestimates risk 
measures. 
The Worst-Case Portfolio: For the independence test, the likelihood ratio test 
statistics of the VaR models are lower than the relevant. critical z2 value for one 
degree of freedom. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1 percent 
significance level, which indicates that the exceptions are independent. For the 
conditional coverage test, the likelihood ratio test statistics of the VaR models are 
higher than the relevant critical x2 value for two degrees of freedom, which 
indicates that the models are rejected. Therefore, it could be concluded that when 
VaRs are calculated for the worst-case portfolio, all VaR methodologies provide 
inaccurate estimates. 
The results suggest that concerning the independence hypothesis, the null hypothesis 
is accepted for each model that calculates VaR either for the fixed portfolio or for the 
worst-case portfolio. This indicates that exceptions are independent. On the other 
hand, the results concerning the joint hypothesis, i. e. the conditional coverage 
hypothesis, provide confusing conclusions. While in general VaR models arc found 
to provide accurate estimates for. the fixed portfolio, the same VaR models provide 
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inaccurate estimates when VaR is calculated for the worst-case portfolio that 
generates a loss on each trading day. 
8.7.3 The Ranking Tests 
As the statistical backtests do not allow the users to rank the VaR models, the tests 
applied in the previous section are supplemented by the ranking tests proposed by 
Lopez (1998) and Blanco and Ihle (1999). Table 8.13 demonstrates the ranking test 
values of the Lopez and the Blanco-Ihle approaches. 
The first column of the table demonstrates the VaR models. The second and fifth 
columns demonstrate the number of exceptions. The test results of the Lopez 
binomial approach for the fixed and worst-case portfolios are shown in the third and 
sixth columns, respectively. The results are derived from the loss function implied by 
the binomial method which uses the same information that is used in the Kupiec test; 
i. e. the number of exceptions. After setting up the loss function, a score function 
(quadratic probability function), that takes the loss function and benchmark as its 
inputs, is established to rank the VaR models. Similar to the tests that are carried out 
in the statistical backtests, a1 percent significance level is selected as the benchmark 
for the loss function. Then, for each VaR model the quadratic probability function is 
calculated, which takes a value in the range [0,2] and a lower QPS value indicates a 
better model. 
The fourth and seventh columns demonstrate the test results of the Blanco-Ihle 
approach for the fixed and worst-case portfolios, respectively. The loss function 
proposed by Blanco and Ihle gives each exception a weight equal to the difference 
between the tail loss and the VaR estimate, divided by the VaR estimate. Then, a 
weighted average indicator that incorporates both the size and the frequency of the 
exceptions is established. This indicator reflects the size loss function of the Blanco 
and Ilile approach and the frequency loss function of the Lopez approach. In this 
backtesting, equal weights are given to each function (A = 0.50). Finally, different 
VaR models are evaluated by comparing the indicators and the indicator that shows a 
lower score demonstrates a more accurate model. 
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Tahlp Si _I; - 
Rarktectino Recultc for the Rankin" Tests 
n=1136, p=0.01, A=0.50 Fixed Portfolio Worst-Case Portfolio 
Number of Lopez - Blanco Number of Lopez - Blanco 
VaR Models Exceptions Binomial & Ihle Exceptions Binomial & lhlc 
Variance-Covariance (EqVCV) 
1) 2500-day 3 0.0054 1.62 117 0.2021 88.12 
2) 1250-day 8 0.0140 4.50 150 0.2590 112.56 
3) 750-day 10 0.0175 5.74 166 0.2866 124.79 
4) 500-day 12 0.0209 6.83 166 0.2866 125.72 
5) 250-day 17 0.0295 10.24 174 0.3004 133.92 
Variance-Covariance (ExpVCV) 
6) A=0.93 19 0.0330 11.75 176 0.3039 137.05 
7) A=0.94 19 0.0330 11.55 174 0.3004 134.68 
8) A=0.95 18 0.0313 10.85 173 0.2987 132.91 
9) A=0.96 16 0.0278 9.69 172 0.2970 131.29 
10) A= 0.97 12 0.0209 7.58 172 0.2970 130.32 
11) A=0.98 11 0.0192 7.02 169 0.2918 128.26 
Historical Simulation (HS) 
12) 2500-day 1 0.0019 0.50 81 0.1400 58.71 
13) 1250-day 3 0.0054 1.81 98 0.1693 72.17 
14) 750-day 7 0.0123 4.08 110 0.1900 81.02 
15) 500-day 11 0.0192 6.15 125 0.2159 91.19 
16) 250-day 11 0.0192 6.32 118 0.2038 85.94 
In Table 8.13, the lower scores indicate a better model. As the historical simulation 
models are found to provide lower test values in general, it could be concluded that 
these models are better than the variance-covariance methodologies. On the other 
hand, the ExpVCV methodologies are found to be the worst models as their ranking 
test values- are higher in general. 
By using the ranking test values of the Lopez and the Blanco-Ihle approaches, 
alternative models are compared and ranked from the best to the worst. The ranking 
of the VaR models are shown in Table 8.14. 
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Table 8.14: Ranking of the VaR Models 
Fixed Portfolio Worst-Case Portfolio 
Rank Lopez Blanco & Ihlc Lopez Blanco & llile 
1 HS 2500-day uIS 2500-day IIS 2500-day I IS 2500-day 
2 EqVCV 2500-day EqVCV 2500-day ItS 1250-day I IS 1250-day 
3 HS 1250-day HS 1250-day IIS 750-day I IS 750-day 
4 HS 750-day HS 750-day EqVCV 2500-day I IS 250-day 
5 EqVCV 1250-day EqVCV 1250-day HS 250-day EqVCV 2500-day 
6 EqVCV 750-day EqVCV 750-day IIS 500-day IIS 500-day 
7 ExpVCV A=0.98 HS 500-day EqVCV 1250-day EqVCV 1250-day 
8 HS 500-day HS 250-day EqVCV 750-day EqVCV 750-day 
9 HS 250-day EqVCV 500-day EqVCV 500-day EqVCV 500-day 
10 EqVCV 500-day ExpVCV A=0.98 ExpVCV A=0.98 ExpVCV A=0.98 
11 ExpVCV A=0.97 ExpVCV A=0.97 ExpVCV A=0.96 ExpVCV A=0.97 
12 ExpVCV A=0.96 ExpVCV A=0.96 ExpVCV A= 0.97 ExpVCV A=0.96 
13 EqVCV 250-day EqVCV 250-day ExpVCV A=0.95 ExpVCV A=0.95 
14 ExpVCV A=0.95 ExpVCV A=0.95 EqVCV 250-day EqVCV 250-day 
15 ExpVCV A=0.93 ExpVCV A=0.94 ExpVCV A=0.94 ExpVCV A=0.94 
16 ExpVCV A=0.94 ExpVCV A=0.93 ExpVCV A= 0.93 ExpVCV A=0.93 
The ranking tests indicate that the VaR estimates that are calculated by the historical 
simulation approach based on 10 years of data provides the best VaR estimates for 
both portfolios. These results make the historical simulation methodology that uses 
longer datasets an attractive and appropriate choice for the market risk measurement 
of the foreign exchange portfolios. 
On the other hand, the results of the comparison of VaR models point out that a VaR 
model that relies upon the ExpVCV methodology is highly inappropriate for the 
foreign exchange portfolios. 
As a conclusion, the backtesting results indicate that in order to obtain accurate VaR 
estimates, the characteristics and risk nature of the port folio are important issucs that 
should be considered while determining the VaR methodology. Risk practitioners 
and regulators, who attempt to evaluate a model through backtesting, should backtest 
the model by carrying out alternative portfolios. Otherwise, they should not rely on 
the accuracy of the models. 
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8.8 Conclusions 
As the VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR methodology, the most difficult 
decision that risk managers make with regard to VaR is to choose an appropriate 
model. Despite the variation of the outcomes, under the market risk capital 
regulations, banks could either choose the standardised approach or employ a VaR 
model to calculate the required capital. The market risk capital regulations do not 
prescribe any specific methodology of VaR but sets some quantitative standards, 
such as a 99 percent confidence level, a ten-day holding period, and at least 250 days 
of historical data. However, the reliance on allowing financial institutions' to 
determine the VaR methodology on which they base their required capital to cover 
market risk could create an incentive for them to choose a methodology that provides 
less required capital amounts. Furthermore, given the use of VaR in the financial 
institutions' risk management and in-the regulatory framework, it is a critical issue to 
assess the accuracy of VaR models. 
In this chapter, the impact of choosing different approaches to calculate the required 
capital was analysed. In addition, the accuracy of VaR models was evaluated by 
applying backtesting methodologies. These methodologies test how well the VaR 
forecasts would have-performed in the past by comparing the VaR estimates with 
realised trading results. In this final section, the empirical results are explained. First, 
the results concerning the comparison of the required capital amounts, second, the 
results of the backtests are presented. 
In this study, simulations were carried out to calculate the required market risk 
capitals for a `fixed' and a `worst-case' portfolio. The simulations cover the period 
from January 1996 to June 2000. The required capital charges were calculated by 
applying the standardised and 16 VaR models. These VaR models arc; 5 equally 
weighted variance-covariance models (2500-day, 1250-day, 750-day, 500-day, and 
250-day), 6 exponentially weighted variance-covariance models (A = 0.93, 
A=0.94, A=0.95, A=0.96, A=0.97, A=0.98) and 5 historical simulation 
models (2500-day, 1250-day, 750-day, 500-day, and 250-day). The capital charges 
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were calculated for 1,137 days from 2 January 1996 to 30 June 2000. The results of 
these simulations are explained below. 
1) The analysis of risk factors, which are currencies in this study, indicates 
that the returns are not normally distributed, as they display the kurtosis, 
which is a common feature of the financial data. The Jarque-Beta tests of 
each distribution also reject the null hypothesis that variables arc 
normally distributed. However, a variance-covariance methodology that 
assumes normality is widely used among financial institutions although 
this approach is not suitable for financial assets because of fat-tailness. 
2) The findings of this study raise some questions concerning the variability 
of the capital requirement across banks as the comparison of different 
techniques for calculating VaR provides that each methodology produces 
different measures. Therefore, relying on these models might mislead 
regulators, as the market risk capital regulations do not provide a `level 
playing field'. 
3) The major observations for this simulation are; (i) xvhile the standardised 
approaches provide smaller capital charges, the historical simulation 
methodologies provide higher capital charges, (ii) in particular, the `liS 
2500-day' model produces the highest average required capital amount, 
(iii) together with the 'EqVCV 250-day' model, the ExpVCV models 
produce the lowest average required capital amounts among all the VaR 
models, (iv) together with the ExpVCV models, the `u1S 2500-day' 
model also produces higher standard deviations (v) compared with the 
case of the fixed portfolio, the models produce relatively lower required 
capital amounts in the case of the worst-case portfolio, due to the 
diversification impact of investment. 
The VaR models are currently in use in the industrialised countries. In addition, the 
emerging countries have plans to implement these types of models in their risk-bascd 
capital regulations frameworks. However, the findings of this study present a 
warning to those who use or intend to use them. The empirical findings demand a 
crucial attention as the capital charges for the market risk computations indicate that 
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the market risk capital regulations could provide capital savings for some banks. The 
disadvantage of the market risk capital regulations is that these regulations cannot 
ensure a `level playing field' for financial institutions in order to eliminate the 
competitive inequalities. Therefore, giving an option to banks to determine the VaR 
methodology could create a moral hazard problem as banks may choose an 
inaccurate model that provides less required capital amounts. 
The empirical results concerning these simulations indicate that banks with the same 
risk could have different capital amounts depending only on the selected 
methodology for calculating the required market risk capital. Regulators should also 
take into consideration this crucial issue while allowing banks to use a specific 
model. As a result, when accepting a bank's application concerning the methodology 
to calculate the market risk capital requirement, bank regulators should compare the 
structure of a bank's portfolio with the structure of the peer banks' portfolios and 
only permit the use of the same methodologies for similar portfolios. Furthermore, 
because the returns of exchange rates -are not normally 
distributed, applying the 
variance-covariance methodology that assumes a normal distribution could-result in 
biased estimates of VaR. Therefore, regulators should be cautious while allowing 
banks to use their own internal VaR models. 
This chapter also provides the results of backtesting concerning the performances of 
16 VaR models. These are, the regulatory back-testing required by the Basic 
Committee amendment, the statistical tests, and the ranking tests. The results of the 
backtesting analysis are presented below. 
1) The first method to measure the model performance is the regulatory 
backtesting. This is a simple `count the number of exceptions' method 
and a 99 percent confidence level is considered, which implies that there 
is a1 percent chance that the VaR estimates underestimate respective 
portfolio losses. The results of the regulatory backtesting indicate that in 
general the VaR models perform reasonably well when VaR is calculated 
for the fixed portfolio. 
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2) However, the regulatory backtesting results indicate that when VaR is 
calculated for the worst-case portfolio, the models do not provide 
accurate results. For the equally weighted variance-covariance 
methodology, the regulatory backtesting indicates that the percentage of 
exceptions is between 10 and 15. For the exponentially weighted 
variance-covariance methodology, the regulatory backtesting indicates 
that the percentage of exceptions is between 15 and 16. Although the 
historical simulation methodology performs better than the parametric 
models, the percentage of exceptions for the historical simulation models 
is still high compared with the results of the fixed portfolio (the 
percentage of exceptions for the historical simulation models is between 
7 and 10). 
3) In particular, the turmoil years, such as 1997 when the Southeast Asia 
crisis occurred and 1998 when the Russian crisis occurred, are found to 
provide a relatively higher number of exceptions in the regulatory 
backtesting analysis. 
4) The statistical tests that were applied include the one-sided binomial test, 
the two-sided binomial test, and the Christoffersen test. These tests are 
based on a hypothetical testing framework and were used to test the null 
hypothesis that the VaR estimates are accurate at the 1 percent 
significance level. The results of these tests indicate that, in general 
models that calculate VaR for the fixed portfolio provide accurate risk 
measures. However, when VaR is calculated for the worst-case portfolio, 
the statistical backtests offer disappointing results as these models arc 
found to provide inaccurate VaR estimates. As a result, it could be 
concluded that while some VaR models overestimate the risk measure 
and accordingly the required capital amount for a particular portfolio, the 
same VaR models might underestimate the risk measure when VaR is 
calculated for another portfolio. Therefore, risk practitioners and in 
particular regulators should be very cautious when evaluating backtesting 
results. 
5) Finally, the VaR models were compared with each other by using two 
ranking tests, namely the Lopez test and the Blanco-Ihle test. These tests 
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are forecast evaluation methods that give each model a score in terms of 
the frequency and size loss functions. The advantage of these approaches 
is that they are not statistical tests of model accuracy and therefore they 
do not suffer from the low power of statistical tests. In addition, these 
tests could be applied for the relatively small datascts. These ranking 
tests provide additional information on the accuracy of models and the 
results indicate that the `HS 2500-day' model is superior compared with 
other models. However, because the ranking tests are not statistical tests, 
this result does not indicate whether the performances of other models 
are significantly worse or not. 
The results of this study indicate that a VaR model that provides accurate estimates 
for a specific portfolio could fail when the portfolio changes. Therefore, the users of 
VaR and regulators should carefully consider the characteristics and risk nature of a 
portfolio before applying a model to obtain accurate VaR estimates. Risk 
practitioners or regulators should backtest. a VaR model with alternative portfolios, 
as additional backtesting gives more information on model accuracy than would 
otherwise be available. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
Banks have a unique role in the well-being of an economy. This role makes them one of 
the most heavily regulated and supervised industries. Among bank prudential 
regulations, capital adequacy is a major supervisory concern. In order to strengthen the 
soundness and stability of banking systems, regulators require banks to hold adequate 
capital. In 1988, the Basle Committee recommended member countries to implement the 
risk-based capital regulations. The risk-based capital regulations require banks to hold a 
certain amount of capital depending on the riskiness of their portfolios. While credit risk 
was the only risk that was covered by the original Basle Accord, since 1998 banks have 
also been required to assign capital for their market risk. 
In this study, the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank capital levels and 
derivative activities was investigated. In addition, this study also analysed the impact of 
using different approaches in calculating the required market risk capital, as well as the 
accuracy of VaR models that are allowed to be used within the framework of the market 
risk capital regulations. The objective of this final chapter is to explain the strategic 
conclusions of the research. In the second section, the key findings of the research are 
emphasised. The third section provides the policy implications of the research. The last 
section provides directions for further research. 
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9.2 Key Findings of the Research 
Among the financial safety nets that policy-makers rely on to ensure the stability of a 
banking system, deposit insurance and capital adequacy have always played a prominent 
role. Although policy-makers generally consider that deposit insurance is necessary to 
protect small depositors and to prevent bank runs, it could also cause a moral hazard 
problem. Therefore, it is generally accepted that policy-makers implement capital 
adequacy regulations to overcome the moral hazard problems created by deposit 
insurance. As a result, bank regulators place an emphasis on the capital adequacy of 
banks and influence bank capital by setting capital adequacy regulations to ensure that 
banks hold sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. However, the impact of these 
regulations is not clear. 
On the other hand, the second half of the 1990s will be remembered in the finance 
history as the period that Value at Risk (VaR) has been developed. Indeed, VaR has 
become the common standard for the measurement of market-risk in a very short time 
period. This development attracted the attention of not only practitioners, but also 
regulators and academics as well. Following the developments in banks' risk 
management practices, VaR was implemented in the risk-based capital regulatory 
framework. Since 1998, banks have been required to set aside capital to cover their 
market risk, either by employing a standardised approach or by using the internal VaR 
models. 
Due to the ongoing debate concerning the effects of capital adequacy regulations, a key 
question is to find out the impact of the market risk capital regulations. In order to 
analyse the impact of these capital regulations on bank activities, an econometric 
analysis was carried out in this thesis. 
The aim of this analysis is to empirically analyse the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations on bank capital levels and derivative activities. The implementation of these 
regulations can influence banks either by increasing their capital or by decreasing their 
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trading activities and in particular trading derivatives. Therefore, the analysis provided 
in this chapter investigated the impact of the market risk capital regulations on the 
changes of bank capital levels and derivative activities. 
The changes in capital and derivatives usage ratios were modelled by using a partial 
adjustment framework. The study focused on the large US BIICs as they are more 
involved in-trading activities and therefore subject to the market risk capital regulations. 
Using quarterly data from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 1999 (17 
observations), the estimates were obtained by the panel data analysis. There are two 
reasons that lie behind the choice of US banks for our analysis. First, the US banks arc 
leading financial institutions dominating derivative markets, and second, it is possible to 
obtain detailed information on them. 
Four different capital indicators were used to calculate the changes in bank capital 
levels. As well as the three capital ratios that are used by the US regulators to measure 
bank capital adequacy (the total risk-based capital ratio, the tier-1 risk-based capital ratio 
and the leverage ratio), the equity capital ratio, which is- extensively- employed in the 
banking and finance literature, was also used as a dependent variable in the analysis. In 
order to proxy bank derivative-activities, two dependent variables were used; first, the 
ratio of total of positive and negative fair value of trading derivatives to total assets, and 
second, the ratio of notional gross amount of trading derivatives to total assets. 
In the empirical analysis, six hypotheses were tested. The regulatory cost hypothesis 
implies that in order to be effective, capital regulations should increase the capital levels 
of banks, as the regulatory view considers capital as a cushion that absorbs unexpected 
losses. The second hypothesis that was tested in the study is the capital avoidance 
hypothesis, which indicates that bank derivative activities increase because of the lack of 
capital standards. The main results concerning the regulatory cost and capital avoidance 
hypotheses indicate that while the implementation of the market risk capital regulations 
has a significant and positive impact on the US BHCs' risk-based capital ratios, there is 
no significant impact on derivative activities. 
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The study also investigated whether there is a relationship between i) bank capital and 
asset size, ii) derivative activities and asset size. These questions were included in the 
- analysis to test the economies of scale hypothesis. The economies of scale hypothesis 
suggests that large banks prefer to have lower capital ratios due to the `too-big-to-fail' 
doctrine and large banks are involved more in derivative activities due to the 
specialisation that these instruments require. The fourth hypothesis that was tested in the 
study is the moral hazard hypothesis. According to the moral hazard hypothesis, banks 
with low capital invest more in risky portfolios and are involved more in derivative 
activities. The regulatory discipline hypothesis is the fifth hypothesis that was tested in 
the study. This hypothesis implies that, because of the bank capital regulations in place, 
banks with a greater level of capital are more likely to participate in derivative markets. 
The final hypothesis that was tested in the empirical study is the market discipline 
hypothesis, which implies that external monitoring and pricing prevent banks from 
riskier activities. This hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the indicators 
of credibility and derivative activities. 
Empirical results failed to support the moral hazard, regulatory discipline, and market 
discipline hypotheses. However, the results support the economies of scale hypothesis, 
as large banks were found to be more involved in derivative activities. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that large banks participate actively in derivative markets as they have the 
specialised management skills. 
The second analysis that was investigated in this study is the evaluation of the 
standardised and the internal models approaches of the market risk capital regulations. 
Although bank regulators integrated the VaR models in the framework of capital 
adequacy regulations, these models have limitations and pitfalls. In addition, there is still 
no industry consensus on the methodology for calculating VaR. 
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In order to evaluate these approaches, firstly, a documentary analysis was conducted to 
demonstrate the variations on bank VaR models. Secondly, simulations were carried out 
to compare the different approaches and to evaluate the accuracy of VaR models. 
Although the market risk capital regulations prescribe some quantitative standards, such 
as a 99 percent confidence level, a ten-day holding period and at least one-year of 
historical data, these regulations do not set any specific type of VaR model. Ilowever, 
even when the same parameters are used, applying different methodologies could create 
different outcomes. In order to demonstrate the variations among VaR methodologies of 
banks, a documentary analysis was conducted. In this analysis, the disclosure practices 
of 25 international banks were compared. The sample was chosen from a search of 
banks that report market risk information in their annual reports. 
The results of this analysis indicate that in recent years financial institutions were 
tending to give out more detailed VaR information in their annual reports. On the other 
hand, the VaR systems that financial institutions use differ widely across institutions. 
According to the survey results, there are two major VaR methodologies that are in use 
by banks in their market risk management systems. These are; the variance-covariannce 
and historical simulation methodologies. In addition, there are differences in the 
underlying -assumptions, such as the holding period, confidence interval, or historical 
observation period. 
These results of the documentary analysis indicate that, there is no industry consensus 
on the methodology for calculating VaR and the assumptions that are used to calculate 
VaR estimates vary considerably among financial institutions. Therefore, it is very 
difficult for financial market participants to make comparisons across institutions and to 
evaluate the risk-taking of individual banks by looking at single VaR values. 
After demonstrating the variations of VaR models on banks, the impact of using 
different approaches while calculating the required market risk capital and the accuracy 
of VaR models that are allowed to be used within the framework of the market risk 
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capital regulations were evaluated. In order to calculate the required capital amount, 
simulations were conducted and different VaR models were evaluated by applying 
backtesting methodologies. 
In these simulations, the required market risk capitals were calculated for a `fixed' and a 
`worst-case' portfolio. The simulations cover the period from January 1996 to June 
2000. The required capital charges were calculated by applying the standardised and 16 
VaR models. These VaR models are; 5 equally weighted variance-covariance models 
(2500-day, 1250-day, 750-day, 500-day, and 250-day), 6 exponentially weighted 
variance-covariance models (A = 0.93, A=0.94, A=0.95, A=0.96, A=0.97, 
A= 0.98) and 5 historical simulation models (2500-day; 1250-day, 750-day, 500-day, 
and 250-day). The capital charges were calculated for 1,137 days from 2 January 1996 
to 30 June 2000. 
The major observations for these simulations are: 
1) While the standardised approaches provide smaller capital charges, the 
historical simulation methodologies provide higher capital charges, 
2), - The 'historical simulation model that uses 2,500 -days of historical data 
produces the highest required capital amount, 
3) Together with the equally weighted variance-covariance model that uses 250 
days of historical data, the exponentially weighted variance-covariance 
models produce the lowest average required capital amounts, 
4) Compared with the case of the fixed portfolio, the models produce relatively 
lower required capital amounts in the case of the worst-case portfolio, due to 
the diversification impact of investment. 
This analysis also provides the results of backtesting concerning the performances of 16 
VaR models. The backtesting methodologies that were applied are; the regulatory 
backtesting required by the Basle Committee amendment, the statistical tests, and the 
ranking tests. The major observations for backtesting are: 
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1) The results of the regulatory backtesting indicate that in general the VaR models 
perform reasonably well when VaR is calculated for the fixed portfolio. 
However, when VaR is calculated for the worst-case portfolio, the models do not 
provide accurate results. Although the historical simulation methodology 
performs better than-the parametric models, the percentages of exceptions for the 
historical simulation models are still high compared with the results of the fixed 
portfolio. 
2) In particular, the turmoil years, such as 1997, when the Southeast Asia crisis 
occurred and 1998, when the Russian crisis occurred, were found to provide a 
relatively higher number of exceptions in the regulatory backtesting analysis. 
3) The results of the statistical tests (the one-sided binomial test, the two-sided 
binomial test, and the Christoffersen test) indicate that, in general models that 
calculate VaR estimates for the fixed portfolio provide accurate risk measures. 
However, when VaR is calculated for the worst-case portfolio, the statistical 
backtests offer disappointing results as these models were found to provide 
inaccurate VaR estimates. It could be concluded that while some VaR models 
overestimate the risk measure and accordingly the required capital amount for a 
particular portfolio, the same VaR models might underestimate the risk measure 
when VaR is calculated for another portfolio. 
4) The VaR models were compared by using two ranking tests (the Lopez test and 
the Blanco-Ihle test). These ranking tests provide additional information on the 
accuracy of models and the results indicate that the historical simulation model 
that uses 2,500 days of historical data is superior compared with other models. 
These results indicate that the historical simulation model that uses 2,500 days of 
historical data not only produces the highest average required capital amount but 
also provides accurate VaR estimates. 
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9.3 The Implications of the Research 
This thesis provides a substantial contribution to knowledge and understanding in the 
area of financial regulation as it answers the question of `What impact do capital 
requirements have? ' By providing an answer to this vital question, this research extends 
the knowledge on bank capital regulation. 
Understanding the impact of the market risk capital regulations on bank activities is not 
only important to bank regulators who have already implemented these regulations but 
also important to those who are planning to implement them. One of the most important 
tasks of this study is to determine whether the market risk capital regulations have 
caused banks to change their decisions concerning capital levels and derivative 
activities. The-results suggest that banks that are subject to the market risk capital 
regulations should be prepared to increase their capital levels as it was found that there is 
a significant positive relationship between capital regulations and bank capital levels. If 
banks do not have any intention to increase their capital, they should consider revising 
their financial risk-taking. Furthermore, regulators should also consider the potential 
impact of implementing bank regulations on bank capital levels. 
On the other hand, implementing a modem risk measurement technique such as VaR 
into the regulatory framework is a crucial improvement. However, regulators and users 
should fully understand the limitations of VaR: The main problem concerning the use of 
VaR models is that there is no best VaR estimation method and the VaR estimates arc 
dependent upon the VaR methodology, parameters, and data assumptions. On the other 
hand, the use of these models differs widely across financial institutions. Therefore, one 
of the most difficult decisions that risk practitioners face with regard to VaR is to choose 
an appropriate model. 
The empirical results concerning the simulations indicate that banks with the same risk 
could have different required capital amounts depending only on the selected 
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methodology. Regulators should also take into consideration this crucial issue while 
allowing banks to use a specific model. As a result, when accepting a bank's application 
concerning. the methodology to calculate the market risk capital requirements, bank 
regulators should compare the structure of the bank's portfolio with the structure of the 
peer banks' portfolios, and permit the use of the same methodologies for similar 
portfolios. 
On the other hand, the reliance on allowing financial institutions to choosc the VaR 
methodology could generate an incentive for them to prefer a methodology that 
calculates the minimum capital requirement. As the results of this research indicate, the 
VaR estimates are dependent upon the VaR methodology. In addition, the models that 
provide accurate VaR estimates also provide higher required capital amounts. Therefore; 
- The market risk capital regulations do not provide a `level playing Gcld' for 
banks that are subject to these regulations. 
- Giving an option to banks to determine the VaR methodology could create a 
moral hazard problem as banks may choose an inaccurate model that 
provides less required capital amounts. 
The practical application of this research is that, bank regulators should be very careful 
in allowing banks to use either a standardised or internal models approach in calculating 
the required capital amount to cover their market risk. Bank regulators should consider 
bank portfolios carefully and allow similar methodologies for banks that have similar 
portfolios. Otherwise, using different approaches could provide capital savings for some 
banks. As each methodology produces different estimates of VaR, regulators should take 
the necessary measures to ensure that they provide a `level playing field' for banks. An 
alternative is implementing more detailed rules concerning the usage of VaR. This issue 
is crucial as it is necessary to reduce competitive imbalances, which are caused by the 
differences in regulatory rules. 
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In addition, the results of this study indicate that a VaR model that provides accurate 
estimates for a specific portfolio could fail when the portfolio composition changes. 
Therefore, the users of VaR and regulators should carefully consider the characteristics 
and risk nature of a portfolio before applying a model to obtain accurate VaR estimates. 
In order not to cause a moral hazard problem, regulators should carefully backtest the 
VaR models with alternative portfolios, as additional backtesting gives much more 
information on model accuracy that would not be evident otherwise. 
9.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
An interesting issue left for future study is whether the market risk capital regulations 
have any impact exclusively on banks' speculative derivative activities. Banks are 
involved in derivatives trading not only for- speculative purposes but also for hedging 
and dealing purposes. This indicates that an increase in derivative activities does not 
necessarily imply an increase in bank risk-taking when banks are involved in derivatives 
for hedging purposes. However, unavailability of detailed data that-separates the nature 
of derivative activities is a major limitation of this study. With more detailed data, 
analysing the impact of capital adequacy regulations on banks' speculative derivative 
transactions is left to the future research. 
In addition, the future work should determine the impact of the market risk capital 
regulations on bank capital levels and derivative activities on countries other than the 
US. Further empirical evidence on bank behaviour outside the US would be very useful 
in assessing other countries' experiences. 
Another limitation of the study is that 15 banks were included in the panel data analysis. 
The reason for employing only 15 banks in the sample is the limited number of banks 
that are subject to the market risk capital regulations in the US. Therefore, with more 
observations from the US, depending on the availability of data, repeating the study is 
another issue that is left to future research. 
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The data set that was used in the simulations only cover currencies from developed 
countries. Therefore, employing data from other countries, especially from emerging 
countries, would be an interesting study, which is also left for the future research. 
Finally, starting from 2007, Basel II will be implemented in the capital regulation 
framework. Analysing. the impact of these regulations would extend our knowledge of 
the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank behaviour. 
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Appendix 2.1: Derivative Instruments 
Derivative instruments are off-balance sheet items whose value depends on the value of 
an underlying asset, which could be a financial asset or commodity. There are four major 
types of derivatives, namely forwards, futures, options and swaps. These are briefly 
explained below: 
Forwards Forwards are contracts that oblige the holder to buy or sell a specific 
underlying to a specified price, quantity and date in the future. These 
contracts are usually not standardised as the terms of each contract are 
negotiated individually between buyers and sellers. Forwards are over- 
the-counter (OTC) instruments and there are no organised exchanges 
for trading forward contracts, i. e. there is no interposition of clearing 
house that guarantees the parties of contracts will satisfy their 
obligations. 
Futures A futures contract is a form of forward in that it conveys the right to 
buy or sell a specified commodity or a financial instrument at a fixed 
price on a future date. The essential feature of futures contracts is that 
they standardise the quantity of underlying asset to be delivered per 
contract, the underlying commodity or financial instrument, the 
minimum price movement and the period of the contract. Unlike 
forwards, futures are exchange-traded instruments. 
Options An option is a contract between two parties, conveying the right to buy 
or sell a certain amount of a specified financial instrument or 
commodity at a fixed price and at a specified future date or during a 
specified period of time. An option contract is essentially a forward or 
futures transaction with the important difference that the buyer of the 
option acquires the right, but not the obligation, to exercise the contract 
at his/her own discretion. For enjoying this right, or option, the buyer 
pays a price or premium to the seller when the contract is made. 
Options may be purchased and traded either on the organised 
exchanges or in the OTC markets. 
Swaps A swap is a contract between two parties. While in the currency swaps 
parties exchange principal and interest payments in different currencies 
over a stated time period, interest rate swap parties exchange interest 
obligations in the same currency on an agreed amount of notional 
principal for an agreed period of time. Swaps are OTC instruments. 
Appendix 2.2: FINANCIAL RISKS OF BANKS 
The financial risks that the banks face in their activities are as follows: 
Market Risk Market risk is the risk to an institution's financial condition 
resulting from adverse changes in the value of its holdings 
arising from movements in interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, equity prices, or commodity prices. These risks are 
explained in Appendix 2.4. 
Credit Risk Broadly defined, credit risk is the risk that a borrower, an issuer, 
or counterparty will fail to perform on an obligation to the 
institution. In managing credit risk, institutions should consider 
settlement and pre-settlement credit risk. These risks are the 
possibility that a counterparty will fail to honour its obligation at 
or before the time of settlement. 
Liquidity Risk Liquidity risk is the risk that an institution will be unable to 
meet its obligations as they come due because of an inability to 
liquidate assets or obtain adequate funding, or that it can not 
easily sell, unwind or offset a particular position at a fair price 
because of inadequate market dept. 
Country Risk Country risk is the risk that encompasses the entire spectrum of 
risks arising from the economic, social, and political 
environments of a foreign country that may have potential 
consequences for foreigner's dept and equity investments in that 
country. 
Operational Risk Operational risk (which is also defined as transaction risk) is the 
risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal controls 
will result in unexpected loss. Sources of operating risk include 
inadequate information systems, breaches in internal controls , human error, system failure, or fraud. 
Legal Risk Legal Risk is the risk that unenforceable contracts (contracts are 
not legally enforceable or documented correctly), lawsuits, or 
adverse judgements can disrupt or otherwise negatively affect 
the operations or condition of the institution. 
Reputational Risk Reputational risk is the risk that negative publicity about the 
institution will cause a decline in the customer base or revenue 
reductions (make this related to the investment portfolio) 
Source: www. federaireserve. gov Banking Supervision, Investment Portfolio Management Manual & 
FED Branch and Agency Examination Manual. 
Appendix 2.3: TYPES OF MARKET RISKS 
Interest-Rate Risk Interest-rate risk is the potential that changes in interest 
rates may adversely affect the value of a financial 
instrument or portfolio, or the condition of the institution as 
a whole. Risk in trading activities arises from open or 
unhedged positions and from imperfect correlations 
between offsetting positions. With regard to the interest rate 
risk, open positions arise most often from differences in the 
maturities or repricing dates of positions, and cash flows 
that are asset like (i. e. longs) and those that are liability like 
(i. e. shorts). 
Foreign-Exchange Risk Foreign-Exchange risk is the potential that movements in 
exchange rates may adversely affect the value of an 
institution's holdings and thus, its financial position. As 
with all market risks, foreign exchange risk arises from 
both open or imperfectly offset or hedged positions. 
Equity-Price Risk Equity-price risk is the potential for adverse changes in the 
value of an institution's equity related holdings. Price risks 
associated with equities are often classified into two 
categories: general (or undiversifiable) and specific (or 
diversifiable). General equity price risk refers to the 
sensitivity of an instrument's or portfolio's value to 
changes in the overall level of equity prices. As such, 
general risk cannot be reduced by diversifying one's 
holdings of equity instruments. Specific equity price risk 
refers to that portion of an individual equity instrument's 
price volatility that is determined by the firm specific 
characteristics. This risk is distinct from market wide price 
fluctuations and can be reduced by diversification across 
other equity instruments. 
Commodity-Price Risk Commodity price risk is the potential for- adverse changes 
in the value of an institution's commodity related holdings. 
Most commodities are traded in markets in which the 
concentration of supply can magnify price volatility. 
Moreover, fluctuations in market liquidity often accompany 
high price volatility. Therefore, commodity prices generally 
have higher volatilities and larger price discontinuities than 
most commonly traded financial assets. 
Source: www. federalreserve. gov, Banking Supervision, Investment Portfolio Management Manual & 
FED Branch and Agency Examination Manual. 
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Appendix 7.1: Disclosure Recommendations for Market Risk 
Market Risk - Qualitative Disclosures 
. Discuss the methods used to measure and manage market risk 
. Discuss how performance in managing market risk is assessed 
. Describe the major assumptions and parameters used by internal models necessary to 
understand an institution's market risk disclosures 
" Type of model used 
" Portfolios covered by the model 
" Holding period 
" Confidence level 
" Observation period 
. Discuss the method of aggregating risk exposures 
. Discuss the method used to recognise correlations between market factors (e. g. 
correlation assumptions) 
. Provide an overview of policies and procedures for validating internal models 
. Provide an overview of policies and procedures for back testing internal models 
. Provide an overview of policies and procedures for stress testing market risk 
. Discuss changes in market. risk exposure and risk management strategies from previous 
year 
Market Risk - Quantitative Disclosures 
. Provide summary quantitative information on market risk exposure based-on internal 
methods used for measurement, with information on performance in managing those risks 
. Provide daily information on profit and losses on trading activities, combined with daily 
value at risk numbers 
Provide summary VaR results on a weekly or monthly basis 
. For those disclosing VaR data, provide high / low VaR 
" For those disclosing VaR data, provide average VaR 
" Discuss the results of scenario analysis or impact of rate shocks for traded portfolios 
" Discuss the number of times (days) actual portfolio loss exceeded VaR 
" For non-traded portfolio: provide summary VaR or EaR 
" For non-traded portfolios: provide summary results of scenario analysis of 
impact of rate 
shocks 
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